Why Indonesia and the United Arab Emirates are betting on the Rafale to limit US ITAR control, secure their upgrades, and diversify their alliances.
In summary
For several countries, the Rafale has become an instrument of non-alignment rather than a simple arms purchase. The idea is simple: to reduce the bottlenecks associated with US exports and their rules (ITAR), without breaking ties with Washington. The United Arab Emirates has signed a contract for 80 Rafale F4s, valued at around €16-17 billion depending on the scope, and has already unveiled the first aircraft, with initial deliveries announced for the end of 2026. In January 2026, Indonesia received its first batch of three Rafale aircraft, the first stage of an order for 42 aircraft as part of a naval and industrial cooperation package worth around $8 billion. Behind these figures lies the issue of technological control: access to software upgrades, weapons integration, data sovereignty, and freedom of resale. The Rafale is not a magic “pass” against all constraints, but it reduces the likelihood of a US veto on key choices.
The Rafale as a political signal rather than a technical choice
Buying a fighter jet is never a neutral decision. A squadron contract commits a country for 30 to 40 years, well beyond changes in government. The Rafale has carved out a niche for itself: that of countries that want to modernize quickly, but without accepting that an external partner can block, slow down, or condition the use of the system.
The term is often used in a simplified way: ITAR-free. In industrial language, this refers to a product designed to avoid any legal dependence on US exports. European institutions also distinguish between “ITAR-free” and “ITAR-light”: minimizing the US footprint rather than eliminating it entirely. In practice, a modern fighter jet incorporates hundreds of subsystems. “Zero components” is rare, especially when it comes to sensors, electronics, or dual-use components. The real issue is therefore the ability to limit “veto points.”
This is where the Rafale scores points. It offers an architecture and decision-making chain dominated by France and European manufacturers. This does not mean there are no constraints. It means there is less risk that a political debate in Washington will turn into technical leverage over your fleet.
The reality of ITAR and the issue of remote control
ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations) is the US regulation governing the export, re-export, and sometimes the use of US-origin hardware, software, or data. As soon as a system incorporates certain elements subject to ITAR, a state may find itself subject to authorizations, delays, or even refusals on upgrades, transfers, or resales.
Purchasing countries are therefore looking for three things.
First, control over updates. A modern aircraft is no longer “frozen” at delivery. It evolves through software standards, patches, threat libraries, computer updates, and developments in radar and electronic warfare modes. The greater the dependence, the more sovereignty is diminished.
Second, data sovereignty. Fleets generate mission data, sensor parameters, and tactical libraries. In some highly integrated ecosystems, the issue becomes political: who hosts, who audits, who validates, who can refuse?
Finally, there is freedom of integration. A state wants to be able to add or adapt weapons, data links, pods, or national systems without having to systematically seek third-party authorizations. This is often where ITAR comes into play, because integrating weapons is as much a matter of software as it is of mechanics.
The United Arab Emirates: the Rafale as a credible alternative to the F-35
The case of the UAE is emblematic. The country wanted to rapidly upgrade its air force. In December 2021, it signed a deal to purchase 80 Rafale F4s, a record export for French industry.
When it comes to the figures, we need to be precise. The French ministry valued the Rafale component at around €16 billion (including a portion for weapons), while Reuters cited a total of around €17 billion, including other parts of the package. The difference is not insignificant: it serves as a reminder that the “aircraft price” is often misleading. The real cost includes ammunition, initial support, training, infrastructure, simulators, and sometimes ramp-up options.
The timeline also illustrates the industrial nature of the subject. At the end of January 2025, Dassault presented the first Rafale aircraft destined for the Emirates, indicating that the first deliveries were planned for the end of 2026. This long-term mechanism is at the heart of “non-alignment”: you are not just buying an airframe, you are buying the right to evolve.
The issue of national armaments and operational autonomy
The Emirates do not want only imported missiles. They also want to be able to arm their aircraft with ammunition that they control and can produce or co-develop. This is where the logic of national armaments becomes strategic.
One concrete example has been widely discussed: the announced integration of Emirati guided weapons into the Rafale fleet, which reflects a desire to retain control over part of the “sensor-decision-effect” chain. This type of integration also sends a message: “we are choosing an aircraft capable of absorbing our industry, not just consuming foreign catalogs.”
Indonesia: the Rafale for diversification without tying its hands
Indonesia is pursuing a pragmatic modernization program. It wants to cover a vast archipelago, secure its maritime approaches, and replace aging heterogeneous fleets. In this context, it has ordered 42 Rafales and has begun to take delivery of them.
In January 2026, Jakarta officially received the first batch of three Rafales, the first stage in the delivery of the order. Reuters estimates the overall agreement to be worth around $8 billion, noting that it is part of a broader cooperation that also includes naval capabilities.
This case illustrates a point that is often misunderstood: “non-alignment” is not anti-Americanism. It is about reducing the risk of a single supplier becoming indispensable. Indonesia is exploring and comparing. It is in discussions with several countries and several platforms. The Rafale, in this logic, serves as a non-American Western “foundation.”
ITAR as a variable in the calculation, not as a slogan
For Indonesia, the constraint is not theoretical. US rules and sanctions can weigh on certain purchases, transfers, or diversification trajectories. An aircraft with a strong American footprint reduces the room for maneuver, especially if Indonesia wants to maintain a diverse portfolio of partners.
The Rafale does not eliminate all external dependence. It shifts the center of gravity. It reduces the number of scenarios in which a decision in Washington determines the evolution of the fleet, the compatibility of certain weapons, or future resale to a third-party partner.
Other customers who are also buying room for maneuver
Interest in the Rafale extends far beyond Indonesia and the Emirates. The list of export customers has grown, with sometimes different motivations but a common thread: the search for strategic autonomy.
Serbia, for example, has signed up for 12 Rafales. Reuters estimates the contract to be worth €2.7 billion and highlights the symbolic shift of a country historically equipped with Soviet technology towards a French solution, displaying military “neutrality.”
Greece has accelerated its acquisitions with a mixed formula (new aircraft and aircraft taken from French stocks) to quickly strengthen its position. The published costs vary depending on the scope, but one thing is clear: the purchase also includes weapons and support, not just aircraft.
Croatia has opted for 12 second-hand Rafales, at a cost of around €1 billion according to figures regularly cited at the time, favoring a European package over other offers.
Egypt and Qatar, for their part, have made the Rafale a pillar of their combat aviation, with large orders and a logic of strategic continuity.
This overview puts one figure into perspective: Reuters reported at the end of 2025 that the Rafale had a total of 533 confirmed orders, a sign that the program had reached commercial maturity.
What buyers really get when they pay more
The Rafale is rarely the cheapest option when comparing “bare” prices. But this comparison is often misleading. A fighter jet is judged on its freedom of deployment, its capacity for rapid deployment, and the cost of political obstacles.
Three benefits are frequently mentioned in military discussions.
The first is freedom of integration: European weapons, national ammunition, local adaptations, and consistency with existing command systems.
The second is the reduction of the risk of political “chain breaks.” States no longer want to discover, in the midst of a crisis, that a component, a software key, an update, or a weapon depends on external approval.
The third is industrial: offsets, local maintenance, and knowledge transfer. This is not ideology. It is resilience. This is the meaning of industrial offsets: buying a capability, but also buying the ability to support it.
The limits of the model and the blind spots of the “ITAR-free” narrative
Let’s be honest. The Rafale is not a perfect “sovereign bubble.”
First, a customer remains dependent on a supplier. It’s just that this supplier is not Washington. It is Paris and the French and European industrial ecosystem. The balance of power still exists, even if it is different.
Second, the “ITAR-free” argument is sometimes presented as binary, when in fact it is gradual. Much Western equipment seeks above all to become “ITAR-light,” i.e., to limit the components and data subject to U.S. control.
Finally, there is the industrial bottleneck. When orders pile up, theoretical sovereignty comes up against scheduling constraints. States want fast delivery, accelerated training, and high availability. However, production rates remain a constraint, and arbitration between customers becomes political.
In this landscape, the Rafale looks less like a miracle aircraft and more like insurance against single-source dependency. This is exactly what countries are looking for when they want to play on several fronts without being tied to just one.
Sources
Reuters, “Cementing ties with France, UAE places $19 billion order for Rafale fighter jets,” December 3, 2021.
Dassault Aviation, “Historical contract for the acquisition of 80 Rafale F4 by the United Arab Emirates,” December 3, 2021.
FlightGlobal, “UAE triggers 80-aircraft Rafale contract,” April 19, 2022.
Dassault Aviation, “Presentation of the first United Arab Emirates Rafale,” January 30, 2025.
Reuters, “Indonesia receives first Rafale advanced fighter jets from France, official says,” January 26, 2026.
Reuters, “Serbia buys 12 Rafale jets from France’s Dassault Aviation for 2.7 billion euros,” August 29, 2024.
Dassault Aviation, “Serbia acquires 12 Rafale fighters,” August 29, 2024.
European Parliament (EPRS), note on the US defense industry and the concept of “ITAR free/ITAR light,” October 16, 2025.
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