The Royal Air Force is forming its first military space warfare unit to protect British satellites and counter Russian and Chinese threats.
Executive Summary
On September 23, 2026, the Royal Air Force announced the creation of the No. III Space Effects Squadron, the first British military unit specifically tasked with combating threats targeting satellites. Placed under the authority of UK Space Command, this squadron will be responsible for disrupting, degrading, or neutralizing adversarial space capabilities, notably through electronic warfare and defensive measures against anti-satellite weapons.
This new formation complements two existing squadrons dedicated to orbital surveillance and early warning. It marks a significant evolution: the United Kingdom no longer wishes merely to observe space threats, but to possess the means to act against them.
London plans to invest £880 million between 2026 and 2030 in space intelligence and space domain control. This decision comes amid growing military competition with Russia and China, at a time when satellites have become indispensable to modern military operations.
The Royal Air Force Shifts from Surveillance to Space Action
Announced in London during the UK Space Power Conference by Air Chief Marshal Sir Harv Smyth, the No. III Space Effects Squadron fulfills a requirement outlined in the UK Space Strategy of September 8: the Control of Space. The objective is twofold: to guarantee British and allied freedom of action in orbit, and to prevent an adversary from exploiting its own space assets against the United Kingdom.
Until now, the No. I Space Operations Squadron worked alongside entities like the National Space Operations Centre to track objects in orbit. The No. II Space Warning Squadron provided early warning, notably utilizing the radar at RAF Fylingdales in Yorkshire. The new third squadron must now take direct action against detected threats.
This distinction is fundamental. The RAF is not declaring the acquisition of an armed satellite fleet; rather, it is establishing a specialized unit comprising multi-service personnel whose exact headcount, specific equipment, and full operational capability timeline remain classified.
Electronic Jamming Becomes a British Space Weapon
Electronic warfare targets the signals that allow a satellite to communicate and execute its missions. A jammer can inject interfering emissions into an uplink—between the ground and the satellite—or a downlink—between the satellite and its user. Depending on the power, frequency, and geometry of the operation, it can block data reception or severely degrade its quality.
A counter-space operation therefore does not necessarily require an anti-satellite missile. A reconnaissance satellite temporarily deprived of its data link can be rendered operationally useless without sustaining physical damage.
The United Kingdom has moved past the theoretical stage. According to a BBC investigation published on September 23, the RAF has been deploying a classified ground-based system capable of jamming foreign satellites for approximately a year. It has reportedly already been used to deter hostile activities, though its exact operation and targets remain secret.
This approach echoes the principles of the electronic warfare systems deployed on modern fighter jets, albeit with entirely different constraints: target visibility, orbital distance, and radio beam characteristics. London has also hinted at countermeasures against anti-satellite weapons, without specifying their exact nature.
British Satellites Constitute Strategic Targets
The SKYNET network provides the protected military communications upon which British forces deployed worldwide depend. Its upcoming renewal includes the launch of SKYNET 6A in 2027. Concurrently, the ISTARI program is developing space-based reconnaissance, with its Tyche satellite already operating in orbit.
These capabilities feed command, intelligence, and targeting chains. The integration of satellites with advanced tactical aircraft illustrates this heavy reliance: an interrupted data link can deprive an aircrew of crucial real-time information, even when their onboard radar functions normally.
This vulnerability extends far beyond the armed forces. Sir Harv Smyth estimated the potential economic cost of a major GPS disruption to the British economy at £1.4 billion per day—an economic impact projection rather than the observed cost of a specific attack.
Surveillance assets already provide vast volumes of data. Since its inception, the National Space Operations Centre has issued over 45,000 collision alerts to British operators. In 2025 alone, its military team analyzed more than 1,950 missile warning alert events. The new squadron is designed to convert this intelligence into prompt decision-making and decisive action.
Russia and China Accelerate the Orbital Race
London frames this organizational shift as a direct response to adversarial behavior. On September 23, Sir Harv Smyth detailed the maneuvers of five Russian military satellites that approached two Finnish commercial satellites in May 2026. While proximity operations can serve inspection purposes, they can also signal impending jamming, interception, or intentional collision.
China likewise possesses advanced orbital rendezvous and maneuver technologies. Their utility is inherently dual-use: they can service or refuel friendly satellites just as easily as they can conduct hostile operations. Threat assessment therefore cannot rely on an isolated movement; it depends on trajectory, operational context, and presumed intent.
The British decision also follows the recent US confirmation regarding weapons deployed in Earth orbit, announced on September 14, 2026. While Washington and London are pursuing complementary trajectories, their respective capabilities are not identical.
For NATO, the stakes are collective. The Alliance has recognized space as an operational domain since 2019. Depending on its severity, a space-based attack could lead Allies to invoke Article 5, though such a response is not automatic.
The United Kingdom Invests in Sustainable Space Defense
The UK Space Strategy earmarks more than £7.8 billion in public space funding through 2029–2030. These commitments include £2.3 billion for military satellite communications and £880 million for space intelligence and domain control.
London also plans to stand up No. IV, V, and VI Squadrons. These future units will encompass space training and tactical development, alongside activities linked to the Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability (DARC) deep-space surveillance radar program developed jointly with the United States and Australia.
Finally, the British approach maintains a firm political constraint: the government formally excludes destructive anti-satellite missile tests, which generate persistent debris fields hazardous to all orbital infrastructure.
The ultimate test will be operational. Detecting a threat does not guarantee the ability to neutralize it immediately or establish the definitive source of interference with absolute certainty. The No. III Space Effects Squadron provides London with an institutional structure to act. Its credibility will ultimately depend on the actual resources deployed, allied coordination, and the ability to contain crises before they escalate from space to Earth.