The Draken could go into a flat “Super Stall.” How this dangerous flaw became the Cobra maneuver, long before the legendary Sukhoi.
In summary
The Saab J35 Draken is an icon of the Cold War. It is also the source of a brutal paradox: a fighter designed for rapid interception, but capable of entering such an atypical stall that it terrorized generations of pilots. The phenomenon, nicknamed Super Stall, is not a simple stall. It is a loss of lift and control where the aircraft can fall flat, like a falling leaf, with the controls becoming ineffective. In the Swedish Air Force, hundreds of episodes have been reported over several decades, resulting in accidents and deaths, to the point of triggering an institutional response: dedicated training, procedures, and even anti-spin parachutes on two-seater training aircraft. Then, against all logic, this dangerous zone gave birth to a spectacular maneuver: pushing the aircraft into extreme angle of attack, then immediately “breaking” the angle of attack to regain airflow. The Swedes called it Kort parad. The public would later remember it by another name: the Cobra.
The Draken, an aerodynamic beauty born of a national constraint
Sweden wanted a supersonic interceptor capable of operating from dispersed bases, sometimes reinforced sections of road. The specifications combined speed, rapid climb, acceptable endurance, and bad weather capability. Saab responded with a solution that made history: a double delta wing and no rear horizontal plane. This choice was not aesthetic. It aimed to combine high-speed performance with acceptable low-speed handling, thanks to a “broken” leading edge design that generated high-angle-of-attack lift vortices.
On paper, it was brilliant. In real life, it was more complicated. A delta wing can handle high angles of attack, but it can also be tricky. The Draken flew fast, climbed well, and turned sharply for its time. But there was a downside: certain angles of attack and energy levels would bring the aircraft into a zone where the aerodynamics would suddenly change without sufficient warning.
The “Super Stall,” a stall that doesn’t look like one
Let’s be clear: the “Super Stall” is not a “classic” stall where the nose drops and you recover by releasing the throttle. The Draken can enter a deep stall at very high angles of attack, where vortices and airflow reorganize to the point of rendering the control surfaces ineffective. The result is counterintuitive.
Instead of diving straight down, the aircraft can “land” on its cushion of disturbed air, with a high nose, a falling speed, and a trajectory that becomes almost vertical, but without the sharp rotation of a traditional spin. Eyewitness accounts and technical descriptions converge on a striking visual signature: the aircraft falls flat, oscillates, and descends like a leaf, sometimes with a slight rotation, while the pilot has the impression of “flying in a vacuum.”
In this regime, the controls may respond late, or not at all. The pilot can pull, push, use the rudder, and correct with the ailerons. Nothing “bites.” And since the Draken is a fighter aircraft, super stalls rarely occur at an altitude of 6,000 m during perfectly prepared test flights. They occur during training, in tight maneuvers, sometimes at low altitude, sometimes in turbulence or in the wake of another aircraft.
The mechanics of the trap, explained without unnecessary jargon
Why is the Draken susceptible to this? The heart of the problem lies in the combination of three factors.
First, the delta geometry and high-incidence vortex operation. As long as the vortices remain stable, they “stick” the flow to the wing and provide lift. When they break down, lift is quickly lost.
Second, the absence of a rear horizontal plane. On a conventional aircraft, the elevator “attacks” a relatively clean flow at the rear and maintains a margin of control. On a delta wing without a horizontal tailplane, pitch control relies more on wing-mounted control surfaces (ailerons). However, at high angles of attack, these surfaces can find themselves in a highly disturbed flow.
Finally, there is high-angle-of-attack dynamics. At certain angles, the center of pressure and aerodynamic moments can shift in an unfavorable way. The pilot may find themselves with an aircraft that “wants” to stay nose-up, even as it loses speed. This is the definition of a deep stall: a situation where a return to normal flight requires a reduction in angle of attack, but where the aircraft resists the change in attitude.
The super stall is therefore less an isolated “bug” than an extreme behavior of a design that was advanced for its time. Except that this extreme behavior has a human cost.
Flight safety, a record that commands respect
The nickname “pilot killer” did not come out of a fantasy. It reflects a period when understanding of the phenomenon was incomplete, procedures were not stabilized, and simulators did not have the level of realism they have today.
Statistics attributed to the Swedish Air Force and widely cited in aviation literature refer to 179 episodes of super stalls reported between 1959 and 1987, 35 of which resulted in a crash and the destruction of the aircraft. Four pilots were killed in these accidents, due to failed or insufficient ejection. This ratio tells us something concrete: the super stall is not a rare and “theoretical” phenomenon. It was frequent enough to warrant a structured response.
The response was direct, almost industrial. SK 35C two-seater training aircraft were equipped with anti-spin parachutes, used as a recovery tool.
Above all, Sweden implemented systematic training dedicated to the super stall. The goal was not to “reassure” pilots. It was to transform a random risk into a known, anticipated, and manageable sequence.
The birth of the Cobra, or how a defect becomes a technique
This is where the story takes a turn. Once the phenomenon was understood, the instructors made a simple observation: to get out of the zone, you have to break the angle of attack quickly. This involves a maneuver that many pilots instinctively hesitate to perform in a falling aircraft: pushing hard, sometimes to the point of going into negative load factor, in order to re-engage the airflow.
This recovery mechanism gradually becomes a controlled maneuver. The pilot brings the aircraft to a very high angle of attack, almost like a sudden aerodynamic brake, then “releases” the angle of attack sharply. The aircraft loses a lot of speed in a short time, without necessarily losing much altitude if the entry is well prepared, then returns to normal flight.
The Swedes gave it a name that reflects its purpose: a short parade, a brief gesture to provoke an opponent to overtake. In the sources, this name appears repeatedly: Kort parad. The public would later refer to it as the Cobra maneuver.
This point deserves to be made clearly. Yes, a “cobra-type” maneuver existed in the Draken universe before the media shock of the Su-27 demonstration in the late 1980s. No, this does not mean that the Draken “invented” the modern version popularized by Sukhoi. It means that the aerodynamic logic and the movements already existed: extreme angle of attack, dynamic deceleration, then recovery by rapidly reducing the angle of attack.
Tactical controversy, between dogfight myth and energy reality
A spectacular maneuver does not make for good tactics. In real life, the Cobra is a gamble. It breaks the speed. It turns an aircraft into an air brake. This can force a pursuer who is too close to overtake. But it also exposes the pilot who performs it: for a few seconds, energy is low, the ability to maneuver sustainably is limited, and the aircraft becomes a potential target if the opponent keeps his distance.
In a short-range duel with an “aggressive” and overconfident opponent, the surprise effect can work. The Draken, with its ability to withstand high angles of attack, can create this gap. But in modern beyond-visual-range combat, or even in a disciplined dogfight, the Cobra is less a universal weapon than a tool of opportunity. It requires an opponent’s mistake. It requires context. It also requires a pilot who knows exactly where the limit is and who does not confuse “pitching up hard” with “mastering a super stall.”
This is where the controversy comes in. Enthusiasts see a “legendary” maneuver. Operational pilots see it primarily as a dangerous flight regime, sometimes useful, often costly in terms of energy, and never harmless.
The industrial lesson: what the Draken taught engineers
The Draken also tells a story of method. In the 1950s and 1960s, some aspects of high-angle aerodynamics were still being discovered through testing.
A detailed understanding of unsteady flows, vortices, and sudden lift transitions was progressing, but it was not as mature as it is today.
The super stall forced Saab and the Swedish Air Force to structure a flight safety culture around extreme behavior. It also contributed to broader thinking about flight envelopes, training, and simulation. The very fact that an air force implemented large-scale “super stall” training shows the seriousness of the subject, but also the institutional capacity to learn quickly and standardize responses.
This is a point that is often overlooked: fighter aviation is not just a race for performance. It is a discipline where understanding limits saves lives, and where transforming risk into doctrine can make the difference between a “dangerous” fleet and a “controlled” fleet.
The legacy of the Draken, between fascination and caution
The Draken remains one of the most recognizable aircraft of the 20th century. Its silhouette gives the impression of a prototype from an alternate future. The super stall, meanwhile, reminds us that innovation can come with its share of shadows.
What makes the story of the Draken so divisive is that it brings together two opposing emotions. Fascination, because the phenomenon is spectacular and the “exit” resembles a movie stunt. Caution, because it cost aircraft, careers, and lives before it was understood and controlled.
The Draken not only gave Sweden a credible interceptor. It also taught a lesson that engineers and pilots alike know by heart: a flight envelope is not “owned” simply because it has been designed. It must be conquered, and sometimes, it must be paid for.
Sources
Saab 35 Draken, technical and historical overview (AirVectors), last update consulted in 2025.
Saab 35 Draken, “Instability” and “super stall” sections (Wikipedia), version consulted in 2026.
“Cobra maneuver,” Swedish history and link to super stall, version consulted in 2026.
Data on reported superstalls and training device (The Aviation Geek Club), article consulted in 2026.
Excerpt from the book “Saab Aircraft since 1937” (archive), mention of systematic training in super stalls and anti-spin parachutes.
“Pugachev’s Cobra,” mention of the Draken and the Swedish term “kort parad,” version consulted in 2026.
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