Arms race, drones, missiles, and nuclear triad: China is accelerating. Can US intelligence still keep pace with Beijing’s technological advances?
Summary
Over the past 15 years, China has embarked on a rapid military modernization program, which has turned into a veritable arms race since the mid-2010s. With the proliferation of combat drones, ballistic and cruise missiles, hypersonic systems, surface ships and submarines, not to mention the expansion of the nuclear triad, the flow of programs is massive, as seen in major parades such as the one held in Beijing on September 3, 2025.
Faced with this pace, the US Intelligence Community has a budget of around $100 billion per year, or nearly €93 billion, and more than 100,000 analysts and direct staff, supported by more than a million contractors. The issue is therefore not only one of resources, but also of the ability to prioritize, distinguish prototypes from truly operational systems, and anticipate the effects on the military balance, particularly around Taiwan.
The experts interviewed highlight three points: the scale of Chinese military developments, the risk of analytical saturation on the American side, and the temptation on both sides to use communications about weapons as a political tool. The debate is not between an all-powerful China and outdated intelligence, but between an adversary determined to catch up and a heavy American machine that is efficient but slow to adapt.
The tsunami of Chinese military innovations
A continuous flow of new weapons systems
Since the early 2010s, Beijing has changed scale. The ramp-up is visible in all areas: air, naval, land, and strategic. Pentagon reports on the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) note that China has doubled its stockpile of nuclear warheads, from around 300 in 2020 to nearly 600 in 2025, at a rate of around 100 new warheads per year. The goal announced by the US Department of Defense is clear: more than 1,000 warheads by 2030, potentially 1,500 by 2035.
The Victory Day parade on September 3, 2025, showcased nine variants of land-based ICBMs (DF-5A/B/C, DF-31A/AG/BJ, DF-41, DF-61, DF-27 under development), hypersonic anti-ship missiles, new-generation naval and aerial drones, as well as the explicit demonstration of a complete sea-air-land nuclear triad. For a Western analyst, this means dozens of program families to follow, each with its own sub-versions, production lines, tests, and deployments.
In the air domain, revelations are coming thick and fast: heavy stealth drones of the “cranked-kite” type tested in Malan, tailless tactical aircraft (J-XDS, J-36), shipborne derivatives such as the J-35, not to mention the already known programs (J-20, H-6N, future H-20). Each model involves specific sensors, data links, and doctrines of use that require detailed analysis. Added to this is large-scale naval modernization: the Chinese fleet has surpassed the US Navy in terms of the number of surface combatants, with more than 370 warships compared to around 290 on the US side, even if the cumulative tonnage still favors Washington.
This accumulation is not simply for show. It reflects a clear desire to reduce the US technological advantage, complicate US planning in the Pacific, and impose increasing costs on any US intervention around the South China Sea or the Taiwan Strait. For intelligence, this translates into an exponential workload: each new system requires years of monitoring to understand its maturity, its doctrine of use, and its integration into the Chinese arsenal.
US intelligence and its capacity for absorption
A massive apparatus, but already under heavy strain
The US Intelligence Community comprises 18 agencies, from the CIA to the NSA, including the DIA and the armed forces’ intelligence entities. The combined budget for 2023 is $99.6 billion, or nearly €93 billion, divided between the National Intelligence Program ($71.7 billion) and the Military Intelligence Program ($27.9 billion). For 2025, the request climbs to approximately $101.6 billion, or around €95 billion.
In terms of personnel, there are between 100,000 and 120,000 direct employees within the intelligence agencies, plus around 1.25 million contractors working on defense and intelligence missions. The entire US national security apparatus exceeds 3.4 million people, including military personnel, civilians, and subcontractors. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to claim that Washington lacks manpower or financial resources.
The problem lies elsewhere. The same analysts must simultaneously monitor Russia’s war in Ukraine, Iran and its ballistic-nuclear program, North Korea, terrorism, cybercrime, and a whole list of issues related to emerging technologies (AI, space, quantum). The central question is one of prioritization: how many teams should be devoted to monitoring the modernization of Chinese naval missiles, underwater drones, aeronautical programs, and silo infrastructure, without sacrificing other priorities?
Several experts interviewed in the original article make it clear that in terms of pure “collection” (satellites, electromagnetic interception, commercial imagery, open sources), US capabilities remain more than sufficient. Where the system shows its limitations is in its ability to process, cross-reference, and interpret this mass of information in a timely manner, while avoiding political or institutional bias.
In short, it is not a shortage of data that threatens US intelligence, but a possible analytical overload, fueled by China’s speed of execution and the American bureaucratic tendency to multiply conflicting priorities.
The gray areas between reality and misinformation in Chinese weapons
What Chinese parades and announcements really say
China’s large military parades are designed for a dual audience: internal and external. The message to the people is clear: modernization, power, and cohesion around the Party. The message to the outside world is more subtle: to showcase advanced capabilities, blur the lines on what is operational, and shape the perceptions of adversaries and potential partners. During the September 2025 parade, a significant portion of the systems on display had never been seen in actual exercise or sustained deployment.
Some experts point out that not all programs are at the same stage: some missiles may have only undergone a few test launches, while some drones exist only as prototypes. Other systems, on the contrary, have already been produced in dozens of units but remain poorly documented in the West. The real risk for US intelligence is not so much being fooled by models as underestimating capabilities deemed “secondary” or implausible, as we have seen in the past with Iranian drones or Russian missiles.
Conversely, there is a temptation in Washington to be swayed by systematic alarmist rhetoric: every new device presented in Beijing suddenly becomes a major threat, justifying increased budgets without critical analysis. Serious experts insist on the need for balance: taking Chinese weapons seriously, without fetishism or denial.
This touches on a political point: the presentation of Chinese programs fuels the budget debate in the United States. For proponents of a massive increase in military spending, every DF-61 or new stealth drone is an argument for demanding more funding. For skeptics, some Chinese announcements resemble communication tools. The truth probably lies somewhere in between: China’s modernization is very real, but not all of the systems shown will have the same strategic impact.
Operational challenges for US forces
How to counter hypersonic missiles and stealth drones
Beyond intelligence, the practical question is brutal: even with perfect information, does the Pentagon have the technical and financial means to respond to all of China’s new capabilities? Hypersonic anti-ship missiles, some of which are said to be capable of exceeding Mach 10, drastically reduce the reaction time of a US carrier strike group. At 12,000 km/h, a missile located 1,000 km from an aircraft carrier takes five minutes to reach its target. Under these conditions, the US Navy’s historical superiority becomes less obvious around Taiwan and in the South China Sea.
Heavy combat drones, whether airborne or naval, also complicate matters. They allow China to saturate defenses by multiplying vectors, while accepting greater losses than with manned aircraft. For intelligence, the challenge is to distinguish between concepts and systems that are actually integrated into operational units, capable of flying or sailing in swarms, cooperating with manned fighters, and fitting into an access denial bubble.
The American response cannot be to do everything, everywhere. The overall US defense budget exceeds $800 billion per year, or more than €740 billion, but it must cover Europe, the Middle East, the Indo-Pacific, cyber, space, nuclear deterrence, etc. Within this framework, the $100 billion allocated to intelligence is not infinitely expandable.
In this context, choices will have to be made: strengthening the capacity for continuous monitoring of the most critical Chinese programs (strategic missiles, anti-access systems, modernization of the nuclear triad), at the risk of leaving other theaters less covered. Politically, this is a delicate debate: recognizing that the Indo-Pacific is a strategic priority means accepting that other regions are less important. However, in Washington, each geopolitical lobby defends its own turf.
What this technological standoff portends
A strategic test for Washington and its allies
The debate over the ability of U.S. intelligence to keep pace with Chinese military developments is not academic. It foreshadows the strength of the American strategic model: a global country with multiple commitments, facing a major adversary focused on its regional environment and ready to invest heavily to challenge the technological superiority that has been the strength of the United States since the end of the Cold War.
Around Taiwan, the margins for error are narrowing. A misjudgment of the maturity of a new Chinese system—for example, the actual range of an anti-ship ballistic missile, or the ability of a stealth drone to survive in a contested environment—can lead to either excessive caution or dangerous underestimation. In both cases, the outcome of a crisis could be influenced by the quality of the analytical work carried out beforehand.
We must also accept a reality that is often avoided in public discourse: the US Intelligence Community is not infallible. It has already made serious mistakes on major issues (Iraq, Afghanistan, the capabilities of certain allies or adversaries). China knows this and is exploiting this weakness by multiplying signals, tests, and announcements to make interpretation more complex. The reasonable response is neither constant panic nor systematic minimization, but a cool-headed and conscious prioritization of risks.
Ultimately, this technological confrontation lays bare the key question: are the United States still capable of focusing their political, industrial, and intellectual resources on a central challenge, or do they remain prisoners of a fragmented system, where everyone defends their own budget, their own theater, and their own priorities? China, for its part, has made its choice: to close the gap, whatever the cost. If Washington does not clarify its own choice, it will not be for lack of information, but for lack of decisions.
Sources:
– The War Zone, “Can U.S. Intel Keep Up With China’s Tsunami Of Weapons Developments? “
– U.S. Department of Defense, annual reports on Chinese military capabilities
– SIPRI, reports on nuclear arsenals
– CSIS, analyses of the Victory Day Parade 2025
– Congressional Research Service, ”Intelligence Community Spending Trends”
– DNI / NIP & MIP budget releases
– Various analyses on the modernization of the Chinese armed forces and the structure of U.S. intelligence
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