Strategic, industrial, and technical analysis of the future prospects for autonomous fighter jets and remotely piloted aircraft.

A profound change in the role of the pilot

The development of autonomous fighter jets or remotely piloted aircraft is no longer a speculative hypothesis. It is now a direction being pursued by several military programs, integrating artificial intelligence, encrypted tactical communications, and partial or total robotization of air missions. Air combat is gradually moving toward a decentralized architecture, where the role of the pilot evolves, shifts, or disappears depending on the nature of the mission.

Projects such as the Australian MQ-28 Ghost Bat, the German Remote Carrier (NGWS), and the US Air Force’s work on the Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) confirm this trend. These aircraft are designed to fly in support, reconnaissance or even interception roles, alone or in swarms, while being partially or fully autonomous.

The disruption is not only technological. It involves structural transformations: doctrine of use, supply chain, compatibility with current systems, redefinition of operational roles, and reorganization of the tactical decision cycle. This change also raises questions about industrial sovereignty, vulnerability to jamming, and overall cost.

This article examines the concrete prospects for the integration of autonomous or remotely piloted fighter aircraft, assessing existing models, technical limitations, emerging doctrines, and strategic implications for the coming decades.

A technological overview: platforms, performance, programs

The idea of an autonomous fighter jet is no longer a theoretical prototype. Several operational demonstrators are in flight, supported by national or industrial consortia. The MQ-28 Ghost Bat, developed by Boeing Australia, has been flying since 2021. Measuring 11.7 meters long, it carries ISR sensors and modular offensive payloads. It is designed to operate alongside an F-35 or F/A-18, without a pilot, and at a cost of less than $21 million per unit.

The USAF’s Skyborg incorporates AI capable of handling simple tactical missions, such as tracking or supporting a piloted combat aircraft. The aim is to make it a robotic wingman capable of taking initiatives under human supervision. The CCA (Collaborative Combat Aircraft) program, part of the NGAD, plans to produce 1,000 aircraft of this type by 2030, with a budget of $5.4 billion approved for 2025.

In Europe, Airbus and Dassault are developing Remote Carriers as part of the SCAF (Future Air Combat System). These autonomous or remotely piloted drones will operate in tandem with the NGF (Next Generation Fighter) and will be able to jam radars, attack ground-to-air defenses, and provide communication relays. The emphasis is on modularity, with disposable or reusable platforms.

China, for its part, has unveiled several unmanned stealth prototypes, including the FH-97A, which combines passive detection, decoys, and combat capabilities. According to open data, Beijing intends to integrate these platforms into its J-20 by 2027, developing distributed AI command logic.

Development is based on robust software architectures capable of operating in semi-autonomous or completely independent modes. This requires onboard computing power, multi-spectral sensors, optimized propulsion, and enhanced immunity to electronic warfare. These requirements explain why few projects have yet crossed the threshold of industrialization.

Tactical advantages: resilience, saturation, and reduced attrition

The main tactical advantage of a remotely piloted or autonomous aircraft is that it reduces human risk while multiplying the effects on the battlefield. A drone can operate beyond the front line, penetrate airspace saturated with ground-to-air defenses, or be sacrificed in a saturation maneuver. The cost of loss becomes bearable compared to that of a conventional fighter jet, estimated at $60–100 million depending on the configuration.

Use in coordinated swarms makes it possible to saturate enemy detection. By combining four to six autonomous drones, piloted by a single central unit (human or AI), air forces can create a decentralized structure that is difficult to intercept. In simulations, the US Air Force has demonstrated that these configurations offer 35% greater resilience on average against S-400 systems.

Another advantage is persistence. An autonomous aircraft can remain in flight for up to 18 hours depending on the configuration, with passive standby phases, without fatigue or interruption. This allows for long surveillance or patrol missions without the need for human refueling, recovery, or complex retrieval.

The ability to carry out precision strikes is also enhanced. In urban or semi-concealed environments, an autonomous aircraft can strike with reduced latency, based on onboard optical or infrared sensors, without centralized validation delays. The MQ-9 Reaper, although still remotely piloted, is a partially prefigurative version, with an operating cost of $3,500 per flight hour, well below that of a Rafale.

Integration into a hybrid air structure optimizes overall availability. A squadron composed of 40% remotely piloted aircraft can double its rotation rate, reduce maintenance costs, and spread risks. This allows for a gradual ramp-up without any disruption in capacity.

Operational limitations: vulnerabilities, legality, and doctrine of use

Despite their advantages, autonomous or remotely piloted aircraft have significant technical and doctrinal weaknesses. The first critical factor remains vulnerability to jamming. Even encrypted tactical data links can be disrupted by powerful electronic warfare systems. The Russian Khmeimim and PLA bases in the South China Sea deploy jammers capable of neutralizing signals within a 300 km radius.

Loss of connection results in either automatic return or preprogrammed behavior, but deprives the chain of command of its ability to adapt. Russia experienced this weakness with Forpost drones in Ukraine, which were unable to continue their mission after GPS disruption.

Decision-making autonomy also raises legal questions. Who bears responsibility in the event of a firing error, collateral damage, or violation of international humanitarian law? The delegation of the use of force to AI remains unclear in conventional terms. Several international organizations are campaigning for a ban on fully autonomous lethal systems without direct human supervision.

In terms of doctrine, the deployment of these devices requires a complete transformation of practices:

• Adaptation of C2 (Command & Control) architecture,
• Modification of targeting chains,
• Creation of AI-human tactical communication doctrines,
• Redefinition of the role of traditional pilots,
• And training in multi-device supervision.

The transition to a mixed structure also requires an overhaul of maintenance, simulators, and the supply chain. According to Pentagon estimates, economies of scale will only become apparent once more than 100 units are in service.

Strategic outlook: industrialization, deterrence, competition

In the long term, autonomous fighter jets are part of a strategy for the rapid industrialization of air superiority. Their low unit cost, rapid production (less than 18 months for some platforms), and adaptability through software updates give them an advantage in the event of prolonged conflict or massive losses.

France, for example, plans to integrate remotely piloted SCAF drones by 2035 to complement the successor to the Rafale. The United States is aiming for a fleet of CCAs to accompany 400 NGADs over 25 years. China is working on integrated systems with high redundancy, capable of operating with or without ground contact, depending on theater conditions.

The role of these aircraft goes beyond simple tactical support. They are becoming a strategic deterrent, capable of striking quickly and far away, without human constraints. In high-intensity war scenarios, the possibility of deploying hundreds of combat drones launched from secondary bases alters the balance of power between nations.

It remains to be seen whether industrial choices will follow suit. The initial R&D cost of a program such as CCA already exceeds $7 billion. Political acceptability, algorithmic control, the risks of decision-making spirals, and rules of engagement will need to be clearly defined.

However, the cost-effectiveness ratio could make this trend difficult to curb. If a remotely piloted aircraft can perform 80% of a fighter’s missions at 25% of the cost, budgetary logic will eventually make it the operational standard.

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