Bangkok confirms its choice of Gripen E/F for the Royal Thai Air Force. Context, budget, missions, and geostrategic effects: technical and numerical analysis.
Thailand has confirmed the acquisition of Gripen E/F from Saab, the first tranche of four aircraft (three E and one F) to be delivered between 2025 and 2030, with a target of 12 aircraft. This decision comes after the US refused to sell F-35As in 2023 and alternative offers of F-16Vs or F-15EXs. Bangkok’s calculation combines overall cost, schedule, industrial transfer, and consistency with the Swedish ecosystem already in service (Gripen C/D and Saab 340 Erieye). The contract package is worth around SEK 5.3 billion (≈ €455–470 million) for the first tranche, including equipment, support, and training.
Technically, the Gripen E is based on an ES-05 Raven AESA radar, a Skyward-G IRST and an F414-GE-39E turbojet engine (98 kN), with the option of using the Meteor missile. The stakes are not only about capability: it is reshuffling the deck in Southeast Asia, where the Royal Thai Air Force is seeking to modernize its air defense and diversify its partnerships.
The regional context and the state of the Thai fleet
The Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) has been engaged in a phased modernization program for the past 15 years. It already operates 11 Gripen C/Ds based in Surat Thani (Wing 7), a core that has gradually structured early warning and interception in the south of the country. At the same time, the RTAF maintains older F-16s and F-5s that are reaching the end of their service life, resulting in rising costs and fluctuating availability. The regional landscape is pushing for an upgrade: Singapore is strengthening its fleet of F-15SGs and will receive F-35Bs; Indonesia is investing in Rafales and F-15s; Malaysia is introducing the FA-50; Vietnam still relies on Su-27/30s. In this context, Bangkok must cover an extensive airspace, two coastlines (the Gulf of Thailand and the Andaman Sea) and sensitive land routes, with demanding tropical weather conditions.
The first milestone was reached in 2011 with the delivery of Gripen C/D and Saab 340 Erieye (AWACS) aircraft, which brought the RTAF into a network-centric mindset. These assets professionalized the QRA posture, improved maritime detection, and facilitated combined training with partners. However, the aging of part of the fleet and the US refusal to supply F-35As precipitated the need for a credible successor to the F-16 A/Bs. This led to the launch of a pragmatic competition: consolidate the Swedish industry, or switch to a current American standard (F-16V) or heavy standard (F-15EX). The first tranche of Gripen E/F aircraft is therefore serving as a catalyst for a broader shift: renewing one squadron, then gradually expanding the fleet, while maintaining sensor compatibility with the existing Erieye architecture. For the RTAF, the criterion is not only flight performance, but also the system effect: sensors, links, maintenance, and increased availability.
Sweden chosen over Lockheed Martin or Boeing
Why Saab and not Lockheed Martin or Boeing? First, because the rejection of the F-35A closed the stealth option in the short term, and the switch to the F-16V or F-15EX involved different compromises. The F-16V offers continuity in training and infrastructure, but the system architecture would remain less integrated with the Swedish ecosystem already in place. The F-15EX offers exceptional payload and high autonomy, at the cost of higher acquisition and operating costs and a major adaptation of bases.
Sweden’s gamble is based on four levers. One, network consistency: Gripen E is Link 16 native and interfaces ideally with Erieye, enabling more “sensor-centric” interception. Two, the industrial agenda and technology: the Gripen E/F configuration (ES-05 Raven wide-area AESA radar, Skyward-G IRST, advanced electronic warfare) meets BVR and passive detection requirements without requiring a complete overhaul of the infrastructure. Three, the overall cost: the initial package of four aircraft is priced at around SEK 5.3 billion, including support and training; on a per-unit basis, this typically amounts to more than €110 million per airframe with its services, a competitive level compared to heavy alternatives. Four, the offer of compensation and transfers: the Swedish manufacturer has laid the groundwork for cooperation and local skills development (support, electronics, MCO), which is important in a country attached to national value and logistical resilience.
A political factor must also be added: diversification. Bangkok remains a major non-NATO ally of Washington, but wishes to reduce its unilateral dependence. Relying on Saab, while retaining modernized F-16s, creates a more robust operational mix, capable of absorbing the vagaries of exports, parts, or embargoes. Finally, the maturity of the Gripen C/D within the RTAF reduces the risk of integration: procedures, tools, stocks, and know-how already exist, which speeds up the rollout of the Gripen E/F.
Budget, schedule, and technical architecture
The first phase (four aircraft) is framed by a national budget of approximately 19 to 19.5 billion baht for 2025-2029, supplemented by an industrial contract estimated at SEK 5.3 billion (≈ €455-470 million) covering three single-seat E aircraft and one two-seat F aircraft, plus equipment, support, and training. The schedule calls for deliveries to be staggered between 2025 and 2030, with a long-term goal of 12 aircraft. Gripen C/D pilot conversions will be carried out in stages, with an emphasis on data fusion and BVR employment.
In terms of aircraft specifications, the Gripen E has a length of 15.2 m, a wingspan of 8.6 m, and a maximum takeoff weight of 16.5 t. Its F414-GE-39E turbojet engine develops 98 kN with afterburner; range is increased by increased internal fuel capacity, optional conformal fuel tanks, and in-flight refueling. The ES-05 Raven AESA (active electronically scanned array) radar simultaneously processes air-to-air and air-to-ground signals and contributes to low probability of interception modes. The Skyward-G IRST enables passive detection of long-range targets, useful against low-signature adversaries or in cluttered environments. In terms of armament, Thailand will be able to retain its existing arsenal (AMRAAM, Sidewinder) and introduce European capabilities such as Meteor, extending its range and zone of interdiction.
The support logic (modular system, simplified maintenance access, short combat turnaround) remains an asset: the airframe is designed for rapid turnarounds on the runway, even in hot and humid conditions. Financially, the “real” unit investment includes items that are often underestimated in consumer comparisons: ground tools, critical parts, high-fidelity simulators, initial ammunition, technical documentation, and training. This approach limits subsequent cost overruns. For public finances, phasing the effort over a decade (until 2034) smooths out payments in baht and reduces the budget peak while maintaining operational availability.
Geostrategic impact and operational missions
With Gripen E/F, Thailand is stabilizing three areas. First: regional air superiority. By combining Erieye, ES-05 Raven, and Skyward-G, the RTAF is strengthening its first barrier of detection and tracking beyond visual range. The coordinated use of Meteor expands the denial bubble, complicating adversarial trajectories in the event of a border or maritime incident. Second axis: maritime surveillance. Both coastlines require constant surveillance; the radar’s SAR/ISAR modes, data link, and AWACS integration facilitate the detection of slow-moving targets, ship classification, and coast guard support. Third axis: remote ground support. Without a specialized CAS aircraft, the RTAF will be able to deliver precision strikes using guided munitions, while remaining safe from short-range ground-to-air defenses.
Geopolitically, this choice sends a signal of relative autonomy: Thailand is cooperating with the United States but asserting its own path. A non-NATO European supplier such as Sweden reduces the political risk if bilateral relations become strained. It also increases flexibility in terms of technological offsets, training, and maintenance. In the regional equation, Bangkok is positioned between Indonesia’s massification and Singapore’s technological excellence, with an “agility-cost” model that is relevant for a country with a controlled budget.
The question of sustainability remains. The defense budget cannot absorb uncontrolled logistics inflation. Hence the interest in an aircraft designed for low operating costs and high availability. The key will be discipline in the MCO chain, securing supplies, and anticipating electronic obsolescence. If these points are met, by 2030 the RTAF will have an effective “sensor-centric” core that is interoperable with American and regional partners, but without excessive dependence on a single industrial ecosystem.
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