Kiev shares its lead in drone warfare with NATO: training, joint industry, naval drones, and long-range strikes.
Summary
With three and a half years of drone warfare, Ukraine has built up unique expertise that it is beginning to transfer to its NATO partners. Kyiv has set up anti-UAS schools, industrialized low-cost interceptors, and pushed back the Russian fleet in the Black Sea through the use of naval drones. This experience extends to long-range strikes on Russian refineries, which are now weighing on Moscow’s economy and logistics. The European debate is gathering pace: training missions in Northern Europe, joint centers in Poland, joint production of interceptors in the United Kingdom, and industrial projects in Romania. Tactically, the front line has turned into a “wall of drones” where exposing personnel or armored vehicles quickly results in casualties. The challenge for the allies is no longer conceptual but pragmatic: to adopt the Ukrainian method, shorten adaptation cycles in the face of electronic warfare, and finance scalable solutions rather than overly costly measures against low-cost threats.
The context and Ukraine’s rise to power
Since February 2022, Kiev has acknowledged an unfavorable imbalance in manpower, artillery, and aviation. The response has been to generalize the use of drones: FPV quadcopters with payloads of 0.5 to 2 kg, remotely operated munitions, fixed-wing reconnaissance aircraft, robotic logistics platforms, and, behind the scenes, an increase in the capacity of programming, assembly, and repair units. On the line of contact, Ukrainian commanders now describe a “kill zone” of about 10 km on either side of the front, saturated with devices capable of identifying a vehicle or combat group in a matter of seconds. This density greatly reduces freedom of movement beyond the edges and forces movements to be split up, including for repairs and resupply. It also limits the use of mechanized columns, which become detectable and vulnerable as soon as they leave cover.
The term “wall of drones” is appropriate: through its networks of operators, relays, and field workshops, Ukraine has put in place a functional barrier rather than a physical line. The benefit is twofold: compensating for the shortage of shells and slowing down enemy advances through continuous attrition. The pace of innovation is high: new payloads, cameras, links, and scripts appear in cycles of a few weeks, quickly copied and countered. This “short tempo” requires dealing with the entire chain: component acquisition, testing, doctrine of use, training, feedback, iteration. For the allies, the lesson is not theoretical: without modular stocks and teams capable of tinkering and repairing within 24-72 hours, no anti-UAS solution is sustainable in contact.
Anti-drone defense shared with NATO
The European debate has intensified following drone incursions and acts of sabotage attributed to Russia. In Copenhagen, at the European Political Community summit, leaders called for tougher responses, while Mark Rutte, Secretary General of NATO, praised Ukraine as an “innovation powerhouse” in anti-drone technology. This political emphasis has been reflected in operational terms: Kiev has deployed a team of instructors to Denmark to share procedures, sensors, and training in anti-UAS warfare. At the same time, Poland has opened “Camp Jomsborg,” a joint Ukraine-NATO center that can accommodate approximately 1,200 trainees at a time, a rare facility in Europe for both technical (detection, jamming, kinetics) and tactical (setting up local bubbles, base and convoy drills) modules. ([AP News][4])
Beyond the sessions, the focus is on the “Ukrainian method”: prioritizing anti-drone defense in layers — passive sensors, compact radars, spectrum monitoring, directional electromagnetic warfare, rapid-fire weapons, armed patrol boats or pick-ups, and even reusable interceptors. Feedback from trainees shows that effectiveness depends not only on equipment, but also on the rigorous application of rules: assignment of blind spots, responsibility grids, scenario rehearsals, and 24-hour false alarm audits to adjust thresholds. One sensitive issue often comes up: inter-service coordination to avoid fratricidal fire on friendly or civilian targets. Identification standards and dedicated corridors become essential when operating in densely populated areas.
Naval drones and the reversal of the Black Sea
One of the most dramatic shifts can be seen in the Black Sea. Ukrainian naval drones, armed with explosives or decoy sensors, have forced the Russian fleet to retreat to better-protected ports in the east, reducing its presence off the coast of Crimea. In the spring of 2025, Kiev took a step forward by combining surface platforms and missiles: a Su-30 was shot down by a missile fired from a USV, a world first, signaling that air-sea warfare now includes unmanned vehicles as “launchers.” The operational effect is tangible: increased threat to transit, slowed naval logistics, and higher escort costs for Moscow.
This pressure has freed up margins for grain flows and coastal reconnaissance raids. It also forces European navies to revise their port protection plans: RHIB patrols equipped with directional jammers, thermal camera chains, anti-USV barriers, and short air patrols equipped with anti-surface loitering munitions. Finally, accident statistics show that these vectors require increased safety discipline: restricted areas, light beacons, and “boat hook” interception procedures (nets, grappling hooks, non-lethal charges) to avoid the systematic use of costly missiles. Port insurers and energy operators are taking this into account with adjusted premiums, maritime fence audits, and quarterly exercises required by certain contracts.
Long-range strikes on the Russian economy
The other aspect is long range. Since the summer of 2025, Kiev has intensified deep drone strikes against Russian refineries, depots, and logistics hubs. According to several sources, between 30% and 40% of refining capacity has been disrupted by the cumulative attacks, causing gasoline shortages, queues, and local rationing, particularly in Crimea. The Russian authorities have been forced to restrict gasoline exports, import from neighboring countries, and resort to additive substitutions. This campaign does not “shut down” production, but it does cause lasting disruptions: unplanned maintenance, lower yields, rail rerouting, and stock-consumption arbitrage. The effects can be seen in wholesale prices, distributor margins, and logistical pressure on the depot-pipeline-station continuum.
Militarily, these blows to the rear hamper the supply of JP-8 kerosene, oils, and fuels to forward units. They also complicate equipment repair work. Operation Spiderweb in June 2025 demonstrated Ukraine’s ability to strike deep into air bases using unmanned assets, with significant aircraft losses reported by various open sources. The combination of “energy pressure” and “aircraft attrition” aims to reduce the Russian side’s output and increase the cost of each hour of flight over time. The message sent to allies is clear: well-targeted drones, backed by multi-source intelligence, can achieve strategic effects at a fraction of the cost of conventional strikes.
Joint production and the economics of interceptors
To keep pace with the threat, London has approved the mass production of interceptors designed with Ukraine, announced at DSEI 2025: the target is “several thousand per month,” with a unit cost well below 10% of that of a Shahed-136 (≈ €33,000), according to official statements. The benefits are both economic and tactical: recoverable devices, adaptable payloads, and responsiveness against slow-moving, low-altitude targets. At the same time, Bucharest is negotiating an industrial arrangement with Kiev, via an EU-funded scheme, to deploy local lines for the protection of the eastern flank and intra-NATO exports. This approach reduces lead times, creates redundant industrial bases, and mitigates dependence on systems that are too costly to deal with low-cost threats.
Beyond drones, these agreements trigger knock-on effects: simulators, mission planning software, RF test benches, and parts supply chains. They also impose standardization choices: pitch diameters, power connectors, telemetry protocols. This is where Ukraine’s experience counts: Kiev favors “sufficient” formats over perfect ones, in order to deliver quickly, repair quickly, and iterate quickly. For Europe, the challenge is to make these short cycles structural without sacrificing security: streamlined but robust certifications, price-capped contracts with incentives for speed, and controlled export clauses for allies.
Strategic implications and limitations to be corrected
Three lessons are clear. First, Europe will not catch up with Ukraine through abstract five-year plans: it must absorb its “field” TTPs—low-cost multi-sensor detection, prioritization of non-kinetic neutralization, and “Kanban bin” parts logistics at bases and convoys. Second, electronic warfare often determines the local outcome: directional jammers, tracking of “hopping” frequencies, and hardening of fiber or narrow beam links. Thirdly, training must stop pitting cyber, air, and land against each other: anti-UAS warfare is joint in nature and requires regular joint exercises, including in urban environments. All this comes at a cost, but it is cheaper than firing a missile worth several hundred thousand euros at a target worth a few thousand.
There are still limitations. Adversarial countermeasures are evolving: jamming-resistant fiber drones, “low signature” trajectories, mixed swarms. The answer is not “all kinetic”: it combines RF filtering, digital decoys, high-rate-of-fire cannons, low-power lasers for sensors, and physical barriers around sensitive sites. Finally, NATO must accept friction: identification incidents, false alarms, interceptor fragments to manage. The alternative is to let the adversary dictate the pace. In this area, Ukraine is showing a direct, pragmatic, and uncompromising path: produce, test, break, correct, and start again. Europeans who want to hold the line no longer have the luxury of waiting.
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