After Starlink was blocked on the Russian side, Moscow is testing “5G” relay balloons to fill a capacity gap. Is this a technical gamble or a stopgap measure?
In summary
Russia has lost a discreet but now crucial advantage on the front: “illegal” access to Starlink via smuggled terminals. The implementation of a whitelist and the deactivation of equipment suspected of being in Russian hands created an immediate hole in data links. This shock affects tactical coordination, fire control, and above all the drone ecosystem, where conventional radio is jammed and terrestrial networks are fragile. In response, Moscow is promoting Barrage-1, a stratospheric balloon capable of carrying 100 kg at an altitude of 20 km, with the idea of a 5G NTN relay to cover large areas without relying on an orbiting constellation. But a balloon cannot replace a global LEO network: many would need to be deployed, coverage would be less stable, and there would be a real military vulnerability to manage. At the same time, Bureau 1440‘s Rassvet project promises a national alternative, but its timeline and cost suggest that Russia is primarily looking for a technological “bridge” rather than a definitive solution.
The Starlink shock on the front line: an undeclared dependency
Since 2022, Ukraine has shown how high-speed, mobile, and relatively hardened Internet access can transform the conduct of operations. This is not a matter of convenience. It is combat infrastructure: video streaming from drones, position sharing, artillery coordination, logistics, and synchronization of dispersed units.
The key point is density and simplicity: a terminal deployed in minutes, a compact antenna, and connectivity that follows movements. In an environment saturated with electronic warfare, where tactical radio can be jammed or geolocated, having a stable data link is a game changer. The War Zone sums up the impact well: the access restriction affected “command at the highest level” down to basic data exchanges across the theater.
The cut: what SpaceX actually blocked
The story “SpaceX cuts off Russia” deserves to be set straight. Starlink does not officially operate in Russia. The issue is one of illicit use on the battlefield, particularly via terminals smuggled in through contraband channels. According to The Guardian, Moscow relied on “thousands” of smuggled terminals (often via Central Asia), used by Russian units to stay connected when radios were too fragile or too jammed.
The new development in early February 2026 is a control mechanism: the creation of a list of “verified” terminals and the deactivation of non-compliant equipment. In other words, the solution is not an abstract “geographical cut-off.” It is an operational lockdown: if a terminal is not on the whitelist, it becomes silent.
The War Zone describes this switch as a move to a list of “verified users” that has “thrown Russian troops into disarray.”
Russia’s capacity gap: when radio is no longer enough
Russia does not have “zero communications.” It has radios, microwave links, fiber where possible, and a satellite base. The problem is one of performance and usage.
- First, mobility: a fiber link is powerful, but it deploys slowly, is easily cut, and cannot follow a moving unit.
- Next, resilience: radios and tactical Wi-Fi bridges are often easier to jam, intercept, or detect.
- Finally, data: drone and sensor warfare requires heavier data flows (video, mapping, commands, sensor feedback).
In this context, Starlink had provided the Russians with a paradoxical but real Western technological “crutch.” And the loss of this crutch has a mechanical effect on very concrete uses. The War Zone cites, for example, the impact on drones and even on certain unmanned ground vehicles, arguing that Russian UGVs depended on Starlink to operate.
The Barrage-1 gamble: a balloon-borne data relay
This is where Barrage-1 comes in. According to the Foundation for Advanced Studies cited by The War Zone, the system is designed to carry up to 100 kg of payload at an altitude of 20 km. The stated idea is to test “promising” 5G NTN communication equipment.
TechRadar summarizes the Russian logic: after setbacks in space (and the Starlink effect), Moscow is “betting” on a network of balloon relays at an altitude of around 20 km, with one obvious Achilles’ heel: the wind.
The technical logic of a stratospheric relay
A stratospheric balloon, at 20 km, can see far. By simple geometry, the radio horizon (line of sight) can exceed 500 km in radius under ideal conditions. This represents a very wide potential coverage on paper, especially for connecting units in a given area.
The concept is therefore that of a “flying cell tower”:
- the balloon carries radio equipment (in this case, a non-terrestrial 5G layer);
- ground units connect to the balloon rather than to a tower;
- the balloon then sends the traffic back to an exit point (gateway) via a return link (radio, microwave, or satellite).
The key point to understand is that a balloon does not “create” the internet. It creates a bubble of local connectivity. The real difficulty lies in the backhaul (the exit path) and the ability to maintain consistent coverage.
The maneuver: staying in the right place without an engine
The War Zone explains that Barrage-1 would use a pneumatic ballast system to change altitude and exploit different wind layers in order to drift in a desired direction or remain in an area for a “sufficient” amount of time. TechRadar emphasizes this constraint: wind complicates sustained coverage of an area such as Ukraine.
This means that Russia is not necessarily looking for “one balloon” but a cluster of balloons, networked, capable of compensating for drifts and maintaining continuity of service.
Vulnerability: a slow target, a talkative transmitter
A balloon at 20 km is not untouchable. Even if it can be difficult to detect based on its signature, it remains a relatively slow object and, above all, a transmitter. As soon as it relays data, it “speaks” in the spectrum.
The War Zone cites the idea that systems such as the S-300 can engage targets between 20 and 30 km in altitude (12 to 19 miles). The debate is not theoretical: “being able to engage” does not mean “easily engaging” a weakly visible balloon, but it does remind us that the platform is not immune. And anti-drone defense or long-range drone interception is not impossible either, especially if location is facilitated by emissions.
Russian alternatives: a space schedule that does not match the urgency
Faced with Starlink, the real “symmetry” would be a national LEO constellation: wide coverage, low latency, and inter-satellite mesh capabilities. Russia is pushing this idea with Rassvet.
Bureau 1440’s Rassvet project: the strategic option, not the immediate option
The War Zone reports that the first batch of 16 broadband satellites, initially planned for late 2025, has been postponed to 2026, with only six experimental satellites already in orbit to test, in particular, inter-satellite laser links and 5G compatibility.
In terms of budget, Le Parisien cites a total cost of close to €5 billion, with 102.8 billion rubles (approximately €1.1 billion) already allocated, and an additional €3.7 billion from equity funds by 2030.
Even if the project is successful, it will remain far from Starlink’s scale in the short term. To give an idea of the scale of the asymmetry, Space.com reports that by February 2026, the number of active Starlink satellites will exceed 9,600.
GEO satellites and “parabolic” solutions: useful, but structurally limited
Russian operators such as Gazprom Space Systems have geostationary satellites that can provide connectivity. But geostationary satellites impose high latency and more limited capacity. The Guardian notes that these solutions exist, but on a small scale, with coverage and capacity that cannot compete with Starlink.
Technically, latency is not a minor detail: a GEO connection often exceeds 600 ms, while a Starlink-type LEO connection is more in the range of a few tens of milliseconds. For remote control, video, and rapid decision loops, this changes the quality of use.
The drones concerned: what the loss of Starlink really breaks
The question “what types of drones” does not refer to a single family. It refers to a system of systems.
- FPV and tactical quadcopters: they do not need Starlink to fly, but they depend on a decision-making and video-sharing chain that benefits from a robust data network.
- Heavier reconnaissance drones: long-duration video, image relay, and distributed operations become more complicated when data flows poorly.
- Long-range drones and loitering munitions: planning, retargeting, and coordination links are penalized. The War Zone mentions the effect on “long-range aerial weapons” and drone warfare as a whole.
- Offensive DIY projects: The Guardian reports that Russian units have reportedly begun installing Starlink terminals on drones, which improves accuracy and complicates electronic disruption.
The outage does not “ground” the drones. It degrades speed, reliability, and coordination. And in a war of attrition, these losses in performance end up being costly.
The real issue: communications resilience, not a technological gadget
The balloon is not a futuristic fad. It is an attempt at resilience, with an implicit budgetary logic: to quickly create a “good enough” capability without waiting for a costly and slow national LEO constellation.
But let’s be honest: Barrage-1 is more like a smart band-aid than a replacement.
- To provide long-term coverage over a large area, multiple platforms are needed and maintenance in the area must be managed.
- To survive, detectability must be reduced, the supply chain must be protected, and the loss of some balloons must be accepted.
- To provide true connectivity, a robust backhaul is needed, which means falling back on satellite, beam, or terrestrial technology.
Ultimately, the Starlink episode reveals a strategic reality: superiority no longer depends solely on tanks, shells, or missiles. It depends on the network architecture that connects sensors, effectors, and decision-makers. When this architecture depends on a foreign private actor, even indirectly, it becomes a political and operational vulnerability. Russia is trying to eliminate this vulnerability in the short term with balloons and in the long term with Rassvet. Ukraine, for its part, has just shown that a simple access control mechanism can tip the balance of an entire segment of the battlefield.
Sources
- The War Zone, “Russia Eyes Balloon Communications System To Fill Massive Gap Left After Losing Starlink,” February 18, 2026.
- The Guardian, “Russian military scrambles to find Starlink alternative after access blocked,” February 9, 2026.
- TechRadar, “Russia is launching a stratospheric balloon relay network…,” February 20, 2026.
- Le Parisien, “Russia: the launch of the Rassvet satellites…,” January 24, 2026.
- Space.com, “Double delivery: SpaceX sends Starlink satellites…,” February 17, 2026 (published “4 days ago”).
- UCLouvain, “A First Look at Starlink Performance” (paper, 2022).
- Wikipedia, “Starlink” (GEO/LEO latency section, accessed February 2026).
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