Russia is reinforcing its glide bombs and electronic warfare, while the Su-57 and S-70 progress slowly. An adaptation to Ukrainian strikes.
Executive Summary
Russia is redirecting a portion of its military investments toward electronic jamming systems and UMPK glide bombs, while continuing the development of its Su-57 stealth fighters and S-70 Okhotnik-B heavy drones more slowly.
This evolution responds to the realities of the war in Ukraine. Russian forces must protect their infrastructure against increasingly deep Ukrainian strikes while maintaining considerable aerial pressure on the front line. In August 2026, they used 8,766 guided bombs, a record since the start of the invasion.
Sanctions complicate the supply of electronic components, but have not halted Russian military production.
Moscow now prioritizes relatively simple, rapidly manufactured, and immediately usable equipment. This is not an abandonment of offensive operations, but an industrial and tactical adaptation to a war of attrition that exposes the limits of the most ambitious aeronautical programs.
Russia Adapts Its Aerial Strategy to a War of Attrition
After more than four years of war, the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) continue to possess a significant strike capacity. However, they have never achieved complete control of the Ukrainian sky.
Patriot, SAMP/T, and S-300 surface-to-air systems, combined with Ukrainian radars and electronic warfare assets, force Russian aircraft to stay at a distance from many defended areas.
Moscow’s response relies on two complementary priorities: striking without directly exposing its aircraft and protecting its positions against Ukrainian drones.
The production of glide bombs is advancing rapidly. According to data from the Ukrainian General Staff, Russia employed 8,266 guided bombs in June 2026, then 8,766 in August, representing an average of 283 per day.
These volumes show that Russia maintains an offensive strategy. However, it seeks to reduce the cost and risks of each attack rather than systematically committing its most sophisticated fighters.
Russian Electronic Jamming Becomes an Industrial Priority
Electronic warfare consists of disrupting adversarial radio communications, radars, and navigation systems.
Russian forces notably use the R-330Zh Zhitel and Borisoglebsk-2 complexes to jam GNSS satellite navigation signals and certain communication links.
The recent development of the Volna Kupol Garant illustrates an evolution toward high-power directional jamming.
According to Reuters and Janes, this equipment uses multiple antennas to disrupt Starlink communications operated by Ukrainian forces, particularly for guiding drones.
Its announced operational coverage reaches approximately 20 km². Ukrainian officials have confirmed observing its effects on certain satellite links.
In August 2026, the Russian news agency TASS announced the launch of its serial production.
Technical Limits of High-Power Jammers
Emission power does not guarantee extensive protection.
Performance depends on the frequency used, antenna directivity, terrain, and the ability of adversarial receivers to resist interference.
The Volna Kupol Garant can locally disrupt Starlink communications, but Russian claims referring to a direct neutralization of satellites in orbit remain unproven.
This equipment also presents a vulnerability: its emissions can facilitate its localization.
According to the Swedish institute FOI, nearly a hundred Russian electronic warfare systems had been destroyed or captured prior to 2026, based on visually documented losses.
Russia must therefore produce more jammers to replace its losses and cover its sensitive installations.

UMPK Bombs Allow Striking at a Distance From the Front
UMPK (Universal Module of Planning and Correction) modules transform conventional FAB-250, FAB-500, or FAB-1500 bombs into guided glide munitions.
The principle is relatively simple. An assembly comprising deployable wings, control surfaces, and a navigation system is attached to an existing bomb.
After release, the munition travels several dozen kilometers without propulsion.
Initial versions possessed a range generally estimated between 60 and 70 km. The UMPK-PD variants, fitted with improved wings, can reach approximately 100 to 120 km under favorable conditions.
Their guidance combines inertial navigation and satellite corrections, notably thanks to Kometa anti-jamming antennas.
This operation must be distinguished from true remote guidance: documented UMPKs primarily follow programmed coordinates. Continuous piloting by an operator or a general capability to change targets in flight are not established.
Their economic advantage is considerable. The Joint Air Power Competence Centre estimates the cost of a standard module at approximately $20,000, excluding the bomb and integration.
Su-34s constitute the main vectors for these munitions. Other aircraft, notably Sukhoi Su-30s and certain Su-24s, can also carry various Russian guided bombs.
The Su-57 Progresses but Remains Produced in Limited Quantities
The Sukhoi Su-57 Felon program highlights the difficulties encountered by the Russian aviation industry.
In 2019, Moscow ordered 76 fifth-generation fighters, with a delivery target set for 2028.
Production continues at the Komsomolsk-on-Amur plant. Rostec announced a new delivery on September 24, 2026, without specifying the number of aircraft involved.
Estimates vary widely.
The Russian center CAST mentions 48 Su-57s produced between 2020 and 2025, while the British Royal United Services Institute evaluated the fleet at approximately 20 aircraft at the end of 2025.
These discrepancies reveal the absence of public data allowing precise verification of industrial rates.
The development of new engines and avionics remains complex. The Su-57 still mainly uses the AL-41F1 engine, while new engine options continue their trials.
Russia therefore continues to develop its stealth fighter, but its large-scale production remains uncertain for those seeking to experience modern fighter jets.
The S-70 Okhotnik-B Drone Continues to Face Technical Difficulties
The S-70 Okhotnik-B constitutes the other major Russian aeronautical program whose rate increase is slow to materialize.
Developed by Sukhoi, this uncrewed aircraft features a flying wing configuration designed to reduce its radar signature.
Its first flight dates back to August 2019. It was intended notably to operate with the Su-57 as a collaborative reconnaissance and strike platform.
On October 5, 2024, an S-70 crashed near Kostiantynivka, in eastern Ukraine, after likely being shot down by an accompanying Russian aircraft.
The exact circumstances of this destruction remain partially uncertain. Nevertheless, it exposed the vulnerability of a program that is still experimental.
Ukrainian analysis of the debris also revealed components produced by Analog Devices, Texas Instruments, Infineon, and STMicroelectronics.
As of October 2026, no operational mass production of the S-70 is publicly confirmed.
Sanctions and Ukrainian Strikes Weaken Russian Industry
Russia still possesses significant industrial capabilities. Western sanctions, however, complicate the procurement of semiconductors, optical equipment, precision machine tools, and aeronautical components.
According to Chatham House, Russian industry remains dependent on foreign suppliers for several advanced technologies.
Moscow bypasses part of these restrictions through parallel imports, commercial intermediaries, and Chinese supplies.
These solutions allow manufacturing to be maintained, but they can increase costs, extend deadlines, and complicate quality control.
The question of industrial concealment also arises. The Russians disperse certain stocks, camouflage their equipment, and strengthen the protection of sensitive installations. However, nothing demonstrates a general transfer of aeronautical production lines to clandestine sites.
Ukrainian Strikes Now Reach Bases and Factories
Ukrainian attacks aggravate these constraints.
On October 4, 2026, the Security Service of Ukraine claimed strikes against a Su-35 and a Su-34 at the Khanskaya base, located approximately 500 km from Ukrainian territory.
On October 15, Kyiv announced it had damaged six Su-34Ms at Borisoglebsk. Reuters verified satellite imagery showing destruction at the base, without being able to independently confirm the condition of each aircraft.
Industrial facilities are also targeted. In September, Ukraine claimed a strike against the Azov optomechanical plant, which notably produces equipment for guided missiles.
According to the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 321 Ukrainian impacts were documented in September 2026 on Russian territory and in occupied areas.
These operations force Moscow to devote more resources to protecting its bases, stocks, and factories.
Russia Prioritizes Sustainable Firepower Over Sophistication
The Russian redirection does not mean a general shift to the defensive.
On the Ukrainian front, Moscow maintains considerable offensive pressure. UMPK bombs serve notably to destroy fortifications, disrupt logistical routes, and support ground assaults.
Electronic warfare protects Russian forces, but it also contributes to their offensive operations by disrupting adversarial communications and navigation.
The true evolution concerns industrial priorities.
A relatively simple UMPK module can be manufactured quickly. A Su-57 requires complex engines, advanced radars, specific materials, and several years of development.
In a war of attrition, these differences become decisive.
Russia thus appears to prioritize equipment capable of producing immediate military effects, even if it slows down the modernization of its combat aviation.
This strategy has a limitation: glide bombs and jammers do not replace the capabilities of a stealth fighter in a confrontation against modern aviation or professional jet fighter training programs.
Moscow can prolong its offensive power without rapidly modernizing its fleet. But this priority given to immediate needs risks widening its technological gap in the long term.
The evolution of the conflict will now depend as much on Ukrainian capabilities to strike Russian infrastructure as on Moscow’s ability to repair, protect, and renew its industrial apparatus for a complete fighter jet flight experience.
