Russia deploys a kamikaze drone with a speed of 600 km/h and a range of 1,000 km—the Geran-5—which redefines drone warfare in Ukraine
On January 28, 2026, Ukrainian intelligence services confirmed the entry into service of the Geran-5, a new Russian kamikaze drone powered by a turbojet engine. With a speed of 600 km/h, a range of 1,000 kilometers, and a 90-kilogram warhead, this craft blurs the line between drone and cruise missile. Its Chinese jet engine makes it twice as fast as previous models, significantly complicating the task of Ukrainian air defenses, which now face a threat of a new caliber.
Summary
Russian forces deployed the Geran-5, a kamikaze drone equipped with a Chinese Telefly turbojet engine, for the first time during combined attacks in early January 2026. This system marks a major technological breakthrough compared to previous propeller-driven models. Six meters long with a wingspan of 5.5 meters, the Geran-5 reaches 600 km/h and carries a 90-kilogram military payload over 1,000 kilometers. Its conventional design is reminiscent of the Iranian Karrar drone. Russia plans to launch it from Su-25 attack aircraft and equip certain versions with R-73 air-to-air missiles. This development transforms Russian drones into truly economical cruise missiles, capable of saturating Ukrainian defenses while evading conventional interceptors designed to neutralize slower targets.
The technological breakthrough of the Chinese turbojet engine
The Geran-5 abandons the propeller propulsion that characterized previous generations of Shahed and Geran drones. Instead, it is equipped with a Chinese-made Telefly TF-TJ2000A turbojet engine developing a thrust of 200 kilogram-force (1,960 newtons). This engine is an improved version of the one used in the Geran-3, which was already jet-powered.
This development radically changes the drone’s operational profile. Whereas the propeller-driven Geran-2 flies at 185 km/h and the jet-powered Geran-3 reaches between 370 and 520 km/h depending on the source, the Geran-5 exceeds 600 km/h in cruising speed. Some estimates place its maximum speed between 450 and 600 km/h, with potentially higher peaks during the attack phase.
This acceleration is a game changer for Ukrainian defenses. The interceptor drones developed by Ukraine to counter the Geran-2 fly at speeds between 200 and 300 km/h. They are perfectly suited to catching up with and destroying propeller-driven models. When faced with the Geran-5, these interceptors become obsolete. The engagement window is drastically reduced, leaving operators less time to detect, identify, and neutralize the threat.
Ukrainian mobile firing teams, which rely on small arms and heavy machine guns to shoot down slow drones, are also losing their effectiveness. The Geran-5’s flight time over a position no longer allows for reliable engagement with conventional automatic weapons.
An aerodynamic configuration inspired by the Iranian Karrar
The Geran-5 breaks with the delta wing architecture characteristic of the Shahed-136 and Geran-2. It adopts a conventional aerodynamic configuration with a tubular fuselage, straight wings, and horizontal tail. This structure closely resembles the Iranian Karrar jet drone, reinforcing the hypothesis of technology transfer between Tehran and Moscow.
The drone is approximately six meters long with a wingspan of 5.5 meters. Its maximum takeoff weight is 850 kilograms. These dimensions place it in the category of small cruise missiles rather than light drones. Its elongated, streamlined profile gives it a visual and radar signature similar to that of a conventional missile.
This deceptive appearance complicates the work of defenders. Radars and detection systems struggle to differentiate a Geran-5 from a conventional cruise missile during the initial detection phases. This confusion requires additional reaction time, even though the speed of the aircraft already reduces the available margins.
Ukrainian analysts point out that despite these major changes to the airframe, the Geran-5 remains highly similar to other models in the family. Most of the electronic modules, guidance systems, and components are identical to those fitted to the Geran-2 and Geran-3 produced at the Alabuga factory in Russia.
A 90-kilogram warhead and a range of 1,000 kilometers
The Geran-5 carries a 90-kilogram warhead, twice the initial payload of the Shahed-136 (40 to 50 kilograms) and significantly more than the upgraded versions of the Geran-2. This increase is in line with a trend observed since 2024, when Russia began deploying 90-kilogram thermobaric, incendiary, and fragmentation warheads on its drones.
The operational range is approximately 950 to 1,000 kilometers, according to Ukrainian intelligence analyses. This range allows the Geran-5 to strike any target in Ukraine from Russian bases located deep within occupied territory or in Russia itself. It also extends the tactical range, allowing launches from positions further away from the front line.
The flight range is approximately two hours. The theoretical maximum operational ceiling is 6,000 meters, but observations show effective use between 200 meters and 3,000 meters altitude. This altimetric versatility allows the flight profile to be adapted to tactical circumstances and enemy threats.
The drone can fly low to evade surveillance radars, then climb rapidly for a dive attack phase, or maintain an intermediate altitude to maximize its range. This flexibility complicates defense planning, which must cover several altitude layers simultaneously.
Onboard systems combine Russian, Chinese, and Western technologies
Debris recovered by Ukrainian forces reveals a complex electronic architecture incorporating components from various sources. The Geran-5 uses a 12-channel Kometa-M12 satellite navigation system, compatible with the Glonass and GPS constellations. This system is also used in other drones in the Geran family, as well as several Russian missiles.
Flight control is based on an FCU unit combined with a SADRA/MINSOO inertial navigation system. This combination ensures that the mission can continue even in the event of GPS jamming, a recurring problem on the Ukrainian battlefield where electronic warfare systems are deployed on a massive scale.
Telemetric transmission relies on a Tracker V3 system built around a Raspberry Pi microcomputer and 3G/LTE modems. This inexpensive architecture maintains a data link with operators up to 100 kilometers away. A relay drone can double this range. A Xingkai Tech XK-F358 MESH modem completes the communication system.
Ukrainian intelligence has identified at least nine electronic components manufactured by American companies in the Geran-5, including digital signal processors, clock generators, and transceivers. German and Chinese parts complete this international industrial base.
This dependence on Western components highlights the limitations of the Russian military-industrial complex and the relative ineffectiveness of international sanctions aimed at blocking Moscow’s access to sensitive technologies. Ukrainian analysts insist on the need to strengthen export controls and track down circumvention networks.
Air launch from Su-25s extends tactical capabilities
Ukrainian intelligence reports that Russia is actively exploring the possibility of launching the Geran-5 from Su-25 attack aircraft. This option would radically transform the tactical use of the system.
Air launch offers several operational advantages. It extends the drone’s effective range by saving the fuel needed to reach cruising altitude and nominal speed. The Su-25 can carry the Geran-5 several hundred kilometers closer to the target, reducing the flight time exposed to enemy defenses.
This method also allows for more unpredictable approaches. Launching from different approach angles complicates Ukrainian defensive planning, which must cover a much wider spectrum of possible trajectories. Ground launches from fixed or mobile ramps generally follow relatively predictable flight paths.
The concept of the Geran-5 launched from an aircraft is not new. Russia is simultaneously developing the Geran-4, an intermediate version equipped with a less powerful turbojet engine but also designed for airborne use. These two systems could be deployed jointly depending on tactical objectives.
Su-25 attack aircraft, which are numerous in the Russian air force, regularly operate near the front line for close air support missions. Their use as drone launchers would require only minor modifications to the pylons and release systems. This simplicity of integration accelerates operational deployment.
Armament with R-73 missiles blurs the line between strike and defense
The most controversial aspect of the Geran-5 concerns its potential armament with R-73 air-to-air missiles. These Soviet infrared-guided missiles, designated AA-11 Archer by NATO, are normally mounted under the wings of fighters to engage airborne targets.
Their integration on a kamikaze drone would transform the Geran-5 into a hybrid platform, capable of simultaneously striking ground targets and threatening Ukrainian aircraft engaged in intercepting Russian drones. This capability would reduce the maneuverability of fighter jets and defense helicopters, further complicating their already perilous mission.
Russia has been experimenting with this approach since December 2024. Modified Geran-2s have been equipped with older R-60 missiles and even Verba or Igla-type man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS). These adaptations are specifically designed to neutralize Ukrainian helicopters that intercept drones by shooting them down with cannons.
In the case of the Geran-5, the combination of a jet engine and a more modern R-73 missile would create a qualitatively superior threat. The R-73 missile has a range of 30 kilometers and can engage maneuvering targets. Its infrared homing system operates in all weather conditions.
Ukrainian services remain cautious, however, about the actual operational feasibility of this concept. Sensor integration, target designation, and in-flight coordination pose considerable technical challenges. No irrefutable evidence of a successful air-to-air engagement by a Geran-5 has been made public to date.
However, the mere threat of such a capability is enough to change the tactical calculations of Ukrainian pilots. They must now consider that an intercepted drone may retaliate, adding a risk factor to already dangerous missions.
Production costs defy Western competition
The war economy plays a central role in the massive deployment of Geran drones.
The original Shahed-136, produced in Iran, cost between $20,000 and $50,000, according to estimates. Documents leaked in 2023 revealed that Russia had negotiated a purchase price of $193,000 per unit for an order of 6,000 drones.
Localized production in Russia under Iranian license drastically reduced costs. According to analyses, the cost price of a Geran-2 produced in Russia was around $48,800 in 2023. Some sources even mention costs as low as $20,000 to $30,000 for the basic versions.
Successive improvements have driven these figures up. An expert report estimates that in April 2024, the unit cost of an upgraded Geran-2 reached around $80,000, as a result of more sophisticated electronic systems and reinforced warheads.
The Geran-5, with its Chinese turbojet engine and redesigned structure, certainly represents a greater investment. No official figures have been released, but analysts estimate its cost to be in the range of $100,000 to $150,000 per unit. This amount remains negligible compared to conventional cruise missiles.
A Russian Kalibr cruise missile costs between $1 million and $2 million. An American Tomahawk exceeds $2 million. Even assuming a price of $150,000, the Geran-5 is therefore ten to twenty times cheaper than a conventional missile, while offering comparable capabilities for certain missions.
This economic asymmetry is disrupting the defensive equation. Ukrainian anti-aircraft systems, whether Patriot, IRIS-T, or NASAMS, fire missiles worth several million dollars each. Each successful interception therefore represents a net gain for the attacker in terms of cost-effectiveness.
The strategy of massive saturation of air defenses
The low cost of production allows for mass deployment. Russia planned to manufacture 8,000 Geran-2s in 2024. Production continues to increase. In January 2025, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Russian forces had launched nearly 1,100 attack drones in a single week, accompanied by 890 guided bombs and 50 missiles.
This saturation strategy aims to physically and economically exhaust Ukrainian defenses. Each wave of drones forces Ukraine to expend its precious anti-aircraft missiles, whose stocks are limited and whose replenishment depends on Western deliveries.
The drones also serve as decoys. Russia mixes propeller-driven Geran-2s, jet-powered Geran-3s, and now Geran-5s in its attacks, as well as dummy drones without warheads but electronically identical. This combination forces defenders to engage every contact, as it is impossible to accurately identify the type of drone before interception.
The introduction of the Geran-5 further complicates this equation. Its higher speed makes it less vulnerable to short-range interceptors and small arms. Medium- and high-altitude systems must be mobilized, accelerating the depletion of costly missile stocks.
German military analysts at the Frankfurter Rundschau compare the strategic role of the new Geran drones to that played by the Soviet T-34 tank during World War II. Not because of their technological superiority, but because of their combination of adequate performance, controlled cost, and mass production, allowing them to be used without restraint.
Ukraine develops adaptive countermeasures
Faced with this evolving threat, Ukraine is adapting its defensive strategy. The development of interceptor drones is a promising response. These devices, which are less expensive than anti-aircraft missiles, can engage attack drones in flight and destroy them by collision or proximity explosion.
The first Ukrainian models reach speeds of between 200 and 300 km/h, which is sufficient to intercept Geran-2 drones but unsuitable for Geran-5 drones. New, faster generations are currently being developed. The aim is to create an economical interception capability capable of countering massive attacks without depleting stocks of sophisticated missiles.
Electronic warfare systems are also playing an increasing role. GPS and satellite jamming can deflect drones’ trajectories or cause them to crash. However, Geran drones have backup inertial navigation systems that keep them on course even in a jammed environment.
Mobile firing units equipped with 23mm and 30mm automatic cannons remain effective when drones come within range. Their mobility complicates Russian attack planning. Their cost per shot is negligible compared to guided missiles.
The current challenge is to integrate all these capabilities into a multi-layered air defense system. Surveillance radars must detect drones as early as possible. Command centers must distribute targets among the various interception systems according to their speed, altitude, and trajectory. Ground crews must execute engagements in ever-shorter time windows.
Mass production transforms drones into a strategic weapon
The Alabuga factory in the Republic of Tatarstan is the heart of Russian production of Geran drones. Built with Iranian assistance and commissioned in 2023, this facility has gradually increased its production rates. It now produces several types of drones simultaneously, including the Geran-2, Geran-3, and probably the Geran-5.
Russia has invested heavily in this infrastructure. Beyond the assembly lines, it has developed a network of local suppliers to replace Western components wherever possible. However, semiconductors, sensors, and communication systems are still largely imported via front companies based in China, the United Arab Emirates, and Turkey.
This industrialization is transforming attack drones from occasional tactical weapons into strategic weapon systems that can be deployed on a daily basis. The ability to produce thousands of units annually fundamentally changes the nature of conflict. Strikes are no longer limited by restricted missile stocks but can continue indefinitely at the rate of production.
Iran is closely monitoring this development. Other countries, particularly in Asia and the Middle East, are showing interest in acquiring these technologies. In 2023, China unveiled the Sunflower 200, a near-identical copy of the Shahed-136. The proliferation of these systems could redraw the regional military balance in the coming years.
The strategic implications extend beyond the Ukrainian battlefield
The emergence of the Geran-5 is part of a broader trend toward the democratization of long-range strike capabilities. Secondary state actors and potentially non-state groups could eventually gain access to similar systems.
This prospect is worrying Western military leaders. The combination of low cost, relatively simple production, and significant military performance is creating a new category of accessible weaponry. Air defenses designed to intercept ballistic missiles or combat aircraft are proving ill-suited and economically unviable against swarms of low-cost drones.
The very concept of air superiority is evolving. Traditionally defined by the ability to control airspace with fighter jets and anti-aircraft systems, it must now incorporate the dimension of autonomous or semi-autonomous drones operating en masse.
Western military doctrines are beginning to incorporate these changes. NATO and European armies are developing their own attack and interception drone capabilities. France has launched several programs, including the Larinae tactical drone. The United States is accelerating the development of collaborative drones that can escort its manned fighters.
The race between the sword and the shield continues. Every offensive innovation generates a defensive response, which in turn stimulates new offensive developments. The Geran-5 represents one step in this technological spiral, but certainly not the last. Even faster, stealthier, or more autonomous versions will inevitably appear.
The strategic balance between nuclear powers remains stable for now. These drones do not fundamentally alter deterrence. But in regional conflicts and medium-intensity clashes, they are disrupting the balance of power and forcing a fundamental rethink of how to wage war in the 21st century.
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