The J-10CE appears in Azerbaijani livery. Behind this Chinese offensive, the Russian decline in the fighter jet market is becoming increasingly clear.
Executive Summary
The Chinese J-10CE made an appearance at ADEX 2026 in Baku, painted in the colors of the Azerbaijani Air Force. The image is striking, but it requires precise interpretation: no Azerbaijani purchase has been officially confirmed. AVIC displayed a full-scale mockup bearing national roundels and tail number 27-001. The commercial maneuver is nonetheless significant. Azerbaijan already operates the joint Sino-Pakistani JF-17C Block III. Crucially, Uzbekistan unveiled its first J-10CEs in August 2026, becoming the second known foreign operator after Pakistan. For Moscow, the issue extends far beyond Baku. China is beginning to sell modern fighter jets within former Soviet military domain. The phenomenon remains limited for now: Beijing accounts for just 5.6% of global arms exports between 2021 and 2025. However, against a Russia whose exports have plunged by 64%, momentum is clearly favoring the Chinese defense industry.
The Azerbaijani J-10CE remains a marketing operation for now
The photographs released during ADEX 2026 were deliberately ambiguous. A full-scale mockup of the Chengdu J-10CE was displayed in Baku featuring Azerbaijani livery, national roundels, and tail number 27-001.
President Ilham Aliyev visited the exhibition on September 30. The presidency officially cited the presence of the China National Aero-Technology Import & Export Corporation (CATIC), the export arm of AVIC.
However, neither the presidency, the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense, nor AVIC announced a contract for the J-10CE.
The distinction is essential. A painted mockup is not a delivered aircraft.
It is nonetheless a carefully calculated marketing tactic. The goal is to present the jet as a natural evolution of the national fleet long before a purchasing decision is publicly finalized.
The Chengdu J-10 fighter jet is hardly entering unfamiliar territory. In July 2026, the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense officially showcased JF-17C Block III fighters executing training sorties alongside Su-25s and L-39s.
The J-10CE offers far more than a MiG-29 replacement
The J-10CE is the export variant of the Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group’s J-10C. It is a single-engine delta-wing fighter with canards, generally categorized as a 4.5-generation aircraft.
Its primary leap forward lies in its combat systems architecture.
It integrates an Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, modern electronic warfare capabilities, tactical datalinks, and recent Chinese munitions. The PL-10E handles short-range dogfighting, while the PL-15E targets beyond-visual-range engagements.
This integrated suite allows the J-10CE to operate effectively within Chinese networked air combat frameworks, where individual aircraft no longer serve as the sole sensor determining a target engagement solution.
Pakistan was the launch export customer, officially taking delivery of six J-10CEs in March 2022.
The aircraft’s operational profile rose substantially following Indo-Pakistani air engagements in May 2025. Two U.S. officials told Reuters with high confidence that Pakistani J-10s had downed at least two Indian aircraft, one of which was identified as a Dassault Rafale.
This does not mean the J-10CE is intrinsically “superior” to the Rafale. The engagement involved an entire system-of-systems: airborne early warning platforms, datalinks, electronic warfare, intelligence, doctrine, and missile integration.
Commercially, however, the 2025 engagement fundamentally reshaped the market perception of the J-10.
Russia is losing its status as a default supplier
For Moscow, the problem is acute because Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan belong to a region where Russian aircraft were long considered practically indispensable.
The MiG-29, Su-27, Su-30, and Su-25 structured much of the post-Soviet air force fleets. Training, doctrine, maintenance depots, and spare parts supply chains all rested on this legacy heritage.
That dominance is eroding rapidly.
According to SIPRI data, Russian arms exports fell by 64% between the 2016–2020 and 2021–2025 periods. Russia’s global market share plummeted from 21% down to 6.8%.
The war in Ukraine explains much of this contraction. Russian industry must prioritize domestic military consumption. International sanctions further complicate component procurement and financial transactions. Prospective buyers also fear delivery delays, uncertain long-term spare parts availability, and secondary U.S. sanctions under CAATSA.
Meanwhile, China can supply aircraft, radars, missiles, datalinks, air defense systems, and financing within a single cohesive technological ecosystem.

Uzbekistan presents a more immediate warning for Moscow
The most serious signal for Moscow comes not from Azerbaijan, but from Uzbekistan.
In late August 2026, Uzbek authorities released official media featuring J-10CE fighters bearing national markings. At least six operational aircraft were visible, confirming Uzbekistan as the second foreign operator after Pakistan.
The symbolism is strong. Tashkent historically relied on Soviet- and Russian-supplied MiG-29s and Su-27s.
A new Chinese procurement signifies far more than a single lost contract for United Aircraft Corporation. It progressively shifts long-term technological dependence: pilot instruction, simulators, spare parts, weapons integration, software updates, and maintenance infrastructure all align with the new platform.
This is precisely how one defense supplier permanently displaces another.
The trend is particularly sensitive for Moscow because China no longer relies on Russian engines for these platforms. Early J-10 variants were powered by the Russian AL-31FN, whereas recent J-10Cs have transitioned to the indigenous Chinese WS-10.
Consequently, Beijing can now compete directly against Russia with a product whose industrial supply chain it fully controls.
Sino-Russian competition is unlikely to trigger a political rift
It would be an overstatement to anticipate an open geopolitical confrontation between Beijing and Moscow over a handful of fighter contracts.
Both nations share far broader geopolitical interests in their bilateral relationship, and their strategic cooperation extends well beyond defense aviation exports.
However, industrial competition is undeniably real.
Russia still accounted for 6.8% of global arms exports over the 2021–2025 period, while China reached 5.6%. Crucially, their trajectories are diverging: Chinese exports grew by 11%, while Russian exports collapsed.
China does not need to confront Moscow politically; it simply fills the market vacancies that Russian industry can no longer adequately service.
This dynamic could become increasingly visible across Central Asia, Africa, and parts of the Middle East.
Chinese export success remains less global than it appears
Caution is equally necessary against overestimating Beijing’s current position. China has not yet replaced Russia on the global market.
According to SIPRI, 61% of all Chinese arms exports between 2021 and 2025 were directed to a single customer: Pakistan. This heavy concentration highlights Beijing’s main vulnerability.
The J-10CE has yet to prove it can be sustained over several decades across vastly different operational air forces.
After-sales support is critical. Acquiring a fighter jet entails maintaining engines, radars, and avionics computers for thirty years, ensuring software upgrades, and maintaining a constant pipeline of spare parts and munitions.
This is an area where the United States, France, and historically Russia possess decades of proven operational experience.
The model could now replicate across multiple nations
Nonetheless, market conditions are becoming increasingly favorable for the J-10CE.
Its natural target market does not consist of nations capable of freely procuring the F-35. Instead, it targets countries seeking a modern fighter while avoiding Western strategic alignment, those unable to secure U.S. export approvals, or air forces aiming to gradually phase out aging Russian fleets.
Uzbekistan fits this profile exactly. Azerbaijan could become another credible prospect, though its existing JF-17 fleet reduces the immediate urgency for a second Chinese platform.
Bangladesh is likewise evaluating the J-10CE. Defense reporting and official statements in 2026 referenced discussions surrounding a potential batch of roughly twenty aircraft, though no final contract should yet be considered finalized.
Indonesia offers an even clearer lesson in analytical caution. Jakarta announced intentions in October 2025 to acquire J-10 fighters, with cited figures reaching up to 42 aircraft. Officials subsequently clarified that evaluation remained open, and as of 2026, the exact status of the project remains unconfirmed.
Names like Egypt, Iran, and Algeria surface regularly in defense reporting, but public information does not currently support claims of finalized sales.
China’s real test: turning Pakistani success into a global footprint
ADEX 2026 does not mark a confirmed Chinese commercial victory in Azerbaijan. It demonstrates something more subtle: AVIC now deems the J-10CE marketable in the Caucasus and no longer hesitates to display it publicly as a prospective national asset.
A few years ago, such a scenario would have been difficult to imagine in a region historically dominated by Soviet and Russian hardware.
The decisive test will lie in future contract signatures. If the J-10CE remains confined mostly to Pakistan alongside a small Uzbek fleet, its market penetration will remain limited. If Beijing successfully converts interest from Bangladesh, Azerbaijan, or other air forces into firm orders, the shift in global defense trade will be far more profound.
Russia would then not only lose contract revenue; it would watch China take its place as the primary non-Western fighter alternative. That competition would prove especially difficult for Moscow to counter, as Beijing can now deliver precisely what Moscow once promised: a modern fighter, advanced munitions, relative political independence, and a complete military aviation ecosystem.
