Rare deliveries, engines in transition, components under sanctions: the Su-57 Felon is progressing slowly and undermining Moscow’s industrial and export image.
In summary
The Su-57 Felon is presented by Moscow as the symbol of Russian aeronautical renewal. However, the available figures and industrial indicators converge: the production rate remains very low, to the point that several analysts estimate that only 0 to 2 deliveries will have been made by 2025. There is no single explanation for this. It is the result of a combination of constraints: an unfinished engine transition, difficulties in sourcing critical components, budgetary decisions in favor of aircraft that are simpler to produce, and the lasting impact of sanctions on microelectronics and machine tools. Added to this is a credibility problem: the aircraft exists and flies, but series production remains slow and irregular, which limits its operational weight, weakens its export appeal, and exposes Russia to unfavorable comparisons with American and Chinese programs. The Su-57 is not a total failure. It is a constrained program that is moving forward, but under industrial constraints.
Production of the Su-57 Felon faces a wall of industrial reality
The official Russian line emphasizes “mass production” and the gradual arrival of aircraft in units. In reality, the question is not whether the Su-57 is being produced, but how quickly it is actually leaving the factory, and how regularly.
For 2025, several open sources point to an ambiguous situation: no clear official communication of deliveries during the year, while images released in the spring fueled speculation that two aircraft had been delivered. This lack of clarity is not insignificant. An industry confident in its ramp-up publishes figures, a timeline, and identifiable batches. Here, the information is fragmented, as if each cell delivered were to remain a discrete event rather than part of an assumed rhythm.
This contrast feeds a simple interpretation: Su-57 production is technically possible, but structurally difficult to accelerate.
The engine as a bottleneck and factor in delays
The Su-57 entered service with a transitional engine (AL-41 family), pending the new-generation engine often referred to as “Izdeliye 30” (designated AL-51F according to some communications). This choice is not unique. Many programs use a temporary engine. The problem is the length of this transition.
A modern fighter aircraft is not “just” a airframe. Its engine determines its endurance, thrust, fuel consumption, and infrared signature. Until the final engine is stabilized, manufacturers are reluctant to commit to mass production, as they risk assembling batches that will quickly become obsolete or costly to bring up to standard.
The issue is even more sensitive for a stealth fighter. The operational promise of the Su-57 is based in part on supersonic cruise capability, better thermal management, and a propulsion architecture more suited to electronic warfare and energy-intensive sensors. Without a finalized engine, the production version is still perceived as an intermediate step.
The consequence is clear: the Izdeliye 30 engine becomes a bottleneck, because you can’t “scale” a high-end aircraft when the propulsion system is not completely finalized.
Dependence on components and the fragility of sourcing under sanctions
The second major obstacle is the supply chain. A modern stealth aircraft is a product that requires many critical components: computers, memory, RF modules, converters, electro-optical sensors, navigation elements, actuators, and communication systems. Even assuming a robust design, production depends on a stable flow of sub-assemblies.
However, since 2022, Russia has faced lasting restrictions on access to certain advanced components and Western tools. The most sensitive issue is not the traditional “raw materials,” but the industrial ecosystem that enables parts to be manufactured and tested with consistent quality.
In fighter aircraft manufacturing, the difficulty is not in producing a single part. It is in producing 50, 100, or 200 parts with the same level of tolerance, reliability, and traceability. When a program becomes dependent on indirect imports, imperfect local substitutes, or parallel supply chains, production turns into shortage management.
The result: the aircraft may exist, but the production lines do not “run” like a stable industry. They move forward in fits and starts.
The Komsomolsk-on-Amur factory and the limits of ramping up production
The Su-57 is assembled in Komsomolsk-on-Amur, a historic site for Russian combat aviation. On paper, this is an asset: skills, infrastructure, industrial culture. In reality, the challenge is not basic know-how. It is the modernization of processes and access to the equipment necessary for contemporary production.
A stealth fighter requires more demanding processes than those of a previous-generation aircraft: enhanced quality control, surface treatments, application of specific coatings, integration of sensors, fine calibration of systems, and lengthy testing. Each step adds time, and therefore cost. And each upstream delay has a knock-on effect downstream.
Russia can produce combat aircraft in volume, particularly proven platforms. But the Su-57 is closer to a “premium” product in an industry under pressure. The most visible consequence is arbitration: rather than pushing ahead with a difficult aircraft, Moscow is favoring aircraft that are immediately useful, quicker to build, and already optimized for the ongoing war.
Budgetary trade-offs in favor of more militarily profitable aircraft
The operational context is weighing heavily. The war in Ukraine has highlighted concrete needs: long-range strikes, volume, rapid fleet renewal, and the ability to operate from exposed bases. In this context, efficiency is measured not by technological prestige but by the cost/effect ratio.
A Su-57 is expensive to produce and maintain. Open estimates suggest highly variable unit costs, sometimes between $50 million and $100 million depending on configuration, volume, and integration. Even if these figures remain debatable, the industrial logic is clear: the more complex the aircraft, the more each unit “absorbs” scarce resources (engineers, test benches, components, assembly time).
In contrast, aircraft such as the Su-34 or Su-35S remain easier to produce in large numbers, with immediate operational impact. This is not a value judgment on the technology. It is a war planning decision.
The Su-57 therefore suffers from a paradox: it is strategic for image, but less of a priority for combat mass.
Russian autonomy on paper and technological dependence in practice
Russia retains a solid aerospace industrial base. It knows how to design airframes, produce engines, manufacture metal and composite structures, and integrate weapons systems. To say that it would be “incapable” of producing the Su-57 would be false.
But total autonomy is another story. Modern programs depend on a network of specialized suppliers, including in areas that are difficult to replace quickly: high-frequency electronics, signal processing components, certified embedded software, and precision production equipment.
Where the USSR could accept technological compromises, a modern stealth fighter is less tolerant of approximation. If the sensors are less powerful, if reliability drops, or if maintenance becomes too burdensome, the aircraft loses some of its appeal.
Russia can substitute, circumvent, or adapt. But these strategies often reduce consistency, increase costs, and slow down mass production. This is the crux of the problem: producing a few units is possible, but sustainable industrialization at a high rate becomes much more difficult.
The financial and industrial impact for UAC and the Russian state
The financial aspect is often underestimated. Producing a small number of units is expensive. In industry, the unit cost falls as the production rate increases, because fixed costs are spread over a larger number of units. When production remains low, each aircraft bears a heavy share of the structural costs.
Recent public information indicates that United Aircraft Corporation has been operating at a loss for long periods of time, with losses that are decreasing but still present. In this context, accelerating a costly program such as the Su-57 means mobilizing capital, credit, and organization, even as the Russian economy is under pressure from sanctions, labor shortages, financing costs, and competition between sectors.
The visible result is a strategy of optimization: reducing administrative structures, seeking productivity, and prioritizing contracts that are most immediately “useful” to the military effort. The Su-57, on the other hand, looks more like a long-term investment.
Su-57E exports: between commercial showcase and image risk
On paper, export is a solution: sell abroad, secure advances, finance production, and stabilize production rates. But exporting a fifth-generation fighter jet cannot be achieved with a brochure.
A potential customer wants three things: guaranteed availability, a stock of parts, and maintenance capacity for 20 to 30 years. However, the main problem with the Su-57 is not its theoretical design. It is confidence in the industrial ecosystem that surrounds it.
At the end of 2025, Russia announced the delivery of two Su-57E export aircraft to an unnamed customer, fueling speculation. It is a political signal: “we are delivering, despite everything.” But this type of announcement can have the opposite effect if the market understands that the Russian state has to symbolically “snatch” deliveries to prove that the program exists.
Let’s add one more point: since 2022, Russian defense exports have been under pressure, and some statements indicate a significant decline, linked to the priority given to domestic needs. In this context, even if countries are interested in the Su-57E, volumes remain uncertain.
The Su-57 is therefore caught in a dilemma: a technological showcase on the one hand, questions about industrial sustainability on the other. And this dilemma directly affects Su-57E exports.
Russia’s image of power in international comparisons
A stealth fighter program is not just a military capability. It is a strategic calling card. The United States has built an ecosystem around the F-35, while China is accelerating its development of the J-20 and its derivatives. In this landscape, Russia cannot be satisfied with a Su-57 produced in dribs and drabs without suffering a loss of influence.
The problem is not only quantitative. It is narrative. When Russia announces lofty goals but fails to maintain a steady pace, it fuels the idea of an industry that performs well in certain categories but is fragile when it comes to the most advanced systems.
On the ground, the impact is twofold. First, the reduced presence of the Su-57 limits its operational learning curve, as maturity also comes from volume and use. Second, the small fleet prevents a true mass effect, which is essential in high-intensity situations.
Russia can keep the Su-57 as a “rare gem.” But a rare gem does not carry the same weight as an industrialized system.
The likely trajectory: a program that is moving forward, but without any immediate breakthrough
What stands out today is a trend: the Su-57 is progressing in modest batches, under constraints, with sometimes selective communication. There is no indication that the program will disappear. But there is also no evidence of a rapid ramp-up in the short term.
The most credible scenario is one of continuous but slow production, with gradual improvements in standards and a search for export opportunities, with no guarantee of volumes.
The real question, ultimately, is as much political as it is industrial: does Russia want to finance a costly acceleration of the Su-57, or does it prefer to maintain symbolic production while maximizing more accessible platforms?
This is where the Su-57 becomes revealing. It is less a technological myth than a full-scale test of Russian industrial capacity in a closed, constrained world at war.
Sources
Rostec – “UAC has delivered the new Su-57 and Su-34…” (December 23, 2024)
EDR Magazine – “Rosoboronexport provides new details on the Sukhoi Su-57” (May 31, 2025)
RUSI (PDF) – “Vulnerabilities in Sukhoi Production: Clipping Russia’s Wings” (November 1, 2025)
Zona Militar – “UAC ended 2025 without official deliveries of new Su-57…” (January 7, 2026)
The National Interest – “Russia Delivered Few, If Any, Su-57s in 2025” (January 9, 2026)
Business Insider – “Western sanctions threaten Russia’s Su-57 production…” (October 10, 2024)
Reuters – “Rostec says defense exports halved since 2022…” (November 18, 2025)
Business Insider – “Russia’s fighter jet maker wants to crank out 30% more warplanes…” (June 2025)
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