Drones, hypersonic missiles, and defense saturation: Russia is deploying a combined strike doctrine designed to circumvent Western air defenses.
Summary
Since 2022, Russia has gradually implemented an integrated hypersonic doctrine, which now shapes its approach to conducting long-range strikes. This approach is based on a methodical sequence: saturation of air defenses with inexpensive drones, activation and depletion of enemy interceptor stocks, then a decisive strike with very high-speed missiles such as Kinzhal, Zircon, or Oreshnik. The objective is not only the physical destruction of strategic targets, but also the lasting disorganization of defense architectures, constrained by asymmetric costs and unavoidable reloading times. In Ukraine, this doctrine is having real, but not absolute, effects. It puts constant stress on defenses, while revealing its own industrial and budgetary limitations. Faced with sanctions, Moscow favors a logic of strategic yield rather than traditional quantitative superiority, marking a clear break with traditional air doctrines.
The rise of a doctrine designed for saturation
Russia did not invent air saturation. But it has systematized it into a coherent framework, combining it with hypersonic weapons designed to strike at the precise moment when defenses are most vulnerable. This doctrine is not based on conventional air superiority. It is based on time, cost, and the fatigue of enemy systems.
Unlike Western air campaigns, which rely on the prior suppression of enemy defenses using sophisticated and costly means, Russia takes a more brutal but rational approach: forcing the adversary to expend its most expensive resources against cheap threats, then exploiting the window of opportunity that this creates.
The central role of drones in exhausting defenses
Shahed-type drones constitute the first layer of this doctrine. Inexpensive and mass-produced, they are launched in successive waves, often at night, on multiple trajectories. Their objective is not always to hit the target. Their main function is to force the opposing defense to react.
Each interception consumes a surface-to-air missile, the unit cost of which can exceed $1 million, as in the case of a Patriot. In contrast, a Shahed drone costs a fraction of that amount. This economic imbalance is at the heart of Russia’s strategy.
On the Ukrainian battlefield, this phase has proven to be partially effective. Defenses intercept the majority of drones, but at the cost of rapidly consuming precious ammunition. The problem is not interception. It is sustainability.
Temporality as a strategic weapon
Russian hypersonic doctrine exploits an often underestimated factor: reload time. An air defense system is not a permanent wall. It must be resupplied, reconfigured, and sometimes moved.
The waves of drones are followed, sometimes on the same night, sometimes a few hours later, by subsonic or supersonic cruise missiles. This second phase aims to maintain pressure, force continuous radar activation, and increase operator fatigue.
Only then does the hypersonic strike occur. It arrives when the defense is already engaged, sometimes partially degraded, and above all unable to react in a timely manner.
Hypersonic missiles as instruments of disruption
The Kinzhal, Zircon, and more recently Oreshnik missiles embody the third layer of the doctrine. What they have in common is their speed, often exceeding Mach 8, and complex trajectories that drastically reduce the windows of interception.
The Kinzhal, launched from MiG-31K or Tu-22M3 aircraft, combines speed and flexibility. The Zircon, initially naval, broadens the spectrum of launch platforms. Oreshnik, presented as an IRBM with MIRV capability, adds an additional strategic dimension, making saturation almost inevitable.
These weapons are not used en masse. They are used at the right moment, on high-value targets: energy infrastructure, command centers, logistics hubs.
Effectiveness sought above all psychological and systemic
Russian hypersonic doctrine is not aimed solely at material destruction. It seeks to produce a systemic effect. Each successful strike reminds the adversary that certain targets remain vulnerable, despite Western aid.
The psychological effect is real. Defense systems cannot be everywhere. The Ukrainian authorities must prioritize, relocate, and sometimes accept losses. This constant uncertainty weighs heavily on civil and military planning.
On the Russian side, the sparing but highly publicized use of hypersonic missiles reinforces a discourse of expanded deterrence, addressed as much to Kiev as to Western supporters.
Concrete results observed in Ukraine
On the ground, the results are mixed. The doctrine works partially. It allows for successful strikes on strategic targets, despite a generally high interception rate of drones and cruise missiles.
Western systems have proven their tactical effectiveness. But they also show their structural limitations. Stocks are not infinite. Western production lines are struggling to keep up with the high rate of attrition over time.
Russia, for its part, has not achieved total domination. Hypersonic strikes remain rare. Their effect, although spectacular, is not enough to paralyze the entire Ukrainian system.
The cost of the hypersonic doctrine
A hypersonic missile is expensive. Open estimates suggest several tens of millions of euros per unit for systems such as Kinzhal or Zircon. At first glance, this doctrine therefore seems financially fragile.
But the comparison must be comprehensive. A single successful hypersonic strike can neutralize critical infrastructure whose value far exceeds the cost of the missile. Moreover, it forces the adversary to deploy extremely costly defenses that offer imperfect protection.
Compared to a traditional doctrine of massive bombing, this approach is more selective, less dependent on air platforms, but more dependent on advanced technologies.
Adapting to the constraints of sanctions
Western sanctions have had a profound effect on Russian industry. Restricted access to certain components, logistical difficulties, pressure on production lines. The hypersonic doctrine is also a response to these constraints.
Rather than producing thousands of conventional missiles, Russia is focusing its resources on vectors with high strategic added value. It accepts limited volumes but seeks maximum impact.
Shahed drones, produced locally or assembled from available components, partially compensate for these limitations. They make it possible to maintain a high operational tempo at a lower cost.
Comparison with traditional air doctrine
In conventional air doctrine, superiority is achieved through control of the skies, systematic destruction of defenses, and massive use of aviation. This approach requires large fleets, numerous pilots, and heavy logistics.
Russian hypersonic doctrine circumvents this logic. It does not seek permanent control, but rather a window of opportunity. It does not replace aviation. It complements it, or even partially supplements it in a context of high-intensity warfare under constraints.
This difference explains why Moscow persists in this path, despite the costs and technological risks.
The structural limitations of the doctrine
This doctrine is not invincible. It depends on the availability of complex missiles, which are sensitive to industrial uncertainties. It can be partially countered by better coordination of defenses, diversification of systems, and an increase in Western stockpiles.
In the medium term, advances in hypersonic interception could reduce the current advantage. The technological race is on, and there is no indication that it will remain static.
A new standard for remote warfare
The Russian hypersonic doctrine marks a profound evolution in air and ballistic warfare. It highlights an uncomfortable reality: modern air defense is effective, but structurally vulnerable to attrition.
In Ukraine, this doctrine did not reverse the course of the conflict. But it has imposed a cost, a permanent constraint, and a constant need to adapt. It undoubtedly foreshadows a future norm, where speed, saturation, and sequence will count as much as brute force.
This change in military grammar does not guarantee victory. However, it redefines the rules of the game in a world where technology, budget, and time are becoming weapons in their own right.
Sources
Military analyses and specialized reports on the use of Russian hypersonic missiles.
Open data on combined strikes in Ukraine and air defense.
Budgetary and industrial studies on the costs of hypersonic and anti-aircraft systems.
Strategic publications on the evolution of long-range strike doctrines.
Live a unique fighter jet experience