Can the F-35 be neutralized by Washington? Dependence, costs, sovereignty: why the debate is now worrying European allies.
In summary
The purchase of the F-35 by allied countries, such as Denmark, raises a question that has become central: can we depend militarily on a system controlled by another state, even a historic ally? Speculation about a possible political conflict, for example over Greenland, has brought back to the forefront fears of a technically controllable fighter jet, dependent on American software, logistics, and budgetary chains.
The F-35 is not a conventional aircraft. It is a global combat system, connected, continuously updated, and embedded in an ecosystem dominated by the United States. User countries benefit from unparalleled interoperability, but at the cost of structural dependence.
Should we continue to buy the F-35? Or should we redirect budgets towards European or hybrid alternatives? The answer is neither simple nor ideological. It touches on the heart of military sovereignty, the real costs of ownership, and Europe’s ability to decide on its own how to use its forces.
The political context that is reviving an old concern
The issue did not arise with the hypothesis of tension between Washington and Copenhagen over Greenland. It has existed since the program’s inception. But American political unpredictability, particularly under certain administrations, has made this debate much more concrete.
When a country like Denmark entrusts most of its air combat capability to an American aircraft, it is making a long-term political gamble. This gamble assumes that strategic interests will remain aligned, regardless of changes in Washington. However, recent history shows that this assumption is no longer entirely valid.
The true nature of the F-35: an aircraft or a locked system
Let’s be clear. The F-35 is not just a fighter jet. It is an integrated weapons system, consisting of software, networks, tactical databases, and digital maintenance chains.
Structural software dependency
The heart of the F-35 is based on millions of lines of code. Software updates are developed, validated, and distributed under US control. Without these updates, certain key capabilities are degraded: data fusion, electronic warfare, sensor management, and compatibility with recent weapons.
There is no fully autonomous “sovereign mode.” A user country can continue to fly its aircraft, but with degraded capabilities and limitations that increase over time.
The question of the “kill switch”
There is no public evidence of the existence of a single button that can instantly disable an allied F-35. But this debate is partly misguided. The real lever is not a switch, but control of the ecosystem:
– software updates
– threat libraries
– security certifications
– access to logistical support systems
A modern aircraft does not become useless overnight. It becomes gradually less relevant, which is sometimes more effective politically.
The Danish case and Greenland: a revealing scenario
Denmark chose the F-35 to replace its F-16s, accepting a high level of integration with NATO and the United States. As long as interests converge, this choice is rational. But a major political dispute changes the equation.
Greenland is a strategic territory. Any serious tension on this issue would place Copenhagen in a delicate situation: using a military tool that depends on a partner directly involved in the dispute.
Even without explicit deactivation, mere doubt about freedom of use is enough to pose a problem of strategic credibility.
The logistical and industrial dependence of European countries
Maintenance and spare parts
Heavy maintenance of the F-35 relies on an international network approved by Washington. Critical parts, major repairs, and certain inspections must go through approved channels.
A country cannot decide on its own to modify or significantly adapt the aircraft without authorization.
This means that in the event of a serious political crisis, the availability of the fleet could be indirectly affected, without any dramatic measures being taken.
Data and information sovereignty
The F-35 collects, processes, and exchanges considerable volumes of data. These flows are essential to operational superiority, but they raise a simple question: who really controls the information?
Even with protection agreements, dependence on US standards limits a country’s ability to completely isolate its system.
The real budgetary cost of the F-35 over time
The debate is not only strategic. It is also budgetary.
Acquisition and ownership costs
An F-35 costs around €80 to €90 million to purchase, depending on the version and contract. But the real issue is the cost over its lifetime.
The cost per flight hour remains high, at around €30,000 to €35,000 (approximately $33,000 to $38,000), despite efforts to reduce it.
Over forty years, this represents tens of billions of euros for a medium-sized national fleet.
The budgetary crowding-out effect
Every euro invested in the F-35 is a euro that is not invested elsewhere:
– combat drones
– long-range missiles
– ground-to-air defense
– space capabilities
– future European programs
For countries with limited budgets, dependence on the F-35 can freeze the structure of the armed forces and reduce their capacity for autonomous innovation.
Should we stop buying F-35s?
The answer needs to be nuanced.
Why some countries are continuing
The F-35 currently offers a unique combination of stealth, sensors, and NATO interoperability. For countries exposed to a direct threat, it provides immediate military insurance.
Giving up the F-35 without a credible alternative exposes countries to a short-term loss of capability.
Why the issue is becoming political
But in the long term, the problem lies elsewhere. Continuing to purchase the F-35 without investing heavily in sovereign capabilities amounts to accepting lasting strategic subordination.
Europe cannot simultaneously claim strategic autonomy and entrust its entire air superiority to a system over which it has no control.
Possible alternatives and their limitations
European programs
Aircraft such as the Rafale or the Eurofighter offer greater political autonomy, but they do not achieve exactly the same level of native stealth. Future programs, such as the SCAF or GCAP, will arrive too late to meet immediate needs.
Hybrid strategies
More and more countries are considering mixed fleets:
– F-35s for NATO interoperability
– National or European aircraft for sovereignty
– Drones to supplement the fleet and reduce costs
This approach reduces total dependence, but increases complexity and management costs.
What the F-35 debate really reveals
The debate over the potential deactivation of the F-35 is often caricatural. The real question is not, “Can the United States shut down our aircraft?”
The real question is: are we willing to accept that our military capability depends on a political relationship that may change?
The F-35 is a formidable military tool. But it is also an instrument of American power. As long as allies consciously accept this, the system works. The danger begins when this dependence is no longer debated.
Sources
– US Government Accountability Office, reports on the F-35 program
– Congressional Research Service, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program
– RAND Corporation, studies on the logistical dependence of weapons systems
– Danish Ministry of Defense, air planning documents
– NATO Defense Planning Process, interoperability and air capabilities
Live a unique fighter jet experience