F-16s, Mirage 2000s, MiG-29s, Gripens: which aircraft is Europe supplying to Ukraine, who is financing the deliveries, and which countries are benefiting?
Summary
Since the Russian invasion of February 2022, Ukraine’s allies have committed to renewing its military aviation. Deliveries include F-16 Fighting Falcons, French Mirage 2000s, Polish and Slovak MiG-29s, as well as Su-25 attack aircraft, transport planes, and helicopters. Sweden has also provided an ASC 890 radar surveillance aircraft and is preparing the delivery of 16 Gripen C/Ds, alongside the sale of 16 Gripen Es. The European Union and its member states now announce 97.3 billion euros in military support, supported by various financing mechanisms. While this equipment strengthens Ukrainian defense, its economic benefits are unevenly distributed. Germany, Sweden, France, and several Central European countries have industries capable of benefiting from orders. However, industrial contracts do not constitute a net economic benefit for Europe, which simultaneously bears considerable expenses and lasting strategic risks.
European countries have supplied several generations of combat aircraft
The modernization of Ukrainian aviation has taken place in two stages. The first transfers involved Soviet aircraft, immediately familiar to Ukrainian crews. Starting in 2024, deliveries progressively integrated Western fighters.
MiG-29s and Su-25s helped preserve the existing fleet
In 2023, Poland delivered 14 MiG-29 Fulcrum fighters, while Slovakia transferred 13 aircraft, some of which were unusable without repair.
Warsaw announced two additional fighters in October 2026, only one of which is still airworthy.
North Macedonia had also transferred four Su-25s, attack aircraft specialized in close air support. These aircraft were not operational at the time of their donation.
The MiG-29s allowed Kyiv to maintain interception capabilities, while the Su-25s helped preserve its attack aviation.
F-16s constitute the main Western program
Four countries have committed to providing F-16 Fighting Falcon aircraft.
The Netherlands donated 24 aircraft, with delivery completed in 2025. Denmark promised 19, with transfers beginning in August 2024.
Norway handed over six F-16s, but four still required significant refurbishment work in April 2026.
Belgium initially promised 30 fighters. In 2026, it mentioned an extension that could bring its contribution to 53 aircraft by 2029, subject to necessary political decisions. The first operational Belgian planes were expected before the end of 2026.
Commitments thus reach 79 firmly announced F-16s, with a potential of 102 aircraft if the Belgian extension is fully confirmed.
These figures do not correspond to the operational Ukrainian fleet. Some planes are assigned to training, others await renovation or remain grounded for maintenance.
French Mirage 2000s strengthen air defense
France began delivering Mirage 2000-5s in February 2025. Six aircraft had been considered in French parliamentary documents, but the exact number transferred remains partially classified.
Equipped with MICA missiles, these fighters are used notably against Russian cruise missiles and drones.
France has also adapted the aircraft for air-to-ground missions to broaden their operational use.
Sweden prepares a new generation of Ukrainian fighters
On June 30, 2026, Saab signed a contract worth 24.6 billion Swedish kronor—approximately $2.54 billion—to provide 16 Gripen E fighters to Ukraine.
Deliveries are scheduled between 2029 and 2030.
Simultaneously, Stockholm plans to donate up to 16 Gripen C/Ds from its current fleet. The first deliveries are expected in early 2027.
This formula combines an immediate military donation with an industrial order financed by a European loan.
The Gripen presents advantages for Ukraine: relatively simplified maintenance, the ability to operate from short runways, and the use of modern missiles, notably the Meteor on compatible configurations.
However, Sweden must replace the donated aircraft to preserve its own military capabilities.
Transport and surveillance aircraft complement the fighters
Donations of fixed-wing transport aircraft are much less numerous than those of fighters.
Croatia transferred two Antonov An-32Bs, twin-turboprop transport aircraft. These planes are intended notably for the Ukrainian emergency services. An An-32B can transport approximately 6,700 kg (14,770 lb) of cargo.
The United States also provided Mi-17 helicopters from stocks previously intended for Afghanistan. Other countries have transferred Mi-8s, Mi-24s, Sea Kings, or Pumas used for transport, medical evacuation, or military support.
Sweden provided a more strategic capability: the ASC 890, equipped with the Erieye radar. This airborne surveillance and command aircraft, derived from the Saab 340, has been carrying out operational missions since March 2026.
Its radar makes it possible to detect targets at a distance of several hundred kilometers and transmit information to Ukrainian fighters.
Finally, Lithuania delivered an L-39ZA for training and light attack, while the Czech Republic contributes to training with L-39s and Alto NG light aircraft.
Western bombers have not been transferred to Ukraine
No Western country has announced the donation of a strategic bomber or a fleet of heavy bombers to Ukraine.
Kyiv instead retains Soviet-origin Sukhoi Su-24 tactical variable-sweep bombers, which have been adapted to employ British Storm Shadow and French SCALP-EG cruise missiles.
These weapons make it possible to strike targets located several hundred kilometers away, depending on their version and conditions of use.
Western allies have therefore favored the delivery of precision armaments rather than additional bombers.
This policy limits training delays and logistical difficulties associated with introducing a new family of aircraft.
European financing relies on several distinct mechanisms
Military aid is not systematically financed by the country providing the equipment.
A donation originating from national stocks constitutes an expense initially borne by the state concerned. It can then be subject to partial European reimbursements.
In October 2026, the Council of the European Union indicated it had mobilized 10.8 billion euros under the European Peace Facility, with 9.9 billion dedicated to reimbursing military assistance provided by member states.
The Union also established a 90 billion euro loan for 2026 and 2027. It includes an indicative envelope of 60 billion for military needs and 30 billion for budgetary support.
This financing is raised on financial markets, backed by the guarantee of the European budget. Its repayment is expected to rely on reparations owed by Russia.
All military support from the Union and its members is evaluated at 97.3 billion euros. This figure encompasses several mechanisms and should not be added together with previous amounts without precaution.
Western aircraft improve defense without guaranteeing air superiority
The operational effect of the deliveries is real, but remains limited by several constraints.
F-16s and Mirage 2000s make it possible to intercept cruise missiles and drones, conduct air-to-ground missions, and use Western weapons.
However, Russia retains significant air and anti-air capabilities. S-400 systems and long-range air-to-air missiles complicate Ukrainian operations near the front line.
An additional fighter does not automatically produce a proportional increase in military power.
Part availability, pilot training, missile stocks, and engine maintenance are decisive factors.
Norway offers an example: out of six F-16s donated, four still required major renovation in April 2026.
The number of combat-available aircraft remains more significant than the announced number.
European industrialists obtain considerable contracts
The war has accelerated European investments in defense, but their benefits are unevenly distributed.
Germany benefits from a powerful industrial apparatus
Rheinmetall ranks among the companies best positioned in munitions, armored vehicles, and military systems.
In the first half of 2026, its weapons and munitions activity recorded 1.757 billion euros in turnover, a 33% increase over one year.
Ukrainian orders contribute to this growth, alongside German and European purchases.
In June 2026, Rheinmetall notably announced a new Ukrainian 155 mm ammunition contract valued at several tens of millions of euros. Production is carried out at its Spanish plant, Expal.
Germany thus benefits from its national industry, but also from the foreign locations of its groups.
Sweden directly profits from the Gripen program
The Ukrainian contract for 16 Gripen Es represents a precise example of industrial fallout.
Saab benefits from an additional order book, while the donation of the Gripen C/Ds also creates a replacement need within the Swedish Air Force.
For Stockholm, industrial benefits and public expenditures advance simultaneously. A $2.54 billion contract is not an equivalent profit.
France, Poland, and Central Europe benefit from other markets
France possesses an integrated industry centered around Dassault Aviation, Safran, Thales, and MBDA. Ukrainian needs concern notably missiles, electronic equipment, and operational maintenance.
Poland benefits from its logistical role, defense companies, and military investments. The Czech Republic and Slovakia also profit from munitions orders and equipment refurbishment operations.
However, these benefits do not allow for establishing a reliable ranking of net profits by country.
Does Europe really win by financing Ukraine?
On the industrial front, certain European manufacturers unquestionably benefit from rising orders.
On the strategic front, aid to Ukraine can help contain Russian military capabilities, strengthen defense partnerships, and accelerate the modernization of European armies.
The Union also seeks to reduce its external dependency. But this ambition runs up against a reality: according to SIPRI, 48% of European major arms imports came from the United States over the 2021-2025 period.
Part of European spending thus continues to support American manufacturers, particularly for aircraft, their parts, and their armaments.
Simultaneously, Europe bears the cost of donations, debt, stock replenishment, and the reception of refugees.
It would therefore be misleading to present the war as an economically profitable operation for all European countries.
The essential question lies elsewhere. If aid helps durably limit the risk of a broader war in Europe, its strategic benefit may exceed its budgetary cost. But this advantage remains difficult to measure and will depend on the outcome of the conflict.
The true European success will not be determined by the billions in contracts signed. It will depend on the capacity of states to rebuild credible defense, maintain public finances, and establish lasting security without indefinitely maintaining a wartime economy.