Taiwan is interested in the Rafale to replace its Mirage 2000s. Is this a capacity purchase or a lever to bind France and Europe to its cause against China?
In summary
The revelation of Taiwan’s interest in the Rafale has reignited the debate on the link between arms purchases and diplomacy. The island wants to modernize its aging fleet of Mirage 2000-5s delivered between 1997 and 1998, while experiencing delays with its new F-16Vs. The CEO of Dassault Aviation confirmed Taipei’s appetite for the French aircraft during a parliamentary hearing, without prejudging a political decision. A Rafale contract would send a strategic signal to Paris, test the One China policy, and establish a lever for European alignment unprecedented since French sales in the early 1990s. It would also offer an industrial lock-in effect through long-term support, while strengthening the island’s deterrence capability. But the operation carries high political costs and risks for France and the EU, which Beijing would seek to transform into economic and diplomatic pressure. Between capacity needs and influence calculations, Taipei is striving to diversify its dependencies without fracturing its alliances.
The operational context and the announcement that is shaking things up
Taiwan operates around 60 Mirage 2000-5s purchased from France in 1992 and put into service in 1997. The aging airframes, the cost of maintenance, and the lengthening of supply chains are weighing on availability. Taipei has therefore invested in M53 engine parts and life extension assessments to hold out until the arrival of new fighters. At the same time, the island ordered 66 F-16 Block 70/72s in 2019, a cornerstone of its modernization, but delivery has been delayed due to software and industrial delays, with the first aircraft rolling off the production line in 2025 and ramp-up delayed.
On September 25, 2025, a hearing in the French Parliament publicly revealed the Rafale scenario: Éric Trappier stated that “the Taiwanese want the Rafale,” shifting responsibility for a possible sale to the French government. This statement does not mean that a case has been opened, but it lends credibility to an option that many had considered taboo for three decades.
Taipei’s calculation: from capability requirements to arms diplomacy
Militarily, the Rafale F3R/F4 ticks several boxes: AESA radar, Meteor and MICA NG missiles, integrated electronic warfare, increased endurance, and air-to-air/air-to-ground versatility. In an environment saturated by the PLA, these assets would offer greater effectiveness than the Mirage, with an easier transition than an entirely new type for crews from the 2000s.
But a purchase is never purely technical. By diversifying its suppliers, Taipei reduces its exposure to a single industry and strengthens its resilience in the face of US delays or restrictions. Supplier diversification also sends a political message: the island is not betting everything on Washington and is seeking European partners, while European groups are cautiously asserting their presence in Taipei.
The French and European perspective: constraints, margins, and historical precedent
In 1994, France committed, within a bilateral political framework with Beijing, to no longer sell arms to Taiwan, after the sale of Mirage fighter jets and La Fayette frigates in the early 1990s. Since then, Paris has mainly accepted support contracts and limited naval modernization projects (decoy launchers for Taiwanese frigates in 2020), which had already aroused the ire of Chinese diplomats.
A Rafale contract would mark a qualitative step forward and revive the question of compliance with this 1994 commitment, which does not have the status of an international treaty but has structured Franco-Chinese relations for decades. On the European side, the EU has a “one China policy” and favors strategic ambiguity: support for stability in the strait, firmness on economic coercion, but no common line on arms sales to Taiwan. Member states remain free, but exposed.
Finally, the situation is changing: European visibility at the Taipei defense exhibition in September 2025 has increased, signaling a window of industrial and political opportunity, even if most major sales remain American. The United Kingdom has already become involved in Taiwan’s indigenous submarine program, proving that symbolic steps are possible.
The influence gamble: securing implicit support in the event of a crisis?
A Rafale purchase would not create an automatic obligation for French military assistance. But experience shows that a major supply relationship leads to political externalities: regular exchanges, training, industrial support, and supply chains to be secured in the event of tension. This is an indirect lever for European alignment.
From a Taiwanese perspective, the benefits are threefold. First, the “anchoring” of a major EU member state in the operational readiness of Taiwanese combat aviation. Second, the creation of long-term French industrial interests on the island (support, ammunition, sensors), which would be difficult to dismantle without political cost. Finally, the possibility of knock-on effects: if Paris takes the lead, other capitals could toughen their rhetoric on the stability of the strait or strengthen dual cooperation.
For Paris, the equation is more delicate. Industry would gain a premium customer, but diplomacy would have to absorb a Chinese response: targeted sanctions, economic blockades, political cooling. The balance between European strategic autonomy, economic interests in China, and transatlantic solidarity would be laid bare.
The risks of escalation and political safeguards
Beijing repeatedly reacts to announcements of arms sales to Taiwan by summoning ambassadors, sanctioning companies, and suspending trade. A Rafale contract would provoke a stronger reaction than that elicited by decoy launchers or MCO. France and the EU should anticipate coercive measures, potentially in critical sectors (luxury goods, civil aviation, agri-food).
On the European side, the recently adopted anti-coercion tool would provide a framework for retaliation, but using it against China on such a sensitive issue would be a political leap. Hence the importance of coalition work, with coordinated public messages on the stability of the strait and the legality of defense sales to an entity that does not threaten peace.
Legally, Paris should clarify the status of the 1994 commitment and, if necessary, undertake a political review motivated by the strategic environment, recalling that France does not recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state but defends freedom of navigation and the non-use of force.
The figures that matter: costs, support, timelines
A squadron of 18 to 24 Rafale F3R/F4s, with weapons and initial support, would cost several billion euros. Life-cycle costs would extend over three decades, with a logistics flow to be secured. On a Taiwanese scale, these expenditures compete with other priorities (coastal defense, drones, ammunition).
Conversely, the timetable favors a “capacity bridge.” U.S. delays on the F-16V and other equipment create a window where the arrival of a first European batch could reduce the risk of a capacity gap. Technically, the cultural similarity between the Mirage and Rafale would lower human transition costs compared to an entirely new type.
Realistic scenarios: between political signal and lasting transformation
Minimalist scenario: Taipei maintains the Rafale option as competitive pressure and a message to Washington, without crossing the Rubicon. Paris benefits from the announcement effect, Beijing tests counter-communication measures, and everyone sticks to their red lines.
Pragmatic scenario: an enhanced support agreement around the Mirage, possibly with limited modernization, to hold out until the F-16V is fully operational, with no Rafale sales in the short term.
Maximalist scenario: a politically acceptable Rafale contract, backed by a discreet support mechanism and coordinated European messaging. This scenario requires careful diplomatic preparation, guarantees of logistical continuity, and public framing focused on regional stability and the defensive nature of the capabilities acquired.
What this episode reveals about Taipei’s strategy
Whether or not it materializes, the interest shown in the Rafale illustrates Taipei’s tactic of opening up room for maneuver. The island is exploiting competition between suppliers to secure its deadlines, stocks, and technical support, while sending Europe the message that a useful role is available in the Asia-Pacific region beyond declarations of principle.
The long-term strategy would be to partially “Europeanize” support for Taiwanese combat aviation, creating cross-interests and a network of dependencies that would make it more costly to abandon in the event of a crisis. Mirroring this, Paris would have to arbitrate between industrial opportunity and political exposure at a time when its own programs (SCAF/FCAS) and relations with Berlin are under strain.
The answer to the question: tactics or strategy?
It’s both. Tactical, because the Rafale option puts pressure on American deadlines, signals supplier diversification, and improves the short-term balance of power. Strategic, because a large fighter jet contract creates interdependencies, establishes a European presence in Taipei, and may, over the years, influence political reflexes in the event of a crisis.
There is no guarantee that Paris will follow this path. But the very idea that it is on the table shows that Taiwanese deterrence is not only played out on the runways: it is also played out in the creation of de facto coalitions, shared supply chains, and lasting interests between industrial democracies.
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