During the Cold War, the USAF secretly evaluated Soviet MiGs within the “Red Eagles.” History, figures, methods, and legacy of a unique program.
Summary
At the height of the Cold War, the US Air Force set up a clandestine operation to understand and then defeat Soviet fighters in actual aerial combat. Under the auspices of the 4477th Test and Evaluation Squadron, nicknamed the “Red Eagles,” hand-picked pilots flew MiG-17s, MiG-21s, and MiG-23s recovered from abroad, from the Tonopah Test Range (Nevada). The Constant Peg program exposed thousands of American crews to the performance and limitations of enemy aircraft, while keeping its activities under wraps through misleading names and administrative smokescreens. Between 1977 and 1988, more than 15,000 sorties were flown, permanently changing dissimilar air combat tactics and inspiring modern “aggressor” training. This long-classified story illustrates an operational certainty: knowing the enemy intimately, right down to their cockpit, is sometimes as valuable as a new aircraft.
The secret framework that made the impossible possible
The genesis of a project tailored for the Cold War
The idea arose from observations made at the end of the Vietnam War: combat losses were spiraling and training was inadequate in the face of Soviet fighters that were very different from Western aircraft. The military high command wanted a reality check. In 1977, a small unit began working with a core of MiG-17s and MiG-21s obtained through indirect channels. In 1980, the unit officially became the 4477th Test and Evaluation Squadron, aka Red Eagles, operating from the Tonopah Test Range in Nevada, an isolated area northwest of Nellis AFB.
The objective was not industrial espionage, but tactical testing: exposing USAF, US Navy, and US Marine Corps crews to the actual performance of MiGs and their piloting “tricks” during a typical week. Flights are conducted during daylight hours, in VMC weather, under GCI (“Bandit Control”) control, with maximum safety discipline.
Smokescreens, false names, and a culture of secrecy
For years, the existence of the program was denied. The earlier HAVE DOUGHNUT and HAVE DRILL programs, conducted at Groom Lake, paved the way by evaluating the MiG-21 (designated YF-110) and MiG-17, respectively. Constant Peg inherited these practices: multiple administrative identities, discreet hangars, nighttime transport, and compartmentalized documentation. The secrecy was not only aimed at Moscow; it also protected the sources of acquisition and the safety of the crews.
The technical heart: Soviet MiGs dissected in flight
The aircraft: MiG-17, MiG-21, MiG-23
The fleet initially included the MiG-17 “Fresco,” a rustic but formidable low-speed aircraft capable of tight turns and imposing slow combat. Next came the MiG-21 “Fishbed,” Mach 2 (approximately 2,100 km/h), light, responsive, with a favorable thrust-to-weight ratio, whose instantaneous turning ability surprised young Western pilots. Finally, the MiG-23 “Flogger,” equipped with variable-geometry wings, revealed dazzling acceleration in level flight and descent, challenging assumptions about energy and verticality.
Each airframe, sometimes heterogeneous depending on its origin, is brought up to flight standard with a minimum of Western instrumentation and demanding technical monitoring. Mechanics learn from Soviet production lines: no complete documentation, “empirical” tolerances, but a simple design that facilitates rapid return to service.
Mission profiles and tactical lessons
A typical week for a visiting squadron follows a progression: visual familiarization and interception procedures, codified “1 vs. 1” maneuvers, then “2 vs. 1” and “2 vs. 2” combat maneuvers. The Red Eagles instructors orchestrate scenarios that reveal the enemy’s strengths: supersonic flight, the MiG-21’s sharp roll, the MiG-23’s energy recovery. The objective is twofold: to break the “wow” effect and to ingrain reflexes. As one officer summed it up: “remove the ‘Oh my God’ factor.”
These flights also feed into the performance database: sustainable angles of attack, instantaneous/sustained turn rates, energy losses, high-incidence behaviors. Taken together, dozens of quantified parameters feed into Western combat doctrine.
The training method that changed the way we fight
Dissimilar air combat becomes a religion
At the turn of the 1980s, dissimilar air combat became standard practice. The Red Eagles demonstrated that a “good” fighter, poorly employed against the “wrong” threat profile, will lose. The result: a revamp of training syllabi, the rise of “aggressor” squadrons, the reproduction of enemy paint schemes and tactics, and feedback to flight schools and Topgun/Weapons School.
The figures speak for themselves: more than 15,000 sorties carried out, nearly 7,000 crews exposed to these atypical combat situations. Each pilot leaves with a mental checklist of “do’s and don’ts” when facing Fishbeds and Floggers, and precise energy benchmarks in meters per second of climb rate, degrees per second of turn rate, and engine speeds to maintain to avoid dynamic stall.
Doctrinal and industrial implications
In terms of doctrine, NATO places greater emphasis on entering combat with an energy advantage, exploiting credible BVR, and desynchronizing enemy timelines. On the industrial side, an in-depth understanding of MiGs is driving developments in sensors and weapons: air-to-air radars that are more robust against clutter, optimized head-up displays, and missile configurations adapted to “merge” with small, fast-moving targets.
Behind the scenes: acquisitions, security, and accidents
Where did the enemy aircraft come from?
The acquisition channels remain, in part, classified. But documented history mentions recoveries via third countries, defections, and opportunistic cooperation with allies with ex-Soviet stocks. Before Constant Peg, HAVE DOUGHNUT had already evaluated a MiG-21 obtained by a Middle Eastern partner; and this logic continues: what matters is the airframe that can be used, not its exact history.
Technical and human risks
Flying a foreign fighter jet, sometimes in an “unknown” condition, involves risks: incomplete documentation, rare spare parts, and a different construction philosophy. The Red Eagles therefore impose a strict “safety culture”: daytime flights, selected weather conditions, cautious settings, and gradually extended flight envelopes. Despite these precautions, history records losses and incidents, reminding us of the human cost inherent in this type of experimentation.
Organization: a factory of operational discretion
A well-oiled weekly cycle
The rotation is calibrated: visitors arrive on Sunday, read-in and safety rules, daily flights under Red Eagles supervision, detailed daily debriefings (by phone and in person). The MiGs take off from Tonopah, and visiting crews remain within the Nellis perimeter to preserve secrecy and streamline flows. Bandit Controllers provide radar guidance and separation, while ground crews monitor temperatures, vibrations, and engine time.
Maintenance: Achilles’ heel and invisible feat
Maintenance is the other half of the success story. Without an official support chain, logistics had to be “manufactured”: judicious cannibalization, secure stocks, craftsmen capable of machining a ring or reconditioning a pump. This ingenuity, which was nothing short of spectacular, ensured sufficient availability to maintain daily sortie rates while respecting airframe and engine fatigue tolerances.
Extinguishing the fire and the lasting legacy
Closure and what survived
The last flights, dating from 1988, preceded administrative deactivation (1990). The context had changed: relative détente, the arrival of new Soviet generations making the MiG “legacy” fleets less representative, and budgetary decisions. The surviving airframes ended up in museums, as targets, or disappeared from radar. In 2006, partial declassification lifted the veil and allowed veterans to write the “authorized history.”
What the Red Eagles left behind in modern training
The DNA of the Red Eagles still permeates training. Today’s “aggressor” squadrons carry on the spirit: reproducing the threat in its paint schemes, flight paths, and cunning. Weapons schools now incorporate kinematic models of enemy aircraft, refined through years of practice, into their mission software. Above all, the USAF has demonstrated that operational advantage is not limited to the platform: it stems from technical knowledge about the enemy.
The fallout beyond MiGs: sensors, networks, and cognitive warfare
From aircraft to system of systems
The Red Eagles have accelerated a transformation: the aircraft is no longer a “lone hero,” but a node in a network. Realistic confrontation with MiGs has led to the optimization of sensor fusion, low-altitude navigation, cooperative maneuvers, and radio discipline. Success is no longer measured solely by turn rate, but by the ability to impose one’s own tempo of engagement.
Lessons that apply in the era of drones
These lessons are still valid today in the face of swarms of drones and fifth-generation fighters: knowing your opponent, their algorithms, and their electromagnetic weaknesses remains a multiplier. While the Red Eagles of tomorrow will undoubtedly no longer fly heritage MiGs, the spirit of dissimilar air combat remains: the truth of combat is written in real-world contact.
A clandestine history that became a matrix of superiority
The 4477th TES not only gave a few elite pilots a thrill; it reconfigured the way the West approaches advanced training. The numbers—15,000 sorties and 7,000 crews exposed—speak to its scale; the lasting effects on doctrine and training programs speak to its depth. The USAF proved that a decisive advantage can arise from a simple and risky idea: take a seat in the cockpit opposite, so you never have to endure it again.
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