The Su-57 Felon is on display at the Dubai Airshow 2025, claiming its first foreign customer and a modernized Su-57E version, somewhere between marketing and industrial reality.
Summary
The Su-57 Felon is at the center of an aggressive charm offensive at the Dubai Airshow 2025. Moscow claims to have delivered two aircraft to an unnamed foreign customer, while only about 15 production Su-57s are actually operational in Russia, with a target of 76 aircraft by 2028. The aircraft is presented in an Su-57E export configuration with new 2D thrust vectoring nozzles, a large single cockpit display, and engine options such as the AL-51F-1 engine or the Izdeliye 177S.
According to official statements, the aircraft would benefit directly from feedback from its use in the war in Ukraine, which would fuel renewed international interest. In practice, sorties remain rare, verifiable information is limited, and production is hampered by technological sanctions. The Su-57 is positioned as a low-cost 5th generation fighter jet compared to the F-35, but with clear compromises in terms of stealth, production volume, and industrial ecosystem.
An exported Su-57 Felon: a political signal rather than a leap in capability
The claim of the first export of the Su-57 Felon is based on a carefully calibrated announcement: two aircraft are said to have been delivered to an unidentified customer, who has already put them into operational service. Everyone is thinking of Algeria, which regularly appears in leaks and analyses, with a volume often mentioned of around a dozen aircraft. This discretion serves two purposes: to fuel Russian communication, while leaving room for a buyer who has no desire to publicly acknowledge the choice of a Russian fighter in the midst of war.
In quantitative terms, the base remains narrow. Open data indicates that around 30 Su-57s will be delivered to the Russian forces by the end of 2024, including prototypes, out of a total contract for 76 aircraft to be delivered by 2028. Even taking into account the announced ramp-up, this is still far from the volumes of the F-35, of which several hundred have been produced. For an export customer, this means a small fleet, fragile logistics, and heavy dependence on a manufacturer under sanctions.
Pricing is one of Russia’s main selling points. Estimates compiled from open sources put the price of the aircraft at between $35 million and $45 million each, or around €32 million to €41 million, depending on exchange rates. On paper, this is significantly less than an F-35A, often quoted at around $80 million. But this crude comparison masks the reality: the buyer is not just paying for an aircraft, but also for a system, support, standards, weapons, a training network, and long-term access to spare parts. From this point of view, the Su-57 remains a risky bet for any country dependent on Western electronic parts, including those in transit through third countries.
Finally, this “export” is first and foremost a political signal. For Moscow, it is a matter of proving that its 5th generation fighter program is not limited to a few prototypes and propaganda. For the buyer, it is a matter of marking a strategic regional position, or even sending a message to a neighbor or to Washington. Technically, two aircraft do not change the military balance; symbolically, they establish a long-term relationship with a supplier that needs foreign currency as much as it needs a showcase.
A stealth fighter forged by the war in Ukraine, but with very little exposure
Russian communications emphasize the lessons learned from the war in Ukraine. According to Rostec, pilots are feeding back data from the “combat zone” and the Su-57 is being continuously adjusted. On paper, the idea makes sense: testing a new-generation aircraft in operation allows sensors, data links, weapons, and maintenance to be validated in real conditions.
The observable reality is less flattering. The Su-57s are used sparingly, at a distance, mainly to fire guided munitions from Russian airspace or from relatively protected areas. There are no credible indications of repeated low-altitude penetrations in an environment dense with modern surface-to-air missiles. Moscow has no interest in exposing a rare, expensive, and politically sensitive aircraft to the risk of destruction being filmed and broadcast on social media. The Ukrainian attack on the Akhtubinsk base in 2024, which visibly damaged at least one Su-57, shows that even when stationed far from the front line, the aircraft remains vulnerable to long-range drones.
This context explains Russia’s caution. Flights do take place, and some air-to-ground shots are attributed to the Su-57, but at a low rate. Unlike the American or Israeli F-35s, which have been repeatedly deployed in several theaters, the Su-57 remains poorly documented in operation. The “combat proven” argument is therefore largely political: it reassures potential buyers who want to avoid being used as guinea pigs, but it is based primarily on unilateral statements.
For an outside observer, this limited use reflects two observations: Russia does not yet have the number of aircraft necessary to use them as a routine tool, and it fears the strategic impact of a documented loss. A fifth-generation fighter destroyed by Ukrainian ground-to-air defenses equipped with Western systems would be a much more serious blow to the program’s credibility than the loss of a Su-35. On this point, operational caution contradicts the triumphant rhetoric.
A fifth-generation fighter jet with mixed performance
In principle, the Su-57 is defined as a 5th generation multi-role fighter jet: stealth, supercruise, high maneuverability, integrated sensors, data links, and weapon bays. The twin-tail airframe, side air intakes, and ventral and side weapon bays are consistent with this logic. The aircraft carries two large main bays for long- and medium-range air-to-air missiles, as well as side compartments for short-range missiles.
However, the Su-57’s stealth remains forward-oriented. Estimates of radar cross-section from open sources place the aircraft well above the F-35, especially on the sides and rear. The presence of visible engine volumes, marked joints, and numerous panels betrays a compromise: reducing the signature without going as far as the extreme requirements imposed by American programs. It is a pragmatic choice, but it places the Su-57 in an intermediate category, between 4.5th and 5th generation on the strict criterion of stealth.
Nevertheless, the aircraft has some serious advantages: significant internal and external payload, AESA radar, electro-optical sensors, and expected integration with heavy S-70-type drones. The cockpit of the T-50-9 prototype presented in Dubai has been fitted with a large single wide-area display, closer to modern Western standards. This is a step in the right direction: a large, configurable screen improves situational awareness and facilitates the fusion of sensor data, provided that the software processing is up to the task.
The problem remains the ecosystem. A 5th generation fighter is not just a stealth airframe: it is a complete package of maintenance, software updates, simulation, and configuration management. However, Russia, under sanctions, is already struggling to stabilize its fleet of older aircraft. The difficulties in producing civilian aircraft such as the MC-21 or the Superjet in a fully “Russified” version give an honest glimpse of the industrial limitations. Imagining a rapid update cycle for an export Su-57 is more an act of faith than analysis.
An AL-51F-1 engine, 2D nozzles, and an Izdeliye 177S still to be proven
The promotion of the Su-57E version in Dubai relies heavily on its propulsion system. Today, most Russian Su-57s fly with engines derived from the AL-41F-1, already used on the Su-35. The goal is clearly to move towards the AL-51F-1 engine, sometimes referred to as Izdeliye 30, designed to offer more thrust, reduced fuel consumption, and a lower radar and infrared signature. Public data suggests around 110 kN of dry thrust and up to 180 kN with afterburner, which would allow supercruise to Mach 1.6 and a maximum speed of around Mach 2.
The new feature highlighted at the Dubai Airshow 2025 is the adoption of 2D thrust vectoring nozzles with a rectangular cross-section on the Su-57E model. The main objective is discretion: a flattened jet outlet reduces the rear radar signature and also allows for better control of the infrared signature by mixing hot gases with cooler air. This choice brings the Su-57E closer to the F-22 in terms of concept. On the other hand, the thrust losses associated with this type of nozzle are not negligible and require fine tuning.
At the same time, Russia is promoting the Izdeliye 177S, presented as a “fifth-generation” engine derived from the AL-41 but incorporating technologies from the AL-51F-1. This engine is being offered both as a possible powerplant for export Su-57Es and as a modernization option for Su-30s or Su-35s. On paper, this modularity is a smart way to pool development efforts. In reality, it will be necessary to observe its reliability, service life, and actual production capacity.
Here again, industrial constraints are the weak point. Developing a modern engine, mass-producing it, supplying parts, and maintaining service intervals is demanding, even for Western manufacturers with stable subcontractor networks. For an export customer, purchasing a fighter jet based on the promise of a new engine that is not yet widely available, in a country subject to massive sanctions, amounts to accepting a major logistical risk. Politicians may be willing to take this risk for strategic reasons, but the air force will have to deal with the daily consequences for 30 years.
A foreign customer and tense geopolitics surrounding exports
The announcement of the delivery to a foreign customer comes at a particular time: since 2022, Russian arms exports have been halved, according to Rostec, officially because the industry is prioritizing domestic needs. The reality is less presentable: financial sanctions, tighter controls on components, the risk of secondary sanctions for purchasing countries, and increased competition from China in “non-aligned” markets.
For a country like Algeria, purchasing the Su-57E is as much a political choice as a technical one. It is a matter of maintaining a privileged relationship with Moscow, sending a signal to a neighbor such as Morocco, and distinguishing itself with prestigious equipment. But this choice comes with a hidden cost: exposure to the risk of sanctions, dependence on a supplier that itself struggles to source electronics, and potential difficulty in integrating the aircraft into broader air defense networks.
Furthermore, the Su-57 is often positioned on the market in comparison with the F-35. Russia’s argument is to present itself as an alternative for countries rejected by Washington: Iran, Syria, and possibly Turkey or the United Arab Emirates if the F-35 deals run into political disagreements. But if the United States opens up access to the F-35, as suggested by certain discussions with Riyadh or Ankara, the Su-57 loses some of its appeal: why accept an isolated standard, with uncertain support, if the main Western system becomes accessible?
Finally, we must be clear-headed: for the moment, no one can seriously talk about an export “fleet” of Su-57s. Two aircraft delivered, one supposed customer, a few behind-the-scenes discussions—this is not a massive commercial success. It is a bridgehead, a showcase, and a pretext for communication. To convert the trial, it will take more than a shiny model at a trade show: it will take regular deliveries, flight hours, joint exercises, and credible feedback.
Real visibility for the Su-57 on the market, between demonstration and limitations
The presence of the Su-57 at the Dubai Airshow 2025 marks a logical step: if Russia wants to sell its stealth fighter, it must show it off, fly it, open its cargo holds, and display its cockpit and engines. The flight demonstration of the prototype, with the internal bays open, is an extension of the communication efforts already visible at MAKS and Zhuhai: showing what can be shown and keeping quiet about what remains fragile.
Technically, the aircraft now displays acceptable consistency: partial but real stealth, modern sensors, planned integration with drones, advanced engine options, and an updated cockpit. For a country starting with a fleet of modernized Su-27s, this is a significant step forward. But the comparison with American ecosystems is harsh: production volumes, logistics network, software modernization cycles, stealth levels, operational experience—everything favors the F-35 and, to a lesser extent, the F-22.
From a strictly military point of view, the Su-57 may be of interest to a limited number of customers: those who do not have access to advanced Western fighters, who are politically aligned with Moscow, and who are willing to live with the constraints of sanctions. For them, it is a way to have an aircraft that is at least partially stealthy, with a significant military payload and a reasonable level of modernity. For everyone else, the offer remains primarily a bargaining chip in negotiations with Washington: raising the possibility of purchasing the Su-57 is a classic way to get a better deal on the F-35.
Frankly, the Su-57 is neither the “F-35 killer” touted by some Russian media outlets, nor a complete failure as claimed by some Western commentators. It is an ambitious program for a country whose industrial base is in difficulty, which is trying to remain in the very exclusive club of 5th generation fighter designers. Its strengths are real, as are its limitations. The export of two aircraft does not change the situation, but it does indicate that some states are willing to play this card, at least as a complement to other equipment. The rest will depend less on models at trade shows than on Russia’s ability to produce, support, and develop this system over twenty years, in an economic and technological context that clearly works against it.
Sources
– The War Zone, “Su-57 With New Upgrade Options, Russia Claims First Foreign Delivery Has Already Occurred.”
– Wikipedia, “Sukhoi Su-57.”
– Defence Security Asia, articles on the Su-57E and the Izdeliye 177S engine.
– Reuters, analyses on Rostec and Russian arms exports.
– Business Insider and Meta-Defense, articles on the first alleged export delivery to Algeria.
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