Russia creates a new military branch dedicated to drones: what is the rationale, how is it organized, and what impact will it have on the Ukrainian front and NATO?
Summary
Russia has just formalized the establishment of Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), a new branch of the armed forces entirely dedicated to drone warfare. This decision is part of the modernization of Russian forces through drones and reflects the “Russian militarization of tactical drones” in the context of the conflict in Ukraine and beyond. Colonel Sergey Ishtuganov has been appointed to head this structure, while President Vladimir Putin had already given instructions for the creation of such a command. Russia believes it can produce a very high volume of unmanned systems thanks to factories such as the Albatross Group in Yelabuga (Tatarstan), while reducing its dependence. The Russian-Ukrainian strategy is clear: by combining reconnaissance drones, lethal munitions, and electronic warfare, Moscow seeks to impose its superiority in the drone war in Russia and force NATO to adapt its defenses.
The institutional framework and organization of the new branch
The decision to establish the new branch is in line with Russia’s strategy of moving towards a more flexible and technological format. In December 2024, the Russian Minister of Defense announced the creation of a force dedicated to unmanned systems. On November 12, 2025, via the TASS agency, the formation of the Unmanned Systems Forces was officially confirmed, with the organizational structure established and a first command appointed.
Colonel Ishtuganov stated that operational regiments—including personnel, technical, and logistical units—have already been formed and that expansion is continuing. So far, Russia has not published the exact number of regiments or personnel, but some sources mention an ambitious target of 210,000 personnel by 2030 for this autonomous force.
This restructuring marks a turning point: the creation of a “Russian drone command” reveals that Moscow now considers unmanned systems not as mere tactical support but as a pillar of military strategy in their own right. This change is in line with the Russian doctrine of drone warfare, which integrates these systems into the entire architecture of the air, land, and naval forces.
The reasons for this creation in the context of the Ukrainian conflict
The war in Ukraine has highlighted the rapid rise of drones in modern Russian warfare and more broadly in recent conflicts. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces have turned to UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles), suicide munitions or “loitering munitions,” and autonomous targeting systems. One article reported Russia’s intensive use of drones equipped with artificial intelligence to strike Ukrainian logistics lines up to 50 km behind the front lines.
For Moscow, the creation of this branch addresses several challenges:
- structuring and centralizing all drone units, which until now have been scattered among ground brigades, aerospace forces, and naval forces;
- learning from the Ukrainian initiative—Ukraine created its own “Unmanned Systems Forces” in September 2024, which Russia directly cites.
- exploit the mass effect: by structuring a dedicated force, Russia can accelerate production, training, and doctrine, with a view to industrializing drone warfare.
- counter the tactical advantage that drones have given Ukraine in terms of reconnaissance, asymmetric strikes, saturation, and electronic warfare.
Thus, Russia’s military drone strategy aims to make UAVs a central element of the Ukrainian conflict, but also a lever of influence in the region and with potential external customers. This reform reflects the idea that drones are not a secondary tool but a primary combat tool.
Production, industrialization, and dependence: 100% Russian possible?
One of the key aspects of this new branch concerns industrial capacity. Russia has announced its ambition to mass-produce drones to supply this force. On March 7, 2025, an article mentioned the possibility of Russia setting up a factory in Belarus capable of manufacturing up to 100,000 drones per year. Another factory, in Yelabuga (Tatarstan), is currently producing Shahed-136/131 drones (of Iranian origin) as part of a technology transfer program.
However, the question of autonomy remains open. Reports indicate a high initial dependence on Western or Iranian components: for example, some Russian drones produced in Yelabuga still use Western electronic components imported via Iran. So, although the goal is a “fully native Russian reconnaissance and attack drone capability,” the technical reality still requires compromises.
In addition, mass production must be accompanied by diversification of types (air, ground, sea), development of the supply chain, training of operators, and doctrine of use. Simple quantity does not guarantee quality or tactical relevance. Thus, the idea of total industrialization is ambitious but will only be fully realized in several years.
Even with these limitations, the industrialization of drones in Russia is accelerating. The existence of a center such as the Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies “Rubicon,” created in August 2024 to develop UAVs and AI, illustrates this dynamic.
Geopolitical impacts and challenges for NATO
The creation of this Russian branch has direct implications for NATO and European security. First, it shows that drone warfare in Russia is no longer confined to a secondary theater but is taking on a strategic dimension, with an autonomous chain of command and differentiated capabilities.
For NATO, this means:
- an increased need to detect, counter, and neutralize Russian drones, including in the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and the Arctic;
- potential saturation of defenses through the use of large numbers of drones, small munitions, and autonomous elements (AI);
- a rethinking of collective defense doctrines in the face of an adversary capable of launching relatively low-cost, high-yield strikes.
Countries such as Poland and Romania have already announced the deployment of anti-drone systems (such as Merops) in response to Russian drone incursions on NATO’s eastern flank.
Geopolitically, this initiative is part of Moscow’s desire to reaffirm its capacity for military innovation and regional deterrence. Beyond Ukraine, Russia can offer drones to allies or partners, which constitutes a lever of influence. The creation of a “Russian drone command” therefore also sends a political message: that of a modern military player ready to compete technologically.
This effort may also encourage NATO to accelerate its own modernization in the field of unmanned systems. A kind of ripple effect is already noticeable.
Internal challenges in Russia and the limits of transformation
Despite all these efforts, several internal challenges limit the immediate effectiveness of this transformation.
The structure is well advanced, but the doctrine still needs to be refined. The transition from experimentation to industrial warfare requires standardization of systems, tactics, logistics flows, and heavy maintenance. Recruitment, training of technicians and operators, and integration of data and AI are bottlenecks. The article mentions that personnel are being trained but that numbers remain capped.
Furthermore, industrialization as desired requires financial, human, and technological resources. There are no clear public figures available for the budget allocated to this specific branch; nevertheless, equipping drones in volume on multiple fronts is costly (development, production, logistics, support). There is therefore a tension between ambition and effective means.
On the technical side, although reconnaissance and strike drones are becoming more numerous, Russia continues to face difficulties in electronic warfare, autonomous long-range targeting, and fully autonomous systems. These technologies are expensive and require expertise that is increasingly difficult to acquire due to international sanctions and restrictions on access to components.
Finally, in a more general strategic context, the creation of a dedicated branch must be coordinated with other military components (motorized infantry, artillery, air force, navy). If this is not well coordinated, there is a risk that drones will become a “separate weapon” without integration into the overall combat logic. Russia is aware of this constraint, but with rapid progress, this type of latency remains.
A forward-looking assessment of military and industrial developments
The establishment of the new branch marks the transformation of the Russian army through unmanned systems. This is as much a structural change as it is a tactical one. Russia is no longer content with simply adding drones; it is “institutionalizing” them. This marks a step towards a more automated, more flexible, and potentially more export-oriented army.
If this transformation is successful, Russia could envisage:
- large-scale drone attack capabilities, including against rear targets or critical infrastructure;
- high-volume drone production, capable of supplying multiple fronts or being made available to allies;
- an increased position of strength in technological competition with NATO and greater influence on the unmanned systems arms markets.
However, nothing is guaranteed. For this strategy to bear fruit, Russia must still overcome several hurdles: industrial maturity in critical components, tactical integration at all levels of combat, the ability to operate in highly contested environments (with electronic warfare, counter-drones, jamming, etc.), and the logical mass viability of the drone in the face of reinforced defenses.
Geopolitically, NATO and its allies will need to monitor the emergence of this Russian force as a permanent feature, rather than a temporary experiment. If the Russians succeed in aligning doctrine, production, and field effectiveness, this could redefine European alert thresholds and investments in anti-drone defense.
The creation of this branch illustrates Russia’s desire to thoroughly modernize its armed forces, make drones a pillar of its present and future warfare, and send a strong signal to its adversaries. The path has now been laid out: will it move from programs and organizational charts to decisive and lasting military effects? Time and future conflicts will provide the answer.
Sources
– TASS, “Russia establishes Unmanned Systems Forces,” November 12, 2025.
– Anadolu Agency, “Russia announces unmanned systems forces as new branch of military,” November 12, 2025.
– National Interest, “Russia just created a ‘Drone Force’ to counter Ukraine’s drone unit,” November 13, 2025.
– United24Media, “Russia forms Unmanned Systems Forces amid growing drone arms race with Ukraine,” November 12, 2025.
– Business Insider, “Russia is gearing up to build 100,000 drones a year on NATO’s doorstep,” March 7, 2025.
– Le Monde, “Russia steps up use of new military technologies against Ukraine, including AI,” June 7, 2025.
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