NATO has decided to increase its defense spending to 5% of GDP by 2035. Who will pay, how much, and for what? Air defense on the eastern flank is in the spotlight.
In summary
In mid-February, NATO defense ministers endorsed a policy shift: the Alliance is no longer talking only about the 2% threshold, but about a target of 5% of GDP by 2035, with a “change of mindset” called for by the Secretary General. The target is structured in two blocks: at least 3.5% for “core” military needs (capabilities, forces, stocks) and up to 1.5% for defense-related spending in the broader sense (resilience, critical infrastructure, cyber, industry). At the same time, NATO is highlighting an operational priority: strengthening integrated air defense on the eastern flank, as Ukraine has demonstrated the real intensity of the threat (drones, cruise missiles, ballistics) and the speed at which stocks are being depleted. For member countries, the debate is no longer theoretical: maintaining 5% requires unprecedented budget increases, fiscal and social trade-offs, and a credible industrial strategy, otherwise the money will not translate into capabilities.
The 5% shift and what NATO has really decided
The key point is that NATO no longer presents 2% as the horizon. Since the 2025 summit in The Hague, the Alliance has set a more ambitious target: to invest 5% of GDP per year by 2035, combining military spending and security-related spending in the broadest sense. In February 2026, the Secretary General spoke of a “shift in mindset” and emphasized that the Allies were already moving faster than expected.
This two-tier architecture matters politically and technically. It puts pressure on “pure” defense budgets, but it also opens a door: part of the effort can be channeled into resilience, infrastructure, network protection, and industrial strengthening. In other words, the 5% does not mean “5% to buy tanks.” It means national mobilization, where defense becomes a structuring policy, like energy or health.
We must also be clear-headed: a target for 2035 is not an automatic law. It is a trajectory to be negotiated each year, in unstable political contexts. The real question is the credibility of national plans and the ability to convert a budget increase into forces that are actually available.
The mechanics of 3.5% and 1.5%: a budgetary break
NATO specifies that Allies must reach at least 3.5% of GDP according to NATO’s definition of defense spending in order to finance “core defense requirements” and meet “NATO Capability Targets.” The remainder, up to 1.5%, covers defense and security spending: critical infrastructure protection, network defense, civil preparedness, innovation, and industrial base.
This detail changes the debate in capitals. Until now, the discussion has often focused on “reaching 2%.” At 5%, the discussion becomes “which specific items fall within the scope, and which items should be ring-fenced.” The higher the target, the greater the temptation to broaden the definition to make the goal “politically feasible.” But if broadening the definition becomes a workaround, the Alliance faces a paradox: posting 5% while lacking ammunition and air defense systems.
This is where NATO insists on the capability-based approach: money must produce measurable results. This means ready forces, stocks, sustainable rotations, maintenance chains, and an industry capable of delivering quickly.
The priority on the flank is: air defense becomes the litmus test
On the ground, the most obvious priority is air defense. NATO emphasizes Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) because the flank is where the risks are concentrated: proximity to Russia, density of threats, and the need to reassure countries living under constant pressure.
The war in Ukraine has highlighted a brutal reality: interception is expensive, and the adversary can overwhelm the system. A low-cost drone can force the launch of a very expensive interceptor. And even when you have the right systems, you can run out of missiles, radars, parts, or personnel.
NATO is therefore pushing for a “multi-layered” approach: sensors, command and control, and several levels of interceptors, from very short to long range. The flagship systems cited in European debates are Patriot and SAMP/T. But the real key is integration: an isolated battery is not enough; you need a network, coordination rules, and robust data links.
Concrete programs: NATO is trying to accelerate without reinventing the wheel
Beyond the declarations, February 2026 shows some very concrete building blocks. In particular, NATO has announced a “High Visibility Project” in which seven Allies, including France, are cooperating to strengthen defense against ballistic missiles, with sensors, interceptors, and tactical control systems. This approach has two objectives: to pool resources and to accelerate progress.
In the same spirit, the Alliance is promoting production and innovation. The message is simple: if industry does not follow suit, the 5% target becomes budgetary inflation with no military effect. Hence the multinational initiatives and the pressure to standardize, purchase jointly, and secure supply chains.
This dynamic is not isolated. In Europe, parallel initiatives are emerging to develop low-cost interceptors and anti-drone solutions, with very short industrial horizons. This is a direct response to the cost/attrition equation observed in Ukraine.
The implications for France: the gap in figures, without illusions
To understand the impact, we need to look at the orders of magnitude.
In France, public data compiled by vie-publique indicates that in 2025, the national defense effort (total expenditure) will reach €62 billion for a provisional GDP of €3,005 billion, or 2.06% of GDP.
Moving to 5% on the same GDP basis means targeting around €150 billion per year. The gap is around €88 billion extra per year, an increase of close to +142% compared to the 2025 level.
Even if GDP grows between now and 2035, the conclusion remains the same: this is a change of scale. It is not a “small step.” It is a rethinking of budget priorities, or a change in the rules of financing, or both.
And France’s public finances are not in a neutral position. The greater the effort required, the more the question becomes: which expenditures should be slowed down, which taxes raised, or what level of debt accepted? There is no accounting magic.
What would the money be used for: stocks, capabilities, and a sustainable army
If the objective is serious, the expected use is clear.
First, rebuild stocks. Ukraine has shown that the consumption of ammunition in high-intensity warfare is nothing like the “limited edition” models of previous decades. Without stocks, a modern army can be immobilized very quickly.
Next, accelerate ground-to-air defense. The needs relate to radars, launchers, missiles, and above all the ability to maintain and regenerate. You can buy a battery, but if maintenance, parts, and training don’t follow, availability collapses.
Finally, strengthen resilience: critical infrastructure, cybersecurity, logistical continuity, network protection. This is where the “1.5%” bloc can be useful, provided it does not become a catch-all.
For France, these themes already overlap with the logic of war economy and programming priorities: modernization, availability, industrial acceleration, and transformation of detection and interception capabilities (including anti-drone warfare).
Political risks: too high a target can have the opposite effect
Let’s be blunt: aiming for 5% is a risky political gamble.
The first risk is internal division. In many democracies, defense spending competes directly with health, education, and social protection. At 2%, tensions exist. At 5%, it becomes structural and electorally explosive.
The second risk is “creative accounting.” The higher the target, the more tempting it will be for some governments to include expenditures that do not actually improve combat capability. This would result in flattering figures and unchanged armies.
The third risk is industrial overheating. If everyone places orders at the same time, prices rise, lead times lengthen, and programs cannibalize each other. Money can then buy less, not more.
The strategic signal: air defense as a message to Moscow
The choice of integrated air defense on the eastern flank is not only military. It is a strategic signal: NATO wants to make the protection of allied territory credible in the face of saturation strikes and hybrid threats.
This signal has two targets.
In the East, it aims to complicate Russia’s calculations and deter any escalation. In the West, it aims to convince public opinion that the effort required is not abstract, but linked to a concrete vulnerability: European skies are no longer a “given,” they are a technological front line.
And this is probably where the 5% trajectory will play out. If citizens see visible, integrated, and useful capabilities, the effort can hold. If the effort looks like an opaque budget increase, it will fail.
Sources
- NATO, “NATO Secretary General hails ‘shift in mindset’ in Allied deterrence and defense,” February 12, 2026
- NATO, “Defense expenditures and NATO’s 5% commitment,” December 18, 2025
- NATO, “NATO Allies launch new multinational capability cooperation initiatives, expand existing projects,” February 12, 2026
- NATO, “Opening remarks by the NATO Secretary General at the Meeting of NATO Ministers of Defense,” February 12, 2026
- NATO, “Defense Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014-2025),” compendium (estimates for 2024-2025)
- vie-publique.fr, “Defense budget: what steps are needed to bring it to 5% of GDP in 2035?” August 26, 2025
- European Commission, document on defense investment needs related to NATO commitments (core spending 3.5% of GDP), October 16, 2025
- Reuters, “Europe’s main military powers to develop low-cost air-defense systems,” February 20, 2026
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