A rare but possible accident: the Super Hornet can take off with its wings folded. Here’s why it stays in the air, and what aerodynamics costs it.
In summary
The F/A-18E/F Super Hornet is designed to save space on aircraft carriers thanks to its folded wings. Normally, these wings should never remain folded during takeoff. However, naval aviation history shows that carrier-based aircraft have successfully flown and landed with their wings folded, starting with the F-8 Crusader in 1960. For the Super Hornet, the idea is shocking but not absurd from a physical point of view: the airframe and engine provide a margin of power, and the aircraft retains control surfaces (notably via its tailplanes) capable of stabilizing flight. The price to pay is immediate: loss of some lift, a sharp increase in minimum speed, significantly increased drag, degraded roll, and a greatly reduced safety margin. In other words, “flyable” does not mean “easily pilotable.”
The unusual fact behind the reality of the flight deck
Space is limited on a flight deck. Folding wings is not a gimmick: it is an industrial and operational constraint. On the Super Hornet, the wingspan in normal configuration is approximately 13.62 m, but this drops to approximately 9.32 m once the wings are folded, which changes everything in terms of parking and traffic on the deck.
Where the story becomes “unusual” is when the logic of the flight deck collides with the logic of flight. A carrier-based aircraft attempting to take off with its wings folded loses a large part of its lift, and often has its roll controls partially neutralized. This is the kind of mistake that has no “elegant recovery.” There is only one brutal recovery: power, finesse of piloting, and a lot of luck.
Let’s be frank: the best-documented cases publicly concern mainly older aircraft (F-8 Crusader, A-7 Corsair II, and others). For the Super Hornet, there are testimonials in the naval aviation ecosystem and aviation culture, but detailed “public” reports are rare, often undeclassified or difficult to source properly. This lack of transparency does not make the event impossible. It mainly means that when it happens, the Navy has no reason to make it a teaching aid.
The mechanics of folding and the key point that changes everything in flight
The folding system (“wing fold”) is not a light hinge. On carrier-based aircraft, locking is achieved via robust mechanisms, usually locking pins/axles designed to withstand major structural stresses.
The objective is simple: a deployed wing must behave like a single-piece wing.
The “wings folded in flight” situation is different: the outer wing no longer produces useful lift as intended, and its position creates drag and parasitic forces. Even if the structure holds, the aerodynamics are degraded.
To put things into perspective, the wing area of the Super Hornet is around 46.5 m².
If a significant fraction of the effective wing area is lost (which happens when the outer panels no longer contribute properly), the wing loading increases mechanically. And when the wing loading increases, the minimum speed also increases.
Aerodynamics explains why the aircraft still “holds up”
An aircraft flies because lift balances weight. If the wing suddenly becomes “smaller,” compensation is needed. There are only three levers:
- increase speed,
- increase angle of attack (up to stall),
- increase power to overcome drag and accelerate.
This is where the Super Hornet has a card up its sleeve: its engine. With two F414 engines, the maximum afterburner thrust is often given as around 22,000 lbf per engine, or approximately 98 kN each (≈196 kN in total).
This reserve makes it possible to “pay” for a mediocre aerodynamic situation by drowning it in power, at least temporarily. It is exactly the same mechanism that has, in historical cases, enabled carrier-based fighter planes to return to land despite an aberrant configuration.
But beware of the trap: more power does not create lift. It mainly helps maintain speed and prevent the aircraft from sinking. Lift, on the other hand, always comes from a wing that has to work harder.
Immediate effects on stall speed and safety margin
As soon as the available lift is reduced, the stall speed increases. As a first approximation, the stall speed varies as the square root of the wing loading (weight/surface area). This means that a 20% loss of effective surface area does not increase the minimum speed by 20%, but by approximately √(1/0.8) ≈ +12%. A 30% loss would be more like √(1/0.7) ≈ +19%. These are orders of magnitude, but they are enough to understand the danger: the aircraft may only be “alive” above a speed that leaves very little margin, especially near the sea.
And as drag also increases, acceleration and fuel consumption skyrocket. Induced drag becomes particularly detrimental, as the effective wingspan decreases: a “shorter” wing generates more induced drag for the same lift.
In short: the aircraft must fly fast, remain clean, and avoid any unnecessary maneuvers.
Maneuverability deteriorates, especially in roll
The most critical point is not just “does it fly?” It’s “is it controllable?”
When the outer panels are folded back, you can lose a significant part of the effectiveness of the controls near the wing tips, which provide roll torque with the best leverage. Roll control can then switch to backup solutions: tailplane differentials, spoilers, digital compensation, but with reduced authority and slower responses.
In this type of configuration, anything resembling a tight maneuver becomes toxic:
- steep turns (more load, therefore more lift required),
- rapid attitude changes,
- turbulence,
- aggressive go-arounds near the ground.
Even if the aircraft does not go into a spin, it can “float” in a roll, react late, or require constant effort and corrections. And the more you correct, the more drag and disturbance you add.
Historical examples that prove that “impossible” is sometimes wrong
The most famous case is that of the F-8 Crusader: pilots took off with their wings folded and managed to return to land, including an episode dated August 23, 1960, at Napoli Capodichino, with a climb to approximately 1,500 m (5,000 ft) then return and landing, with the pilot reporting higher than normal control forces.
There are also accounts of the A-7 Corsair II taking off and landing with its wings folded in an operational context. The quality of documentation varies depending on the source, but the general idea is consistent: carrier-based aircraft sometimes have enough power and intrinsic stability to survive a configuration designed solely for parking.
What these examples teach us is simple: the real limiting factor is not “magic.” It is the combination of available power, aerodynamic conditions, and the pilot’s composure. And often, a very powerful aircraft can mask a very bad situation for a while.
The concrete reasons that make the scenario plausible on the Super Hornet
Even if the Super Hornet is not the F-8 Crusader, certain factors work in its favor:
- An engine capable of compensating for a significant degradation in performance, at least long enough to stabilize a level flight and prepare for a return.
- A design intended for low-speed carrier operations (landing), which requires a margin of control at high angles of attack in demanding envelopes.
- An aerodynamic architecture that remains “lifting” at the center of the wing and fuselage, even if the extremities are compromised.
But let’s be clear: these points do not make it a procedure. They make it a survival scenario.
Operational limitations and why it is “flyable” but not “acceptable”
The biggest danger is the illusion of control. An aircraft can leave the deck and remain airborne… then become unmanageable as soon as it needs to maneuver to align, reduce speed, configure, or absorb a gust.
On an aircraft carrier, the safety window is already narrow. If, in addition, the aircraft has a configuration that requires higher speed and sluggish roll, it increases the risk for everyone: crew, deck, ship. And in the event of an attempted landing, the margin for go-around becomes critical.
In other words: yes, the aircraft can “hold”. But it holds like a tightrope walker without a net. The correct interpretation is not “it’s doable”. The correct interpretation is “it’s an anomaly that comes at a high price”.
Lessons to be learned in order to understand the Super Hornet “myth”
There are two common misconceptions.
The first is confusing performance with control. A very powerful aircraft can stay in the air in an absurd configuration, but that does not mean it can fight, maneuver, or even land properly.
The second is confusing rarity with impossibility. “Wing fold” incidents are rare because checklists, deck crews, and safety measures exist. They are not impossible because a series of human errors can always circumvent barriers.
And if the idea is fascinating, it’s because it reveals an uncomfortable truth: in certain circumstances, physics leaves a door ajar. But that door opens onto a very short hallway.
Sources
- Wikipedia, “Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet” (general data, dimensions, wing area)
- Aeropedia, “BOEING FA-18F SUPER HORNET” (wingspan and width with wings folded)
- Wikipedia, “Vought F-8 Crusader” (Capodichino episode in 1960 and flights with wings folded)
- F8Crusader.org, “Records” (accounts and lists of episodes with wings folded)
- The Aviationist, “These photos prove…” (historical reminders about flights with wings folded)
- Aviation StackExchange, “How are folding wings managed?” (locking principle and structural logic)
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