Brussels finalizes 11 more F-35As and wants to “Europeanize” them via Cameri. Military relevance, integration, costs, schedule, and limitations.
Summary
Belgium is finalizing the purchase of 11 additional F-35As, intended to supplement the initial order of 34 aircraft and bring the planned fleet to 45 aircraft. The government is presenting this “top-up” as a response to the ongoing deterioration of the security environment and as a means of meeting NATO obligations without exhausting an already understaffed fleet. The novelty is political: Brussels wants this second batch to be “as European as possible,” requesting final assembly in Cameri, Italy, and more visible industrial benefits. Fundamentally, the debate that “Belgian airspace is too small” is a red herring: the aircraft is being purchased for alert, coalition, deployment, and networked combat, not just to fly over the country’s territory. The real issue is the cost of ownership over 30 years, actual availability, and the ability to finance, in parallel, ground-to-air defense and base resilience.
Belgium’s choice of a second batch says more than it seems
Belgium is not “discovering” the F-35. It has already ordered 34. The first deliveries have begun, with some of the aircraft stationed in the United States to train pilots and mechanics, and a symbolic arrival in Belgium at Florennes in the fall of 2025. The announcement of an additional purchase of 11 aircraft is part of a clear trajectory: to rapidly rebuild defense capabilities, reposition itself within NATO, and correct a format deemed too fragile to last.
The key point is operational arithmetic. A fleet of 34 fighters makes it possible to replace the F-16 and meet NATO commitments. But it leaves little margin once heavy maintenance, training, downtime, and deployments are taken into account. A move to 45 aims, very concretely, to stabilize two areas: aircraft in service for alert and operations, and aircraft dedicated to transformation (training, ramp-up, standardization). In an alliance that now requires “long-term commitment,” this is a sign of credibility.
It is also a European political choice. Brussels wants to remain in the “F-35 club” without being accused of buying exclusively outside Europe. Hence the refrain in Minister Theo Francken’s statements: make this second batch “as European as possible.”
The relevance of an F-35 for Belgium, without false debates
The question of “too small a sky” is a false argument
The argument is intuitive, so it comes up often: Belgium is small, so a 5th generation fighter would be “oversized.” This is a geographical interpretation, not a strategic one. A modern fighter jet is not purchased solely to patrol a national airspace. It is purchased to provide early warning, intercept, escort, strike, gather intelligence, and above all, operate in coalition. In these scenarios, Belgian airspace is a starting point, not a playground.
Even for training, the days of flying only “above base” are over. Air forces are shifting to a mix of simulators, synthetic training, multinational exercises, and large areas abroad. The fact that Belgian F-35s are already engaged in the training cycle at Luke Air Force Base illustrates this model.
The added value of the F-35, as seen by a medium-sized air force
The F-35 Lightning II brings three concrete advantages to a force such as the Belgian Air Component.
First, survivability. Stealth does not make it “invisible,” but it does make detection and engagement more difficult, especially against modern surface-to-air defenses. Second, the F-35 is a flying sensor: its strength lies in merging information (radar, optronics, electronic warfare, data links) and redistributing a usable tactical picture to other platforms. Finally, NATO standardization becomes a multiplier: the more F-35s Europe fields, the easier it becomes to integrate missions, standardize procedures, and simplify logistics.
To give an order of magnitude, the official US Air Force data sheet indicates a ceiling of over 15 km (50,000 ft) and a combat radius of approximately 1,093 km (590 nm) on internal fuel, with an internal capacity of approximately 8,391 kg (18,498 lb). In other words, even for a compact country, the aircraft is designed to project power at a distance, not to “turn short.”
Integration into the Belgian Air Component, base by base
The transition is structured around two sites: Florennes as the entry and ramp-up base, then Kleine-Brogel to consolidate the format and operational permanence. Specialized sources indicate that the first deliveries to Kleine-Brogel would take place from 2027 onwards, corresponding to a gradual ramp-up, base by base.
However, the F-35 imposes heavy requirements. It requires suitable hangars, specific maintenance areas related to coatings and discretion, enhanced security procedures, and robust connectivity. This is no small detail: part of the cost is related to infrastructure, support resources, and personnel, not just the aircraft itself.
The human factor is just as crucial. Training an F-35 pilot is not just about teaching them how to fly. They must be taught how to manage a volume of information, produce network effects, remain effective in a jamming environment, and work with other sensors (AWACS, drones, ground-to-air). In this context, a top-up of 11 aircraft can reduce a classic bottleneck: too few aircraft to train, maintain alertness, and deploy without compromising availability.
The budget and the bill, where slogans break down
The figures must be addressed on three levels, otherwise the debate becomes ideological.
The first level is the life cycle cost. When the decision was made in 2018, the Belgian authorities reported a 40-year cost of approximately €12.4 billion (revised downwards from higher initial estimates). This is the figure that matters politically, as it aggregates operation, support, modernization, and maintenance.
The second factor is the national budget trajectory. In 2025, the government set a target of 2% of GDP, with a defense budget of around €12.8 billion. This increase creates political space to finance an additional batch, but it does not make the decision “easy”: Belgium must also finance ground-to-air defense, ground forces, the navy, and ammunition stocks.
The third level is the marginal cost of the top-up. A 2025 article on Belgian planning mentions a budget of around €1.67 billion for 11 additional aircraft, with a planned rather than emergency purchase approach. This amount is considerable on a Belgian scale, but consistent for a follow-up purchase, especially if Brussels obtains more production and maintenance anchored in Europe.
The main risk is not the purchase “check.” It is the cost of ownership over 30 years: parts availability, engine management, software upgrades, dependence on supply chains, and contractual discipline. This is where F-35 fleets come into play, and this is where political opponents often find strong arguments.
The “most European possible” card, between pragmatism and politics
The role of the Cameri site and what it really enables
Demanding final assembly in Cameri, Italy, sends a message. The Italian site is not an empty symbol: it already assembles F-35s for Italy and the Netherlands, and is described as a European pillar of the program, with assembly functions and a regional role in maintenance, repair, and modernization (MRO&U) according to several industry publications.
But we must be clear about the limitations. Having the aircraft assembled in Cameri does not make it “European” in terms of technological sovereignty. The critical components remain American (program architecture, core software, intellectual property, some of the sensors). Cameri brings value, jobs, and know-how to the continent. It does not change the structural dependence. It is a compromise: politically defensible, technically useful, strategically partial.
Belgian benefits, especially around the engine
Belgium is also seeking to establish a domestic industrial base. Announcements have highlighted cooperation around F135 engine components, involving Safran Aero Boosters and BMT Aerospace, as part of a European supply chain approach. For Brussels, this is a lever: a larger fleet makes these benefits more credible and sustainable.
This explains the tone used by the minister: industrial return first, “Europeanization” second. The goal is to be able to say to Parliament: yes, it is an American purchase, but it creates jobs in Europe and adds value in Belgium.
The delivery schedule and points of friction to watch
Several elements of the schedule are already public knowledge. The first deliveries began at the end of 2025: some aircraft are based in Belgium and others remain in the United States for training, which is a classic pattern for new entrants.
For the second base, sources in the aviation press indicate that the first aircraft will arrive at Kleine-Brogel from 2027. This is an important milestone: it determines operational permanence at two sites, and therefore resilience.
For the batch of 11, the intention is to sign in 2026. Deliveries would logically follow the “first wave” already ordered. But Belgium adds a variable: assembly in Cameri. Obtaining this arbitration may be politically profitable. It may also introduce industrial constraints if the Italian line is already busy with other European customers. In this case, “doing more European” does not guarantee “going faster.”
Finally, the most sensitive issue is availability. The goal is not to have 45 aircraft on paper. The goal is to have enough aircraft available every day for alert, training, and operational deployment without compromising the rest. Until Brussels publishes clear targets (availability rate, operating cost, modernization volumes), the debate will continue to be dominated by positions of principle.
Belgium’s place in the European F-35 dynamic
The Belgian top-up is part of a densification of the F-35 fleet in Europe. This strengthens deterrence and NATO integration, and facilitates certain forms of pooling. But it also increases collective dependence: updates, cyber constraints, logistics, and industrial trade-offs remain largely structured around the American program.
This is where Belgium is attempting to walk a tightrope. It is confirming a strong technological choice, which it has been committed to since 2018. And it is trying to correct the political blind spot by pulling the program towards Europe, at least in terms of assembly and maintenance. This compromise is imperfect. It is consistent with the reality of a country that wants to have influence in a coalition, without being able to finance an entire fighter jet industry on its own.
What happens next will depend on very prosaic criteria: how many aircraft are actually available, at what cost, and with what level of base resilience. If these three parameters are met, the “top-up” will make sense. Otherwise, it will become just another purchase, vulnerable to every budget crisis.
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