Boeing abandons the F-15EX for Jakarta. Indonesia opts for the Turkish KAAN: costs, deadlines, integration, and industrial impacts for Ankara and Seattle.
Summary
Boeing confirmed on the sidelines of the Singapore Airshow that its F-15EX campaign in Indonesia was over. The project targeted 24 aircraft, following announcements and an FMS framework that never turned into a binding contract. Jakarta now favors the Turkish KAAN, with an agreement for 48 aircraft and a co-production approach. This shift illustrates a trade-off between a proven but politically cumbersome solution and a riskier program that offers industrial transfers and greater room for negotiation. For Indonesia, the challenge is to integrate different platforms—Rafale, modernized F-16s, Sukhoi—without exploding support, training, and ammunition costs. For Turkey, the order is a major commercial signal, but it exposes the KAAN to export constraints related to American components and a tight development schedule. For Boeing, the loss is symbolic; F-15EX production remains driven by the U.S. Air Force.
The breakup signal announced in Singapore
The sequence is clearer than the rumors that preceded it. On February 3, 2026, Boeing announced that the Indonesian campaign around the F-15 was over and that there were no longer any active commercial efforts on this issue, a statement made in the context of the Singapore Airshow. This point is important because Indonesia was not a “fantasy” customer on a PowerPoint list: an agreement signed in 2023 was for 24 aircraft, subject to U.S. approvals and full contractual formalization.
At the same time, we must not forget the institutional background. In February 2022, the US notification described a potential sale of up to 36 F-15IDs (export designation) for an estimated maximum amount of $13.9 billion, including radars, electronic warfare systems, pods, and support. The gap between “up to 36” and “24 targeted” illustrates a classic feature of FMS sales: the notification sets a ceiling, then negotiation reduces, modulates, or spreads out the actual target. This mechanism opens up options, but it does not create a contract.
The result, however, is binary. The window has closed. And this is a strategic indicator: Jakarta no longer wants to just buy an aircraft, it wants to buy political, industrial, and budgetary latitude. This often costs more in the short term, but it can reduce dependence in the long term.
The financial logic that weakened the F-15 option
Indonesia is modernizing, but it is modernizing “in portfolio.” It has begun to take delivery of its first Rafales (three delivered at the end of January 2026, according to officials), as part of an order for 42 aircraft. Each program has a domino effect: infrastructure, simulators, spare parts stocks, pilot and mechanic training, weapons chains, multi-year support contracts. The cost is not just the aircraft, it’s the system.
On the F-15 side, public figures give an idea of the scale. The DSCA ceiling of $13.9 billion covered a broad configuration including 45 AN/APG-82(V)1 AESA radars, 45 AN/ALQ-250 EPAWSS systems, pods, cryptographic devices, and a substantial support and training package. We are talking about a complete “package,” not a bare airframe. In many countries, it is precisely this “package” that causes the deal to fall through: it secures the capability… and it stiffens the bill.
There is also the question of operating costs. The official US document on hourly costs (FY2025) puts the flight cost of the F-15EX at around $15,250 per hour (budget order of magnitude, according to US methodology). This figure is not a real bill in the commercial sense, but it highlights a reality: a heavy, twin-engine, high-capacity fleet has more demanding maintenance and logistics requirements than a lighter fighter. For an air force that already operates a mosaic of aircraft, adding another “family” can quickly become a penalty.
Finally, there is the FMS mechanism itself, which is decisive in this case. The Foreign Military Sales scheme provides guarantees, but also imposes a pace, validations, clauses, and tripartite governance (customer, US government, manufacturer). The fact that Boeing is referring the question back to the governments, without going into detail, is telling: the decision is rarely “unilateral”; it is often the result of delays, changing priorities, and political signals.
The operational advantages of the F-15EX that Jakarta has decided to forego
Technically, the decision to abandon the program is not a rejection of its performance. The F-15EX Eagle II has a simple selling point: firepower and range, with a digital architecture designed for rapid upgrades. The aircraft can carry 13,300 kg (29,500 lb) of external payload, according to Boeing, and the air-to-air carrying capacity is up to 12 missiles in a standard configuration.
Indonesia’s interest made sense on paper. The archipelago imposes distances, transit times, and a need for maritime coverage. A highly durable and heavily loaded aircraft can perform air superiority and interception missions, as well as strike missions with pods and guided weapons, relying on compliant tanks. On the F-15E Strike Eagle variant, the US Air Force points out that each conformal tank carries approximately 2,800 liters (750 gallons) and that they help extend the range.
In terms of survivability, the integration of a modern electronic warfare system is key. EPAWSS AN/ALQ-250 is described as a digital system designed to detect, identify, locate, and counter air-to-air and surface-to-air threats in contested environments. This type of equipment is not a “bonus.” In a region where the density of sensors and surface-to-air missiles is increasing, it is a ticket to entry.
Frankly, the question is not “Is the F-15 capable?” It is: Is this level of capability worth the political and industrial cost of the FMS route, at a time when Jakarta is already piling up heavy choices?
The industrial promise of the KAAN that attracts Jakarta
Indonesia is not content with vague interest. It has signed a contract for 48 KAANs, according to its Ministry of Defense. A key point, often more telling than press releases, is the publicly announced schedule: the delivery of all aircraft over 120 months (ten years) is reported by the specialized press. In other words, Jakarta is buying a long-term program, not immediate capability.
Why take this gamble? First, because it includes a logic of co-production and, more broadly, technology transfer. Announcements surrounding the deal mention the integration of local capabilities into production, which responds to a constant ambition: to strengthen the national industry, secure skills, and reduce dependence on external support.
Secondly, because Turkey is also selling a stance. KAAN is the symbol of a claimed strategic autonomy, accelerated since Ankara’s removal from the F-35 program and the constraints that followed. On the technical side, the prototype made its first flight in February 2024, and Turkey is aiming for deliveries to begin in 2028, according to public statements. The development agreement with BAE Systems, announced at $125 million, is a marker of industrial credibility, even if it does not solve everything.
Finally, KAAN offers Jakarta more room for negotiation than the purchase of a mature American platform. With the program still in development, the customer can attempt to influence choices: local industrialization, mission architecture, interfaces, future weapons.
This is attractive. It is also risky.
The American constraint that could catch up with KAAN
Here we must be precise, and a little blunt: KAAN is currently dependent on American components, starting with the engines, and this could reintroduce export constraints comparable to those that Jakarta seemed to want to avoid with the F-15.
The political crux of the matter is ITAR: if critical subsystems remain under American control, Washington can, de facto, block, delay, or impose conditions on deliveries, spare parts, updates, or certain weapons integrations. Although the exact details of the export configuration are not public, Reuters confirms that the first prototypes use General Electric F110 engines and that Turkey is aiming for domestic engine production in the long term.
This is not a theoretical question. If Indonesia requests an aircraft that is “free” from US dependencies, this may require re-qualifications, industrial substitutions, and therefore delays. However, the schedule is already long. The risk is simple: purchasing a new-generation fighter, but waiting longer than expected to obtain truly sovereign capability.
For Jakarta, this also means carefully managing the transitions: Rafales delivered now, legacy platforms to maintain, and KAAN to integrate later. Air forces rarely struggle with the aircraft itself. They struggle with the simultaneity of the projects.
Indonesian operational integration between urgency and consistency
Indonesia must strike a balance: meeting immediate air policing and deterrence needs while building a more modern force. The delivery of the Rafale aircraft, based in Pekanbaru (Sumatra) according to public information, serves this short-term objective.
In the medium term, the integration of a heterogeneous fleet poses three very concrete problems.
Firstly, training. Each aircraft requires a conversion program, instructors, simulators, and safety standards. Increasing the number of types dilutes training hours and complicates career management.
Secondly, support. Logistics chains cannot be shared if the avionics, engines, procedures, and tools differ. Immobilized stocks increase, and operational availability often declines before recovering.
Finally, ammunition. A fighter jet only makes sense if it is armed, maintained, and connected. The 2022 DSCA “basket” already showed the scale of the subsystems associated with the F-15ID option. With KAAN, the question will be similar: which missiles, which pods, which data links, and which export authorizations depending on the components selected?
The consequences for Boeing between commercial setback and industrial continuity
For Boeing, Indonesia’s withdrawal is a visible setback, but not a halt to production. The momentum of the F-15EX continues to be driven by US orders and budget planning. In 2024, the trade press reported that the US Air Force was temporarily reducing certain fighter purchases in its FY2025 request, including the F-15EX, in a context of broader budget constraints.
On unit costs, a report relayed by Air & Space Forces mentioned a unit cost of approximately $93.95 million (then-year value) if the US Air Force remained on track to purchase 104 aircraft.
These figures vary with volume, inflation, and production batches, but they serve as a reminder that the aircraft is firmly anchored in a US program.
The Indonesian loss is more of a blow to the export strategy: Southeast Asia is a highly competitive market, where political considerations often take precedence over technical specifications. Boeing remains capable of selling, but the episode shows the fragility of “long campaigns” when the customer wants a quick deal, with heavy offsets and maximum freedom of integration.
The consequences for Turkey between geopolitical showcase and obligation to deliver
For Ankara, the Indonesian contract is a major showcase. It is the first export order for a fighter program presented as next-generation, and a signal sent to other prospects.
But it is also a potential trap: selling an aircraft still in development means committing to a schedule, industrial maturity, configuration stability, and a cost trajectory. The announcement of deliveries spread over ten years provides some breathing room. It does not remove the obligation to deliver results.
If Turkey wants to turn this success into a series of exports, it will have to prove three things: that the ramp-up is credible, that the export configuration is not hampered by external constraints, and that the ecosystem (maintenance, parts, software updates, weapons) is up to the task. The program may win politically, but it will have to win technically.
The question that remains for Jakarta
The switch from the F-15EX to KAAN looks like a maneuver to assert sovereignty. It can also be seen as a search for flexibility: spreading out the bill, negotiating industrialization, and diversifying dependencies.
The real test will be execution. If Indonesia succeeds in synchronizing Rafale deliveries, the extension of its existing fleets, and then the gradual arrival of the KAAN, it will have transformed a disparate fleet into a coherent trajectory. If, on the contrary, export constraints, industrial substitutions, and development delays accumulate, it risks ending up with a modernization “on paper” and very real capacity gaps.
The choice is not between a good aircraft and a bad aircraft. It is between a mature, highly regulated system and a system in the making, which is more negotiable but also more uncertain. And this is exactly the kind of trade-off where air forces play as much on engineering as on politics.
Sources
Reuters, February 3, 2026, Boeing says no longer building F-15 fighter jets for Indonesia.
Defense Security Cooperation Agency, News Release Transmittal No. 22-13, February 10, 2022, Indonesia – F-15ID Aircraft.
Reuters, July 29, 2025, Indonesia signs contract with Turkey to buy 48 KAAN fighter jets.
Reuters, February 21, 2024, Turkey’s KAAN fighter jet conducts first flight.
Janes, June 11, 2025, Indo Defense 2025: Indonesia signs agreement to acquire Kaan fighter aircraft (delivery within 120 months).
Associated Press, June 11, 2025, Turkey to export 48 KAAN fighter jets to Indonesia (local estimate at $10 billion).
Reuters, January 26, 2026, Indonesia receives first Rafale advanced fighter jets from France.
Air & Space Forces, October 3, 2023, New Acquisition Report: F-15EX Unit Cost Will Be $94 Million.
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (FM&C), FY2025 DoD Fixed Wing Aircraft Cost Per Flying Hour (F-15EX).
Air Force, Fact Sheet, F-15E Strike Eagle ( conformal tanks and range logic).
Boeing, F-15EX Eagle (13,300 kg payload and carry capacity).
Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY2022 report excerpt on AN/ALQ-250(V)1 EPAWSS.
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