Baykar tests the Kızılelma with Aselsan’s KARAT IRST. A passive sensor that changes the way stealth aircraft are hunted and the approach logic.
Summary
On January 2, 2026, Baykar officially announced a landmark test: the final test flight of 2025 for the Kızılelma combat drone was carried out with the integration of Aselsan’s KARAT IRST. This infrared sensor, designed for air-to-air search and tracking, enables passive detection. It tracks a target without emitting waves, thus without “turning on” a radar that would betray the drone’s presence. The challenge is clear: to improve the ability to detect low RCS targets (low radar signature), including 5th generation fighters, by exploiting their thermal signature and infrared contrasts. This milestone does not make a drone “invisible” or IRST “magical.” But it reinforces a major trend: counter-stealth is increasingly relying on passive sensors, data fusion, and discreet approach tactics.
The news announced by Baykar and what it really means
Baykar did not just announce “another” flight. The message is more specific: the Kızılelma flew with a sensor brick that changes its tactical posture. With an IRST, the drone can observe the sky without giving off a signal that can be exploited by an enemy radar warning receiver. This is the logic behind the radar-silent approach.
Let’s be honest. The announcement is also an industrial credibility operation. Baykar is showing that it is not just working on a airframe and an engine. It is working on the entire chain: sensors, processing, integration, and use. This is where military value comes into play.
Another point is also important. Integration is not just a matter of connection. A useful IRST requires fine alignment, calibration, cooling, mechanical stability, and above all, software logic for tracking and identification. This is what transforms a thermal image into actionable tracking data.
The role of an IRST in the face of stealth, without slogans
An IRST does not “see” stealth avionics the way a radar would see an echo. It works on infrared. It looks for a difference in temperature, an engine plume, a heated leading edge, or a contrast with the sky. The key word is sensor fusion. Alone, an IRST can detect. But the quality of tracking depends on the context: weather, humidity, clouds, angle, distance, thermal background, altitude.
What IRST brings to the table against a stealth fighter is simple and hard to dispute: stealth is primarily optimized against radar. It does not erase heat. It manages it, reduces it, and partially masks it. But it does not cancel it out. When approaching, an IRST can therefore provide an initial track. And this track can be used to guide a tactic: positioning, reducing distance, coordinating other sensors, or preparing a shot.
Limits must also be set. IRST is less “universal” than radar. Its performance depends heavily on the atmosphere. And identification is more delicate. Seeing an infrared source does not automatically mean “it’s an F-35.” IRST is powerful, but it requires method.
The Kızılelma as a platform and what the figures tell us
On paper, Baykar presents the Kızılelma as a multi-role, low-observability combat drone with internal payload capacity and missions that go beyond those of a simple attack drone. The public data provided by the manufacturer gives an idea of the target: payload 1.5 tons, maximum takeoff weight 8.5 tons, cruising speed Mach 0.6, maximum speed Mach 0.9, combat radius 500 nautical miles, operational ceiling 7,600 m (25,000 ft).
Although some of these values may change during testing, they indicate an ambition: to remain in the area longer than a missile, to go further than a light drone, and to maneuver in contested airspace. The advantage of an IRST in this context is clear: it gives the drone surveillance and interception capabilities that do not rely solely on active radar.
The Kızılelma is also intended for naval use. The idea of operations from TCG Anadolu is central to Turkish communications: a combat drone, capable of short takeoff, which supports power projection without relying on a conventional carrier-based fighter. In this logic, passive detection is even more important. At sea, electromagnetic discretion is an obsession.
The tactical logic behind “not turning on the radar”
To say that IRST makes a drone “undetectable” is too simplistic. What is true is something else: not emitting reduces a family of signatures. Active radar is detectable. An IRST is not detectable in the same way. This complicates the opponent’s life, especially if the space is saturated and several platforms are cooperating.
This is where electronic warfare comes into play. In a jammed environment, radar can lose its effectiveness. A passive sensor, on the other hand, is not “jammed” in the same way. It can be deceived, saturated, or lured, but it’s not the same battle. Infrared decoys, thermal screens, and certain altitude tactics play a role. But IRST offers an alternative when radar is contested.
For a drone, the gain is also doctrinal. It can be sent ahead as a scout without “turning on” a beam. It can generate a track, share it, and let another actor take the final action. This leads to a modern obsession: information superiority before firepower superiority.
What this step brings to Turkey and its industry
This integration sends a message to the outside world, but also internally. Turkey wants to demonstrate that its champions know how to assemble critical building blocks: platforms, sensors, software. This is the Turkish defense industry at its most visible: reducing dependencies, accelerating test cycles, and transforming prototypes into exportable capabilities.
In this scenario, Aselsan is also a winner. A sensor like KARAT needs a showcase. Integrating it into a high-profile program gives it commercial credibility. It’s a classic logic: a sensor only really exists on the market when it is seen in flight, on an ambitious carrier, and in an operational narrative.
There is also a political dimension. Turkey remains marked by the F-35 issue and a desire for strategic autonomy. Strengthening the “counter-stealth” arsenal on a national system is consistent, even if it does not replace a complete air defense ecosystem.
Real counter-stealth: sensors, networks, and blind spots
Modern counter-stealth is not an IRST versus F-35 duel. It is a system. It combines different types of sensors, various frequencies, ground stations, airborne platforms, and algorithms. Passive sensors are part of the equation, but they do not complete it.
Where the integration of the KARAT IRST can hurt a stealth target is in creating permanent doubt. If the adversary does not know when it is being passively “seen,” it must behave as if it were. This influences trajectories, altitudes, radar activation times, and thermal management. It is a strategic constraint, not a gadget.
The other point is industrial: the more sensors a drone carries, the more it has to process, filter, and correlate. This requires computers, links, and architecture. When Baykar shows a sensor milestone, it also says that it is making progress on this architecture.
Baykar’s gamble: a combat drone that fits into the “loyal wingman” trend
In the air, the trajectory is clear: air forces want swarms, escort drones, sensor carriers, communication relays, and effectors. The Kızılelma is part of this race for the loyal wingman. IRST reinforces this posture: capture, share, and let other platforms act.
This point is important in evaluating the announcement. The Kızılelma does not need to “beat” a stealth fighter on its own. It needs to contribute to a tactical picture and an engagement chain. An integrated IRST is a credible building block in this role, especially if data links and fusion follow.
What remains to be proven after this flight
Even a successful test flight does not answer three essential questions.
The first is the actual range in difficult conditions. The second is the robustness of the track: how many false positives, how well does it follow maneuvers, how does it perform in humidity and above a warm ground background? The third is tactical integration: how does the system cooperate with other sensors, how does it prioritize, how does it feed into a decision?
This is where the discourse must remain sober. IRST is a serious advance. But the gap between “integrated” and “combat-ready” is often long. If Baykar continues to conduct public tests, it is precisely because credibility is built over time, not in a press release.
And now, the interesting question is not “can the Kızılelma see the F-35?” The right question is more uncomfortable: how many passive sensors and connected platforms are needed to make stealth less decisive than it was ten years ago? In this area, the integration of the KARAT IRST is an important milestone.
Sources
- Baykar, Bayraktar KIZILELMA product page
- ASELSAN, KARAT (IRST) product sheet
- Combat Aircraft, “Kizilelma… first test flight with Aselsan’s KARAT IRST” (January 2, 2026)
- TurDef, “Baykar’s KIZILELMA Makes First Flight with KARAT IRST” (December 31, 2025)
- Türkiye Today, article on the flight with KARAT IRST (January 2026)
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