The Global Combat Air Program reaches a decisive milestone, while the SCAF program stalls. What do these contrasting trajectories reveal about European defense?
In summary
The Global Combat Air Program (GCAP) has just reached a new political milestone. On November 25, 2025, the defense ministers of Japan, the United Kingdom, and Italy held a videoconference devoted exclusively to this future 6th generation fighter. The objective: to move from a political framework to operational industrial governance and secure the start of the development phase in 2025, with a target entry into service in 2035. The GCAP is based on a clear architecture: a twin-engine, long-range stealth aircraft, integrated from the outset into a “system of systems” network combining drones, sensors, and cloud combat. In contrast, the Franco-German-Spanish SCAF program has been plagued by delays and governance crises, against a backdrop of tension between Dassault Aviation and Airbus. However, both projects are targeting the same segment: replacing the Eurofighter, Rafale, and Mitsubishi F-2 by 2035-2040. The difference in momentum is becoming strategic: the GCAP is establishing itself as a credible alternative for countries seeking a European air combat system… that actually works, while the SCAF risks dilution or even refocusing on simple cloud combat.
The new milestone reached by the trilateral GCAP
On November 25, 2025, Ministers Shinjiro Koizumi, John Healey, and Guido Crosetto held an approximately 80-minute videoconference meeting entirely dedicated to the Global Combat Air Program. The Japanese communiqué emphasizes that the discussion focused on the transition to the development phase, industrial distribution, and confirmation of the 2035 entry-into-service target.
This meeting is part of a longer sequence of events. In December 2022, the three countries decided to merge the British-Italian Tempest project with the Japanese F-X. In 2023, an intergovernmental treaty formalized the GCAP framework. In December 2024, BAE Systems, Leonardo, and a Japanese entity (JAIEC, led by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries) announced a 33.3% joint venture to design and develop the aircraft.
Today, around 9,000 people are already working on the GCAP, with more than 1,000 suppliers, including nearly 600 in the United Kingdom. The British demonstrator is scheduled to fly in 2027, while Japan is preparing its own test beds, following on from the X-2. The stated objective remains initial operational capability around 2035, five years ahead of the SCAF’s current ambitions.
The Global Combat Air Program, an unapologetic 6th generation fighter
The GCAP aims to develop a 6th generation multi-role, stealth, twin-engine fighter to replace the British and Italian Eurofighter Typhoons and the Japanese Mitsubishi F-2s. The concepts presented at Farnborough 2024 show a large, pure delta-wing airframe, similar in size to aircraft such as the F-111, indicating an emphasis on fuel and weapon capacity.
A few key features stand out:
- Long range: the model and official statements suggest a range sufficient to cross the Atlantic on internal fuel tanks, which would be a major leap forward compared to the Typhoon, which requires several refuelings.
- Increased payload: British officials speak of a carrying capacity approximately “double” that of an F-35A, which suggests a potential weapons load well in excess of 8 tons.
- Advanced network integration: the aircraft will be at the center of a network of drones known as Autonomous Collaborative Platforms, sensors, and ground-to-air systems, via a secure cloud combat network.
- Sensors and electronic warfare: the G2E consortium (Mitsubishi Electric, Leonardo, ELT Group, Leonardo UK) is developing the ISANKE & ICS architecture, combining AESA radar, IRST, advanced data links, and non-kinetic effects.
Finally, exportability has been considered from the outset. London emphasizes that the GCAP must be exportable on a large scale in order to reduce the unit cost. In an unprecedented move, Tokyo has relaxed its arms export rules to allow GCAP-related sales to fifteen partner countries.
The SCAF program struggles on the European side
Industrial and political obstacles to SCAF
In contrast to GCAP, the SCAF program – or FCAS – was intended to be a showcase for European sovereignty. Led by France, Germany, and Spain, it encompasses a New Generation Fighter, Remote Carriers (escort drones), and a combat cloud. The initial objective was to have a demonstrator ready around 2027-2029 and to enter service around 2040.
On paper, the logic is very similar to that of the GCAP. In reality, the SCAF is suffering from a series of crises:
- Persistent dispute between Dassault Aviation, the leader for the NGF, and Airbus Defense and Space over governance, intellectual property sharing, and design work.
- Suspension or repeated delays in phase 1B, followed by negotiations on phase 2, which is to finance the demonstrator.
- Growing political pressure: in 2025, Berlin and Paris issued multiple ultimatums to reach an agreement, with the open threat of refocusing the SCAF solely on cloud combat, or even drastically reducing the initial ambition.
The program is estimated to cost around €100 billion over its lifetime, with €2.4 billion already committed without any visible results for the armed forces. The political risk is clear: if no compromise is reached on the next phase, SCAF could miss the 2040 window, leaving the field open to GCAP and American solutions such as the F-35 or the future NGAD.
Reasons why the GCAP is progressing faster
Governance locked in by treaty
The first fundamental difference is the governance structure. The GCAP is based on a trilateral treaty signed in 2023, which clearly sets out the rules of the game, and on a single industrial joint venture owned in equal shares. Each of the three countries has a national champion—BAE Systems, Leonardo, and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries—but the decision-making structure is consolidated around a single shared “design authority.”
In contrast, the SCAF is split into several “pillars,” each led by a different manufacturer, with a delicate political balance between Paris, Berlin, and Madrid. Negotiations on the NGF – the heart of the system – are poisoned by the issue of Dassault’s leadership, which Germany considers incompatible with its financial weight. This fragmentation slows down decision-making and complicates any architectural adjustments.
A tight and committed schedule
The second difference is the schedule. The GCAP aims to have a demonstrator in 2027 and enter service in 2035. This gamble requires quick decisions, sometimes on technologies that are still maturing, but creates healthy pressure on both public and private players. British parliamentarians insist on the need to secure multi-year funding to avoid the “stop and go” approach that weighed down the Eurofighter.
The SCAF, for its part, is still aiming for 2040, but without a fixed demonstrator or stabilized governance. By constantly postponing decisions on the next phase, the European partners are wasting precious political and industrial time. During the same period, the GCAP has already achieved several concrete milestones: launch of the treaty, creation of the joint venture, definition of common requirements, structuring of the sensor segment, and presentation of the British demonstrator to the public.

Strategic impacts for the United Kingdom, Italy, and Japan
The UK’s gamble on air sovereignty
For the UK, the Global Combat Air Program is key to the continuity of its combat air industry. The 2018 Combat Air Strategy already pointed to the risk of losing the expertise acquired with the Typhoon if no major program was launched. GCAP keeps a sector valued at £6 billion in annual revenue and more than 18,000 direct jobs in operation.
Operationally, London sees the future Tempest/GCAP as a sovereign complement to the F-35B carried on the Queen Elizabeth ships. Whereas the American F-35 offers access to the US ecosystem but imposes software and logistical dependence, the GCAP aircraft must guarantee national control of the code, updates, and weapons integration, particularly for long-range conventional deterrence.
Italy at the heart of an alternative European industry
For Italy, Leonardo is already a major player in Eurofighter, patrol aviation, and helicopters. GCAP gives it a central place in avionics, mission systems, and part of the engine industry via Avio Aero. Rome is thus gaining strategic leverage to remain at the heart of a high-end European industry, even if the SCAF program fails.
Italy also sees this as an export opportunity, particularly to countries seeking to diversify their suppliers in the face of American dominance. Working with Japan can facilitate access to certain markets in Asia, while the United Kingdom opens the door to traditional Typhoon customers in the Middle East.
Japan’s strategic shift in the Indo-Pacific
Finally, with the GCAP, Japan is making a double break: technological and political. Technological, because it is shifting from a model of purchasing under American license (F-15, F-35) to a role as co-prime contractor for a 6th generation fighter. Politically, because it has committed to increasing its defense budget to 2% of GDP by 2027 and to relaxing a historically very restrictive export framework.
For Tokyo, GCAP is a key tool for responding to threats from China and North Korea. A long-range aircraft, capable of carrying a large amount of weaponry and commanding a swarm of drones, is part of a more assertive “counterattack” doctrine, including striking enemy capabilities at long range.
The GCAP–SCAF rivalry and what it reveals about Europe
Beyond the technical details, the divergence between GCAP and the SCAF program reveals two cultures of cooperation. On the one hand, there is an alliance of three countries ready to sign a treaty, accept a clear division of responsibilities, and commit to an ambitious schedule, even if it means taking risks on financing. On the other hand, there is a European project where the search for perfect political balance is paralyzing industrial arbitration, at the risk of losing everything: schedule, credibility, and market share.
If SCAF were to be reduced to a cloud battle, or even fragmented into national initiatives, the Global Combat Air Program would, in fact, become the leading non-US offering in the 6th generation fighter segment. For European defense, this would be a heavy paradox: seeing the most integrated initiative come from a post-Brexit United Kingdom allied with Japan and Italy, while the Franco-German core still hesitates over who should design the aircraft.
Sources (selection):
– Ministry of Defense Japan, press release on the GCAP trilateral meeting of November 25, 2025.
– Wikipedia / BAE Systems / Leonardo, pages and press releases on the Global Combat Air Program (industrial structure, schedule, objectives).
– UK Parliament, Defense Committee, report on the GCAP (financing, exports, industry).
– Airbus, Le Monde, Reuters, recent analyses of the SCAF/FCAS, its costs and obstacles.
– Specialized press analyses (Breaking Defense, think tanks and industry websites) on the GCAP–SCAF rivalry and the prospects for the 6th generation.
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