GCAP attracts Berlin and exposes the SCAF divide

CGAP Germany

Germany is now looking toward GCAP with Japan, the United Kingdom, and Italy, while the Franco-German-Spanish SCAF is stalling.

In summary

The GCAP program between Japan, the United Kingdom, and Italy is entering a decisive political phase. In early March 2026, the idea of opening up to Germany is no longer just a rumor. Rome, London, and several industrial players have publicly suggested that expansion is possible, while the SCAF between France, Germany, and Spain is sinking into a governance crisis. However, it is important to be clear: Berlin has not officially left the SCAF or joined the GCAP. At this stage, Germany is exploring an option, in a context where Dassault and Airbus are competing for control of the future combat aircraft. This possible shift is already changing the landscape. It would make Japan a key technological partner for part of European defense, accelerate industrial restructuring around a 6th generation aircraft targeted for 2035, and pose a brutal political question for Paris: can France still impose its vision of a major European program if Berlin is looking elsewhere?

The GCAP is no longer a peripheral program

The Global Combat Air Program is no longer a secondary project to the SCAF. Officially launched in December 2022 by Japan, the United Kingdom, and Italy, it aims to bring a new-generation fighter jet into service by 2035. The three countries have since structured their industrial governance with the creation of Edgewing, a joint venture owned equally by BAE Systems, Leonardo, and Japan Aircraft Industrial Enhancement. This structure is set to remain the aircraft’s design authority throughout its lifetime, beyond 2070. This point is crucial. Where the SCAF became bogged down in disputes over project management, the GCAP locked in its industrial chain of command earlier.

Japan sees a direct interest in this. Its Ministry of Defense points out that the future aircraft must gradually replace the F-2s from the end of fiscal year 2035, while guaranteeing freedom of modification and interoperability with allied countries. This formula is not insignificant. It means that Tokyo wants a fighter jet that is sovereign in its developments, but connected to a broader allied ecosystem. This is an important difference from certain European programs where governance itself becomes a source of dependency.

Berlin is testing an exit door without yet slamming its own

We must be frank about the central political issue. No, Germany has not officially “dropped” France to date. But yes, Berlin is sending increasingly clear signals that GCAP is now a serious option. In December 2025, Italian Defense Minister Guido Crosetto already stated that Germany and other countries might be interested in the program.
In February 2026, Reuters reported that the subject had gained momentum, while Le Monde indicated that Rome, London, and Tokyo were hoping to bring Berlin on board. In early March 2026, the CEO of Rolls-Royce also said he was open to Germany joining, while pointing out that the decision was up to the governments.

This nuance is important. Germany has not yet signed its departure from SCAF. But the mere fact that it is considering an external alternative is enough to weaken France’s position. In a major arms program, political authority counts as much as contracts. Once a major partner considers another option, the nature of internal negotiations changes. The SCAF ceases to be a foregone conclusion. It becomes one option among many.

The SCAF reveals a conflict deeper than a quarrel between industrialists

The SCAF crisis is not just a rivalry of egos between Dassault and Airbus. The issue touches on three different layers: industrial governance, military doctrine, and national policy.

On the industrial front, the conflict is clear. Dassault is demanding a real role as prime contractor on the future manned aircraft, the Next Generation Fighter, based on the initial agreement that entrusted it with this responsibility. Airbus, which represents German and Spanish interests, refuses to be confined to an executive role. In early March 2026, Éric Trappier even declared that the program was “dead” if Airbus refused to cooperate according to a clear division of responsibilities. A few days earlier, Guillaume Faury had explained that Airbus was prepared to consider all scenarios, including separate trajectories. This is no longer a simple disagreement. It is a clash over the very definition of leadership.

On doctrine, French and German needs are increasingly diverging. France is thinking in terms of an aircraft potentially linked to the sea, nuclear deterrence, and expeditionary autonomy. Germany does not have the same relationship to the airborne nuclear component, nor the same naval constraints. Chancellor Friedrich Merz made it clear in February 2026: Berlin does not need the same aircraft as Paris. From there, claiming that a single aircraft will naturally prevail is more of a political slogan than serious military planning.

Finally, on the political front, the situation has become almost ironic. Even as Paris and Berlin continue to issue joint statements on strengthening strategic cooperation, the industrial heart of the future fighter jet remains blocked. The overall political relationship has not been broken. But when it comes to the next-generation fighter, trust has been deeply damaged.

Japan becoming a key technology partner for Europe

This is where the issue takes on a historical dimension. If Germany were to join the GCAP, Japan would cease to be an important Asian partner. It would become a key technological partner in the restructuring of European air combat.

This would have seemed unlikely just a few years ago. But the context has changed. Tokyo has strengthened its partnership with the Atlantic Alliance. The individual partnership program between Japan and NATO for 2023-2026 emphasizes a more integrated management of the relationship. In February 2026, the Japanese ambassador to NATO explicitly cited the GCAP among the concrete initiatives linking industrial cooperation, innovation, and resilience between Europe and Japan.

This is therefore not simply an Asian program. It is part of an increasingly assertive Euro-Indo-Pacific strategic space.

However, we must be precise about the phrase “standardized for NATO and the Pacific.” The GCAP is not a NATO program, and the Alliance is not its institutional customer. On the other hand, the project clearly aims for a high level of interoperability between allied partners, with a logic of open architecture, advanced connectivity, and cooperation with other systems. It is correct to say that it is designed for a NATO and Pacific environment. To say that it is already an official NATO standard would be an exaggeration.

CGAP Germany

Germany’s calculation goes beyond technology alone

Why is Berlin looking to the GCAP? The answer is not solely technical. It is also budgetary, industrial, and geopolitical.

First, Germany does not want to be trapped in a program where negotiations take longer than engineering. The SCAF is estimated by Reuters to cost around €100 billion over its entire life cycle. At this level, no government will accept vague governance in the long term. However, the GCAP currently presents the opposite image: stable governance, a public schedule for entry into service in 2035, and a clearer industrial discourse. This does not guarantee ultimate success. But it makes the program politically sellable.

Second, Berlin is thinking in terms of an expanded European value chain. Germany has a sufficiently broad industrial base to want a significant share in any future fighter jet. The problem is that the key roles in the GCAP are already divided among the three founders. Germany’s arrival would therefore be financially attractive, but it would not be easy to absorb. Shares, responsibilities, and industrial returns would have to be renegotiated. This could strengthen the program, but it could also complicate it. Proponents of opening up the program are well aware of this.

Finally, there is the geopolitical backdrop. Germany wants to remain European, but no longer wants to depend on a Franco-German tête-à-tête that has become sterile on certain major projects. In this context, the GCAP offers a more flexible triangle: London for military capability and exports, Rome for the continental industrial gateway, and Tokyo for technological depth and Indo-Pacific connections.

The French risk that is suddenly becoming apparent

For France, the risk is not only industrial. It is strategic. If Berlin were to move closer to the GCAP, Paris would face a clear dilemma. Either maintain a SCAF emptied of its political centrality at all costs, or admit that a future French fighter jet may have to be designed within a more national framework, or in a much closer partnership.

This would also explain Dassault’s tougher stance. The company is not just defending a contractual position. It is defending the idea that a combat aircraft cannot be designed through constant compromise between incompatible doctrines. In this respect, the current crisis is revealing. The European debate on strategic autonomy often remains abstract. The battle over the SCAF makes it concrete: who decides, who designs, who bears the risk, who exports, who controls future developments? Until these questions are answered clearly, grand speeches about sovereignty will remain fragile.

The real shift that is now taking place

Perhaps the most important thing is not whether Germany will formally join the GCAP in 2026, 2027, or never. The most important thing lies elsewhere.
For the first time, an air combat program led with Japan appears to Berlin as a credible alternative to a program that is supposed to embody the heart of European defense.

This is the real turning point. The center of gravity of the future Western combat aircraft is no longer just a Franco-German-British affair. It now extends to the Pacific. And if Paris fails to reestablish a tenable political and industrial framework with Berlin, the split in the SCAF could well make the GCAP something other than a competitor: a new benchmark for those who prefer to move forward rather than negotiate endlessly.

Live a unique fighter jet experience