The Pentagon is creating a counter-UAS marketplace to quickly equip US bases and agencies in response to the rise in drone incursions.
Summary
The Pentagon is setting up an online purchasing portal presented as an internal “Amazon” dedicated to anti-drone defense equipment. Led by JIATF-401, an interagency task force headed by the US Army, this portal will enable base commanders, the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security, and police forces to identify, compare, and order anti-drone sensors and effectors, with standardized feedback. This initiative comes as the commander of NORAD/NORTHCOM acknowledged approximately 350 drone incursions on about 100 military installations in 2024, and more than 27,000 detections within a 500-meter radius along the southern border in the second half of the year. The global market for anti-drone systems, estimated at around $2.5 to $3 billion (approximately €2.3 to €2.7 billion) in 2025, is growing at an annual rate of more than 25%. The Pentagon is therefore seeking to streamline previously scattered purchases, improve technical interoperability, and fill legal gaps that still limit the ability of bases to neutralize drones above their own perimeter.
An anti-drone defense portal inspired by e-commerce
The core of the project is to create a counter-UAS marketplace accessible to federal and local actors concerned by the threat of drones. The idea is simple on paper: a secure website, online catalog, detailed product descriptions, comparisons, user reviews, just like a large consumer e-commerce platform. Except that in this case, the products are not headphones but short-range radars, radio frequency sensors, electro-optical cameras, and radio or kinetic effectors.
The JIATF-401 (Joint Interagency Task Force-401), created in the summer of 2025, has an allocation capacity of approximately $50 million per initiative, or nearly €46 million, to accelerate the deployment of anti-drone capabilities. It can partially bypass the traditional, cumbersome, and slow procurement procedures that make the US bureaucratic apparatus unable to keep pace with the proliferation of commercial and military drones. The portal is intended to serve as a single point of entry, whereas today each service still purchases its solutions through its own channels.
This initiative responds to a reality that has become difficult to ignore. According to figures released to Congress, approximately 350 drone incursions were detected above or near a hundred US military bases in 2024. Incidents around Langley, Wright-Patterson, Vandenberg, and Picatinny Arsenal have shown that these devices can observe aircraft, map procedures, or test defense responses, without the authorities always having the right or the technical means to neutralize them immediately.
The Pentagon is therefore taking a pragmatic approach: rather than claiming to have a universal system, it accepts the coexistence of a multitude of specialized tools, but wants to make them visible, comparable, and objectively evaluated. Behind the marketing vocabulary of the “marketplace,” the implicit message is clear: without standardization and pooling of resources, the money spent on anti-drone defense will continue to be misused.
A modular architecture for counter-UAS systems
The portal should not only list “finished products,” but above all modular technological building blocks. The goal is to abandon the logic of the “monolithic system” in favor of an assembly of interchangeable components: radars, EO/IR cameras, radio receivers, non-kinetic or kinetic effectors with low collateral risk, and data fusion software.
In concrete terms, a base commander or DHS official will be able to consult data sheets detailing detection range in kilometers, angular accuracy, false alarm rate, reaction time, power consumption, and total cost of ownership in dollars and euros per year. Performance will be documented according to standardized test protocols, in variable weather conditions, in urban or rural areas, against drones of different sizes and signatures. This database is intended to be “authoritative,” i.e., enforceable, to avoid purely commercial discourse.
The kits deployed by NORTHCOM provide an overview of this modular logic. The “flyaway kits” include, for example, the Heimdal mobile sensor, a radar and thermal optics with 360° coverage on a trailer, the Anduril Anvil interceptor drone chain, the Pulsar electronic warfare effector, and the Wisp wide-field infrared system. Together, they provide a detection and neutralization bubble covering several kilometers around a facility, with autonomous engagement capability against small drones.
Globally, the anti-drone systems market is growing at a rate of 25 to nearly 30% per year, according to studies, from around $2.5 to $3 billion (€2.3 to €2.7 billion) in 2025 to more than $30 billion (around €28 billion) by 2034. North America already accounts for more than 40% of the volume. Manufacturers—Anduril, DroneShield, EOS, startups specializing in compact radars—are competing to offer more sensitive sensors and more accurate effectors. The Pentagon portal is, in fact, becoming a tool for selection and pressure in this market: solutions that do not pass the technical filter of the counter-UAS marketplace will have little chance of success.
This deliberate choice of modularity has a direct consequence: it forces manufacturers to design open interfaces. The promise to users is clear: assemble a radar from manufacturer A, a radio receiver from manufacturer B, and an effector from manufacturer C, without having to reinvent the integration each time. In a sector where the temptation to lock in proprietary technology remains strong, this is anything but trivial.
Unified command, but very rapid local responses
JIATF-401 does not just list equipment. It also works to streamline the command and control (C2) systems used for counter-drone warfare. During Operation Clear Horizon, all the major mission command systems of the various branches of the armed forces were tested and compared, both in terms of measurable performance and the fluidity of decision-making chains.
The implicit conclusion is unsurprising: each service has developed its own tool, with its own data formats, screens, and procedures. This leads to laborious integration whenever a new sensor or a new means of neutralization needs to be added. The goal now is to define common communication protocols, based on the model used for domestic Wi-Fi networks: when a new sensor arrives, it must automatically announce itself to the system, share its data in known formats, and allow itself to be controlled without specific development.
The challenge is twofold. On the one hand, a unified C2 system makes it possible to build a coherent “air view,” integrating military radars, civilian sensors, radio monitoring, passive systems, and external data. On the other hand, the task force insists on the need to leave control in the hands of local operators. A small drone can appear and reach a target in a matter of seconds. If every decision requires hierarchical approval and political green light, the defense is already overwhelmed.
This is a politically sensitive issue. A NORAD general acknowledged before Congress that the limitations of current authorities sometimes prevent a base commander from acting immediately, even when a drone is flying over sensitive infrastructure. Hence the stated desire to expand and clarify the scope for action under law 130i, which currently governs the protection of certain facilities against drones. As long as these ambiguities persist, the best anti-drone defense remains partially disarmed.
The truth is brutal: sensor and effector technology is advancing rapidly, but coordination between actors, decision-making processes, and the legal framework are lagging behind. It is this gap that JIATF-401 is trying to bridge, with a combination of software harmonization and strengthened local responsibilities.
Rapid response kits and layered base defense
The rapid response kits, or flyaway kits, deployed by NORTHCOM embody a concrete approach to layered defense. These kits, which can be transported by C-130, can be deployed within 24 hours to a base facing a drone threat that it cannot control. They combine mobile radar detection, panoramic thermal surveillance, radio monitoring, electronic warfare, and autonomous interception.
In practical terms, the Heimdal mobile sensor scans the airspace at 360° to detect low-altitude drones, sometimes only a few dozen centimeters away. The Wisp system provides wide-field infrared surveillance aided by artificial intelligence algorithms, capable of simultaneously tracking multiple echoes. The Pulsar effector intercepts, tracks, classifies, and jams radio links between drones and operators, sometimes forcing them to land or return to their point of departure. Finally, Anduril Anvil interceptor drones fly up to intercept and physically neutralize the targeted aircraft in flight, aiming for a direct impact or controlled contact.
These kits are not a miracle solution. Currently, only a few strategic sites have them, while the United States has more than 350 large military installations. Furthermore, even though non-explosive effectors limit collateral damage, neutralizing a drone over a densely populated area remains risky: falling debris, radio jamming affecting other systems, misidentification. The authorities are aware of this, but the alternative—allowing unknown drones to fly over laboratories, ammunition depots, or fighter squadrons—is considered even more dangerous.
Official data shows a clear increase in the phenomenon. In addition to the 350 incursions on bases, US authorities report more than 27,000 drones detected in the immediate vicinity of the southern border over a six-month period, and a doubling of stadium flyovers between 2021 and 2024 (from approximately 1,300 to 2,300 incidents). These figures are not the result of alarmist rhetoric: they simply reflect the explosion in the number of civilian drones and the ease with which they can be used for surveillance, smuggling, or offensive testing.
In this context, “layered defense” is not just a conceptual slogan. It involves aligning long-range sensors, proximity radars, passive means (acoustic, optical), electronic warfare, and drone-to-drone interceptors, according to a graduated logic. The Pentagon’s anti-drone defense portal does not aim to impose a single model, but to offer a structured catalog for building this architecture, site by site.
Borders under pressure and a legal framework in need of adjustment
The southern border of the United States has become a de facto laboratory for anti-drone configurations. NORTHCOM is working with DHS, Customs and Border Protection, the Department of the Interior, and other agencies to deploy a detection and neutralization network dense enough to track drones crossing more than 3,100 km (1,954 miles) of border. This is not an isolated case, but involves thousands of flights, some of which are used to transport drugs, spare parts, or simply to test US reactions.
In this theater, anti-drone defense cannot be limited to protecting a few fixed sites. It is necessary to correlate radars, optical sensors, radio detectors, mobile vehicle-mounted devices, and even systems carried on helicopters or fixed-wing aircraft. The projects mentioned by JIATF-401 include low-cost interceptors that can be used in large numbers without breaking the bank. The idea is clear: a €3,000 smuggling drone will never be shot down with a missile costing several hundred thousand euros, as this would be economically unsustainable in the long term.
At the same time, the legal debate is heating up. Title 10, Section 130i already authorizes the military to detect, track, and neutralize drones to protect certain sites, including by jamming radio communications. But this authority only covers some of the bases. Many sensitive areas remain under a more ambiguous regime, in which responsibility for action is shared between the FAA, FBI, DHS, armed forces, and local police. In practice, this means delays, hesitation, and gray areas that malicious drone operators can take advantage of.
The requests made to Congress are straightforward: extend 130i to all strategic facilities, clarify responsibilities “inside” and “outside” fences, and facilitate real-time data sharing between agencies. The rhetoric about privacy protection or the risk of security abuses is legitimate, but it also sometimes serves as a pretext for not making any decisions. Meanwhile, drones fly, film, and test the limits.
It would be hypocritical not to say it: if US bases remain vulnerable, it is not because of a lack of available technology, but largely because of a pileup of rules, administrative rivalries, and poorly coordinated budgets. The Pentagon’s counter-UAS marketplace and the rise of JIATF-401 are attempts to circumvent this deadlock without waiting for comprehensive reform, which will not happen quickly.
An industrial response to a long-standing national security problem
By combining technical standardization and interagency coordination in a single marketplace, the Pentagon is treating the drone threat as a large-scale industrial problem. Given the market figures—annual growth of more than 25%, projected to reach $30 billion (approximately €28 billion) for anti-drone systems by 2035—this approach is anything but abstract. It structures a sector where the most agile players, whether American, European, or Australian, are seeking recurring contracts for anti-drone defense.
However, this response is only partial. The portal and flyaway kits do not answer the fundamental political question: to what extent is a democratic state willing to extend the power of its armed forces and agencies to monitor and neutralize drones, which are sometimes used by individuals or companies? At what point does a leisure activity become an accepted threat, and who assesses this in real time?
From an operational standpoint, the trend is clear. Western armies understand that they can no longer reserve anti-drone defense for foreign theaters alone. Ukraine, Israel, and attacks on refineries and ports around the world have shown that national infrastructure is an easy target for simple, inexpensive drones. The United States, with its hundreds of bases, critical industrial sites, and extensive borders, is drawing its own conclusions.
The online catalog of counter-drones sought by the Pentagon is therefore not a bureaucratic gimmick. It is an attempt to regain control in a field where the proliferation of disparate solutions, the weight of procedures, and political hesitation have already consumed several years. If this attempt fails, the vulnerability of bases and infrastructure will remain a blind spot that adversaries, whether state or non-state, will exploit. If it succeeds, JIATF-401 could become a model of coordination for other areas where the line between civilian and military is blurring, and where technology no longer allows time to hide behind endless debates.
Sources (selection, without links):
– The War Zone, “Pentagon Creating Amazon-Like Shopping Portal For Counter-Drone Equipment,” November 2025.
– U.S. Northern Command, press release on the certification of C-sUAS flyaway kits, November 2025.
– Defense News, articles on the creation of JIATF-401 and counter-UAS capabilities, 2025.
– Hearings of General Gregory Guillot before the U.S. Senate, February 2025.
– 2024–2025 market reports on the drone market and the counter-drone market (Fortune Business Insights, Market.us, other specialized firms).
– Recent articles on drone incursions over US bases (Langley, Wright-Patterson, Picatinny) and related technical and legal responses.
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