The US Department of Defense selects 25 companies to mass-produce low-cost disposable drones, a revolution in modern warfare inspired by the conflict in Ukraine.
In summary
On February 3, 2026, the Pentagon announced the selection of 25 companies that will compete to supply thousands of low-cost, single-use attack drones as part of its Drone Dominance program. This $1.1 billion initiative aims to produce more than 200,000 drones by 2027, with unit prices falling from $5,000 to $2,300. The first phase, dubbed “Gauntlet,” will begin on February 18 at Fort Benning, Georgia, where military operators will test the proposed systems. Participants include giants such as Kratos Defense and Ukrainian start-ups that have proven their combat capabilities. This competition marks a radical change in the Pentagon’s approach, favoring speed, volume, and cost over technological sophistication.
The genesis of a disruptive strategic program
The Drone Dominance program launched by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth in December 2025 stems directly from a stark strategic realization: the U.S. military can no longer afford to use munitions costing millions of dollars to destroy enemy drones worth only a few thousand dollars. This asymmetry in cost-effectiveness threatens the credibility of US deterrence against adversaries capable of saturating air defenses with swarms of inexpensive systems.
The initiative is a continuation of an executive order signed in June 2025 by President Donald Trump aimed at improving US capabilities in military and commercial drones. Hegseth’s July 2025 memorandum laid the groundwork for a radically new philosophy: “Drone dominance is as much a process race as it is a technology race. We buy what works — quickly, at scale, and without bureaucratic delay. Lethality will not be hampered by self-imposed restrictions. “
The Ukrainian conflict has served as a real-world laboratory for this new approach. For the past four years, Kiev has been making extensive use of inexpensive kamikaze drones against the Russian invasion, with an effectiveness that has surprised Western military observers. According to recent analyses, drones are responsible for up to 75% of combat losses on both sides of the Ukrainian front. FPV (first-person view) systems manufactured for around $400 regularly destroy tanks worth several million dollars.
This reality on the battlefield has forced the Pentagon to rethink its doctrine. The Drone Dominance program is the first attempt to transpose the lessons learned in Ukraine into the US arsenal on a large scale, focusing on mass production rather than technological perfection.
The twenty-five competitors selected for the first round
The list of 25 companies chosen to participate in the initial phase of the program reveals a deliberate desire to diversify the American industrial base beyond the traditional major defense contractors. The Pentagon has opted for a strategic mix of established players and new entrants, industry giants and agile start-ups.
Among the well-known names are Kratos SRE Inc., a subsidiary of Kratos Defense specializing in unmanned vehicles and defense electronics, and Halo Aeronautics. These established players rub shoulders with innovative companies such as Auterion Government Solutions, ModalAI, and Firestorm Labs, which represent the new generation of drone manufacturers backed by Silicon Valley venture capital.
The presence of two Ukrainian companies—General Cherry Corp. and Ukrainian Defense Drones Tech Corp.—sends a strong signal. These companies bring real combat experience that few others can claim. General Cherry has indicated that it is preparing to present a comprehensive solution combining reconnaissance, target detection, and destruction, and is considering locating part of its production in the United States or an allied country to meet the program’s requirements.
The full list also includes Anno. Ai Inc., Ascent Aerosystems Inc., DZYNE Technologies, Ewing Aerospace, Farage Precision, Greensight Inc., Griffon Aerospace Inc., Neros Inc., Oksi Ventures Inc., Paladin Defense Services, Performance Drone Works, Responsibly LTD, Swarm Defense Technologies, Teal Drones Inc., Vector Defense Inc., W.S. Darley & Co., and XTEND Reality Inc.
This diversity reflects the Pentagon’s desire to transform its industrial approach. As Amol Parikh, co-CEO of Doodle Labs, which supplies radio modules for seven finalists, pointed out, the small drone industry “was literally in garages five years ago” but now operates on “a very, very real and very significant production scale.”
The concept of iterative competition known as Gauntlet
The Drone Dominance program is based on a methodology that is radically different from the Pentagon’s traditional acquisition processes. The approach, consisting of successive competitive phases known as “Gauntlet,” aims to drastically accelerate development and production cycles.
The first phase, Gauntlet I, will begin on February 18, 2026, at Fort Benning, Georgia, and will continue until early March. During this period, actual military operators—not engineers or bureaucrats—will fly and evaluate the systems proposed by the 25 selected companies. The drones will be tested in real-world operational scenarios, including strikes at 10 kilometers in open terrain and 1 kilometer in a simulated urban environment, with a minimum dummy payload of 2 kilograms.
At the end of this evaluation, the Pentagon will select only 12 suppliers, who will receive approximately $150 million in orders to deliver functional prototypes over the following five months. The department expects these 12 companies to produce a total of 30,000 drones at a unit price of $5,000.
The next three phases will gradually reduce the number of suppliers from 12 to 5, while increasing production volumes and reducing unit costs. The ultimate goal is to achieve a price of $2,300 per drone for orders of 150,000 units. The Pentagon is counting on creating stable and predictable demand that will encourage manufacturers to invest in their production capabilities.
This iterative approach allows for rapid adjustment of technical and operational requirements. Competitive improvement cycles will be “measured in months, not years,” the department said. This speed contrasts sharply with traditional weapons programs that span decades.
Operational objectives and desired capabilities
The Pentagon is pursuing several distinct but complementary strategic objectives through the Drone Dominance program. The first concerns the ability to saturate enemy defenses with swarms of inexpensive drones, imposing a favorable cost-effectiveness ratio on the United States. A $2,300 drone that forces the enemy to fire an anti-aircraft missile costing several hundred thousand dollars is a clear economic victory.
The technical specifications sought favor operational simplicity and robustness over sophistication. The systems must be deployable by small units with minimal training. The department is requesting platforms capable of carrying at least 2 kilograms of payload—enough for a lethal warhead—over distances of 1 to 10 kilometers, depending on the terrain.
Resilience to electronic countermeasures is also a priority. Ukrainian drones have had to evolve rapidly to counter Russian jamming, developing autonomous navigation and artificial intelligence target locking capabilities that allow them to maintain their mission even if the control link is cut. American candidates will have to demonstrate similar capabilities.
Interoperability is another essential criterion. Systems must be able to integrate into existing command architectures while remaining sufficiently modular to evolve rapidly. The Pentagon seeks to avoid creating incompatible technological silos.
Logistical autonomy is a final major challenge. Deployed forces must be able to maintain, repair, and even partially assemble these drones in the field with a minimum of specialized equipment. This requirement stems directly from the Ukrainian experience, where decentralized production and maintenance proved crucial to maintaining operational pressure.
Potential savings and the transformation of the economic model
The Drone Dominance program promises considerable savings compared to traditional weapons systems, but above all a radical transformation of cost-effectiveness in modern military operations. The figures speak for themselves: for the price of a single conventional cruise missile—around $1 million—the Pentagon could acquire between 434 and 200 drones, depending on the phase of the program.
This math profoundly changes the tactical and strategic equations. According to analyses by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Russian Shahed drones hit their target less than 10% of the time, but their estimated cost of between $20,000 and $150,000 allows Moscow to launch them en masse every day, gradually exhausting Ukrainian air defenses, which spend much more expensive ammunition to intercept them.
The Pentagon aims to reverse this dynamic. With an arsenal of hundreds of thousands of drones costing $2,300 each, U.S. forces could overwhelm any enemy defense while maintaining superiority in terms of guidance, accuracy, and coordination. A Ukrainian soldier recently destroyed a Russian Tor missile system worth $24 million with an FPV drone donated by civilians. The Tor could theoretically purchase 10,435 drones at the target price of the Drone Dominance program.
Beyond direct savings on platforms, the program generates multiplier effects across the entire value chain. The Pentagon requires that all components be manufactured in the United States, eliminating dependence on brushless motors and lithium batteries previously sourced from China. This industrial relocation creates domestic jobs and strengthens the resilience of the defense industrial base.
Standardized orders and predictable demand allow manufacturers to invest in automation and process optimization, further reducing unit costs. The business model is shifting from low-volume, custom-made prototypes to industrialized mass production comparable to consumer electronics.
Expected technological innovations and potential breakthroughs
The Drone Dominance program acts as an accelerator for innovation in several critical technological areas. Intense competition between 25 companies, then 12, then 5, will create a Darwinian dynamic conducive to rapid advances. Several areas of innovation are already emerging.
Intelligent autonomy represents the first technological frontier. Ukrainian drones have developed object recognition and autonomous navigation capabilities that allow them to lock onto a target and continue the mission even if the control signal is cut off. This fire-and-forget terminal guidance function, similar to that of Javelin or AIM-120 missiles, democratizes precision strikes at a negligible cost. American candidates will likely have to go further, integrating machine learning algorithms capable of distinguishing real targets from decoys.
Electronic resilience is a second major area of innovation. Faced with intensive jamming, manufacturers are exploring several avenues: diversification of communication frequencies, adaptive frequency hopping, improved inertial navigation, and GPS-independent artificial vision guidance. Some Ukrainian prototypes already use acoustic sensors to detect and avoid areas of electronic jamming.
Coordinated swarming is perhaps the most disruptive innovation. Beyond simply launching multiple drones, advanced systems enable distributed coordination where each device shares targeting information, adjusts its trajectory to saturate defenses, and adapts its mission based on the results of others. This collective intelligence transforms a set of inexpensive individual platforms into a sophisticated weapons system capable of overwhelming elaborate defenses.
Composite materials and additive manufacturing techniques also offer opportunities for innovation. 3D printing of drone cells drastically reduces production costs and lead times while facilitating rapid customization for specific missions. Ukrainian startups are already producing partially 3D-printed drones for a few hundred dollars.
The integration of inexpensive multispectral sensors from the smartphone industry can significantly increase reconnaissance and targeting capabilities without breaking the bank. Miniaturized thermal cameras, compact lidars, chemical sensors: all these technologies are now available at low cost thanks to economies of scale in the consumer market.
Strategic and operational benefits for the armed forces
The widespread adoption of low-cost drones by the US military promises to radically transform the way the Pentagon projects its military power. The benefits extend far beyond simple budget savings to touch on the very heart of operational doctrine.
On a tactical level, the availability of hundreds of thousands of drones fundamentally changes the risk equation. Commanders will be able to deploy these disposable systems for dangerous reconnaissance missions, harassment, air defense suppression, or precision strikes without exposing pilots or expensive aircraft. This abundance allows for a proactive approach where the loss of dozens of drones in a mission becomes acceptable if the objective is achieved.
The saturation effect against enemy defenses is a major strategic asset. When facing an adversary such as China, which has invested heavily in sophisticated anti-aircraft systems, the ability to launch successive waves of inexpensive drones depletes defensive missile stocks and creates gaps that can be exploited by more expensive systems. Analyses by the Hudson Institute suggest that this dynamic shifts the advantage to the defender, complicating large-scale offensive operations.
Operational decentralization becomes possible on an unprecedented scale. Small units—sections, platoons, even squads—will have their own precision firepower beyond the visual horizon without relying on heavy support. This empowerment of tactical levels allows for increased responsiveness and reduces dependence on traditional vertical chains of command.
Doctrinal innovation is necessarily accelerating. The Air Force has already announced the creation in 2026 of an experimental operational unit dedicated to single-use attack drones, tasked with defining the tactics, organization, training, and equipment needed before wider integration in the 2030s. This institutionalized experimentation allows for rapid adaptation of operating procedures to the realities of modern combat.
Deterrence by volume is emerging as a new strategic paradigm. Faced with an adversary contemplating an invasion—Taiwan, for example—the prospect of confronting swarms of tens of thousands of drones defending fortified positions radically changes the cost-benefit calculation of aggression. Admiral Sam Paparo, commander of the Pacific, has emphasized that in certain areas, it is sufficient to deny the adversary air or maritime superiority rather than to conquer it oneself.
Repositioning the US defense industrial base
The Drone Dominance program is catalyzing a profound transformation of the US defense industrial ecosystem. Pete Hegseth’s approach is upsetting the established balance between traditional major contractors and new technological entrants.
Traditional major integrators such as Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and General Dynamics are faced with a model that values rapid production and low unit costs rather than maximum technical sophistication. Their expertise in complex high-tech systems puts them at a disadvantage when it comes to disposable drones produced in their tens of thousands. Some, such as Kratos Defense through its subsidiary Kratos SRE, are attempting to adapt by creating divisions specializing in “attritable” systems — literally, those that can sustain losses.
Conversely, venture capital-funded technology startups are finding unprecedented access to defense markets through this program. Companies such as Anduril, Shield AI, and the many companies selected for Gauntlet I bring a culture of rapid innovation, iterative prototyping, and agile industrialization inherited from Silicon Valley. As Brendan Stewart, senior vice president of a participating company, noted, “A lot of people you wouldn’t traditionally expect to see in defense contracts now have a seat at the table.”
The industrial reshoring imposed by the program is creating new, entirely domestic supply chains. The requirement that all components be manufactured in the United States is forcing the development of domestic capacity for items previously imported from China: brushless motors, lithium batteries, flight controllers, and optical sensors. This reconstruction of a complete industrial base represents a strategic investment beyond the Drone Dominance program alone.
The Ukrainian ecosystem plays a special role in this transformation. The 300 Ukrainian start-ups dedicated to drone development, forged in the heat of real combat, bring irreplaceable operational experience.
The presence of General Cherry and Ukrainian Defense Drones Tech Corp among the 25 selected for Gauntlet I demonstrates the Pentagon’s desire to learn directly from those who practice drone warfare on a daily basis. If these companies succeed, they could locate part of their production on American soil, creating a transatlantic technological bridge.
The predictability of demand fundamentally changes the relationship between the Pentagon and its suppliers. Rather than one-off contracts for unique prototypes, the program offers multi-year visibility on massive volumes. This stability encourages manufacturers to invest in automation, process optimization, and production capacity expansion, creating a virtuous cycle of cost reduction and performance improvement.
Technical and operational challenges to overcome
Despite its ambition and transformative potential, the Drone Dominance program faces significant obstacles that could limit its effectiveness or slow its deployment. These challenges range from technical to organizational to doctrinal.
Vulnerability to electronic jamming remains the main Achilles heel of these systems. The Russians are deploying massive amounts of electronic warfare equipment that disrupts the control links and GPS signals on which most drones rely. While Ukraine is developing countermeasures—improved inertial navigation, autonomous terminal guidance, frequency diversification—the technological race between jammers and counter-jammers is never-ending. A system that is effective today may become obsolete in a matter of months in the face of new enemy tactics.
Doctrinal integration raises complex questions. How can thousands of drones be effectively coordinated with traditional aviation, artillery, and special forces? Who commands these systems at what level? What rules of engagement apply to semi-autonomous platforms capable of striking beyond visual range? The Air Force has created an experimental operational unit to explore these questions, but the answers will not be obvious or unanimous among the different branches of the military.
Logistical bottlenecks could limit operational use even if production reaches the targeted volumes. Deploying, maintaining, recharging, and preparing tens of thousands of drones requires a considerable logistical infrastructure. Frontline units must have batteries, spare parts, light repair capabilities, and launch equipment. Paradoxically, this logistical footprint could weigh down the forces it is supposed to make more agile.
The human factor is another major challenge. Training a sufficient number of drone operators takes time and resources. While Ukrainian FPV systems are relatively easy to fly for anyone who has played video games, complex missions require specific skills. The growing autonomy of these systems partially mitigates this problem but raises ethical and legal questions about delegating lethal decisions to algorithms.
Cybersecurity is a critical vulnerability that is often underestimated. Mass-produced and widely deployed drones offer a considerable attack surface for adversaries seeking to hack, hijack, or disable these systems. Securing hundreds of thousands of devices against intrusion while maintaining operational simplicity and low costs is a formidable technical challenge.
Competition with the Replicator program and other initiatives
The Drone Dominance program operates in a complex institutional landscape where other initiatives pursue similar or complementary goals, potentially creating redundancies and confusion but also opportunities for synergy.
The Replicator program, launched in August 2023 under the Biden administration by Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks, already aimed to acquire thousands of low-cost autonomous systems within two years. Initially managed by the Defense Innovation Unit, Replicator struggled to meet its quantitative goals, delivering only hundreds rather than thousands of drones before the change in administration. The program was renamed the Defense Autonomous Working Group (DAWG) and refocused on larger systems for the Pacific theater, while Drone Dominance focuses on small tactical drones.
This specialization by size creates a theoretical complementarity: DAWG for long-range drones capable of operating over the vast distances of the Pacific, Drone Dominance for short-range tactical systems usable by small units. Emil Michael, Undersecretary for Research and Engineering at the Pentagon, explicitly distinguished the two approaches at the Reagan Forum in December 2025, noting that Hegseth is working on a robust program of small drones while DAWG is focusing on larger systems.
Service-specific programs add another layer of complexity. The Marine Corps announced the purchase of 10,000 drones in 2026. The Army is establishing small drone teams integrated with aviation units. The Air Force is developing its experimental operational unit for single-use attack drones. These parallel initiatives could either create synergies by pooling certain developments or lead to costly duplication and incompatibilities between systems.
The counter-drone dimension is the other side of the equation. The Replicator 2 program, announced in September 2024, focuses specifically on anti-drone capabilities. Joint Interagency Task Force 401 made its first purchase under this initiative in January 2026 with the DroneHunter F700 system. This offensive-defensive duality reflects the reality that any army deploying drones on a massive scale will also have to defend itself against those of its adversary.
The lessons of the past weigh heavily on these programs. Replicator suffered from bureaucratic turf wars and frustrations among some large contractors who felt the Defense Innovation Unit was biased in favor of Silicon Valley startups. The architects of Drone Dominance are attempting to avoid these pitfalls by directly involving operators in the evaluation and creating stable demand rather than unpredictable one-off purchases.
Geopolitical implications and the global drone race
The Drone Dominance program is part of a global technological and industrial competition in which the United States is trying to catch up with its adversaries and even its allies. The geopolitical ramifications extend far beyond the simple acquisition of military equipment.
Ukrainian production is upsetting the established balance. Kiev manufactured more than two million combat drones in 2024, creating a formidable industrial ecosystem forged by necessity. After the war, these capabilities could turn to export, with Ukrainian manufacturers already receiving requests from several European countries as well as Egypt, India, and Pakistan.
One Ukrainian lawmaker has estimated that these sales could generate $20 billion, which would be reinvested in the national defense industry. This prospect worries some analysts, who fear a proliferation of low-cost precision strike technologies to potentially destabilizing actors.
China currently dominates global production of small commercial drones and many critical components. DJI controls about 70% of the global consumer drone market. The Pentagon’s requirement for an entirely American supply chain is explicitly aimed at reducing this strategic dependence, but requires the reconstruction of an industrial base that is virtually non-existent for certain components. This relocation will be more expensive in the short term but guarantees security of supply in the event of conflict.
European allies are closely watching the American initiative. Some, such as France, are developing their own mass drone programs inspired by the Ukrainian experience. Others, particularly in Eastern Europe, which are directly threatened by Russia, may seek to participate in the American program or acquire its results. This dynamic could strengthen NATO interoperability but also create tensions if Washington refuses to share certain sensitive technologies.
The Middle East is another crucial geopolitical theater. The Houthis in Yemen, supported by Iran, have disrupted shipping lanes in the Red Sea with inexpensive drones, demonstrating the strategic effectiveness of these systems even against sophisticated navies. Iran itself exports its Shahed drones to Russia, creating a technological axis of concern for Washington. The US’s ability to mass-produce drones and counter-drones sends a deterrent signal to these actors.
The Taiwan dimension implicitly underlies the entire initiative. In a scenario of Chinese invasion, the ability to rapidly deploy tens of thousands of defensive drones could transform the strategic equation. These inexpensive systems could harass an invasion fleet, attack bridgeheads, disrupt logistics—in short, impose disproportionate costs on the aggressor. Admiral Paparo explicitly linked the proliferation of drones to a shift in the balance between offense and defense in favor of the latter.
The transformation underway transcends purely military considerations to touch on the foundations of industrial and technological power in the 21st century. The country that masters the mass production of low-cost, intelligent autonomous systems will have a strategic advantage comparable to that conferred by air or naval superiority in previous centuries. The Drone Dominance program represents the U.S. attempt to maintain this advantage, but the race has only just begun. Successive iterations of Gauntlet will determine whether this ambition translates into real operational capability or whether it joins the list of major Pentagon announcements that struggle to cross the “valley of death” between promising prototype and large-scale deployment.
Sources
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