Why the Navy will keep the Super Hornet alongside the F-35C: complementary roles, ammunition “truck,” operating costs, and upgrades.
Summary
The U.S. Carrier Air Wing will not switch entirely to the F-35C. The Navy is keeping the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet for what it does best: generating numerous sorties, carrying a lot of external weaponry, keeping pace at sea, and serving as an “ammunition truck” for raids where stealth is not essential. The F-35C provides discreet penetration, sensor fusion, and the opening of corridors in A2/AD zones thanks to its low signature, but its internal payload limits the amount of bombs it can carry when stealth is required. The Super Hornet Block III has increased potential (service life extended to 10,000 hours, TTNT/DTP-N network, IRST) and remains cost-competitive, with a well-oiled maintenance chain on aircraft carriers. The arrival of the MQ-25 tanker extends the range of action and reinforces complementarity: the F-35C breaks through, the Super Hornet follows and delivers the payload. Budget and availability data confirm this division of roles.
The operational framework: a mixed carrier air wing by design
The current composition of Carrier Air Wings includes three squadrons of F/A-18E/F and one squadron of F-35C (gradually increasing), with E-2D, EA-18G, and helicopters. This mix is not transitional: it meets two conflicting but complementary needs—stealth to open the way and ammunition depth to strike massively in permissive or semi-permissive environments. In the short term, the Navy is aiming to increase its F-35C fleets without sacrificing the volume of Super Hornets needed for permanence and attrition at sea.
The role of the Super Hornet as an ammunition “truck”
The F/A-18E/F has 11 hardpoints and an external load of approximately 8,050 kg. On a “permissive” raid, a pair of F/A-18E/Fs can carry heavy combinations: JDAMs from 227 kg to 907 kg, JSOWs (≈ 500 kg), anti-ship missiles, while still carrying fuel tanks and air-to-air missiles. In “sensor-shooter” raids, the F-35C detects/targets discreetly while the Super Hornet delivers the volume of weapons from behind the threat bubble. This magazine depth logic is the key to a sustained strike from a CVN.
The added value of the F-35C: opening up corridors
The F-35C has a combat radius of approximately 670 nm (≈ 1,240 km) on internal fuel with two 907 kg (GBU-31) bombs in the bomb bay and two AIM-120 missiles. It can also switch to “beast mode” with external loads (up to ~8,165 kg combined internal/external), at the cost of radar signature. Its sensor fusion and data links make it a quarterback in the combat bubble, designating targets for other platforms, including the Super Hornet.
Operating costs: what the figures say
There are two interpretations, which must be clearly distinguished:
- F-35 sustainability trend: the GAO reports an increase in support costs for the F-35 program (lifecycle estimate raised to $1.58 trillion in 2023, +44% vs. 2018), with availability rates below targets, including for the F-35C variant. These factors are weighing on the generation of sea deployments.
- Navy FY2024 reimbursable rates: interagency schedules indicate, for budgetary reference, hourly rates of $13,310 (F-35C) and $17,584–22,266 (F/A-18E/F). These are not “costs per flight hour” in the full MCO sense, but they illustrate internal benchmarks for billing for use. The Navy points out that these figures do not capture all support, ammunition, or depreciation.
In practice, the Navy is keeping the Super Hornet because it supports high rates of operation with familiar carrier maintenance, and because the “heavy external carry” option remains the most economical for many missions.
Block III modernization: endurance and connectivity
The Block III standard is based on three areas:
- Extended service life: from 6,000 to 7,500 hours, then a target of 10,000 hours via Service Life Modification (SLM). This is a major gain, allowing the aircraft to remain in service until the 2040s.
- Connectivity/processing: DTP-N and TTNT network for sharing high-speed tracks/targets within the CVW.
- Sensors: widespread use of IRST21 (pod) for passive detection of low SER targets at long range beyond the radar horizon.
These increments stabilize the tactical value of the Super Hornet by bringing it into the sensor bubble of the F-35C.
Range: the MQ-25 effect
A recurring criticism targets the range of carrier-based jets. The F-35C has a combat range of ~670 nm; the Super Hornet, depending on profiles and loads, has a shorter armed penetration range. The arrival of the MQ-25 Stingray (carrier-based tanker) changes the game: it relieves the F/A-18s of tanker missions, increases fuel margins during catapulting/landing, and extends the wing’s effective range from 300 to 400 nm (≈ 555 to 740 km). It is the missing piece that extends both the F-35C and the Super Hornet.
The generation of sorties: the raison d’être of the duo
In a cycle of operations at sea, the question is not only “how much can an aircraft carry,” but how many aircraft the CVN can launch/recover and bring back online in 24 hours, taking into account weather and maintenance. The Super Hornet, with its massive presence, remains the volume tool for maintaining CAP alert, escorting, striking in the second echelon, or “filling the hold” of a composite raid. The F-35C wins the first penetrations, launches the first salvos, detects, designates, and deconflicts the package. The Navy is seeking to densify the F-35C squadron on board, but without losing the resilience provided by a majority of F/A-18E/Fs.
Performance figures that structure roles
- F-35C: Mach 1.6 (≈ 1,975 km/h), combat radius ~670 nm (1,240 km), 2× GBU-31 (907 kg) and 2× AIM-120 in the bomb bay in stealth mode, up to ≈ 8,165 kg combined internal/external in permissive mode.
- F/A-18E/F: 11 hardpoints, external load ≈ 8,050 kg, versatile profiles with designation/IRST pods and various air-to-air/air-to-ground missiles.
These orders of magnitude explain why the F-35C opens and the Super Hornet saturates.
The question of cost: metrics and flight deck realities
The cost per flight hour varies depending on the scope (fuel, parts, spare parts, ammunition, depreciation). The GAO emphasizes the rise in support costs for the F-35 and availability below targets, which constrains the pace at sea. Conversely, the FY2024 reimbursable rates—which are indicative—sometimes show lower values for the F-35C than for the F/A-18E/F, reminding us that these budget lines are not complete MCOs. This is where the operational decision lies: keep the Super Hornet for mass roles and smooth out the use of the F-35C on disruptive effects where it makes a difference.
The 2030-2040 trajectory: SLM, Block III, and F/A-XX
The Navy is extending the life of the fleet via SLM and Block III conversion (target 10,000 hours), while preparing the F/A-XX for the next decade. In other words, the Super Hornet will remain the backbone until the arrival of a successor with a long range and swarm operations with drones. In the meantime, the gradual increase in the number of F-35Cs per carrier wing will reinforce the stealth sensor-shooter, without eliminating the volume projection tool that the F/A-18E/F remains.
A conscious complementarity, not a binary choice
The Navy is not seeking to choose between stealth and volume. It is organizing their cooperation. The F-35C creates the tactical opportunity; the Super Hornet exploits it with masses of weaponry at a contained cost. The arrival of the MQ-25 and the densification of TTNT networks will increase the value of the pair, pending a F/A-XX generation designed natively for collaborative combat with drones. The flight deck remains an ecosystem: it is the composition that creates the effect, not monoculture.
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