Can a modern fighter jet be deployed without AWACS? Discover the challenges, limitations, and technical solutions for operating without this key support in 2025.
In modern air operations, the airborne warning and control system (AWACS) plays a central role. These platforms, such as the Boeing E-3 Sentry, provide long-range air surveillance and essential tactical coordination. With radars capable of detecting targets at ranges of over 400 km, AWACS allow fighter jets to remain stealthy while receiving a complete tactical picture via data links such as Link 16. However, in a context of advanced electronic warfare and sophisticated anti-aircraft threats, the question arises: can a modern fighter jet, such as the F-35 Lightning II or the Dassault Rafale, be deployed effectively without this support? This question is crucial, particularly in scenarios where AWACS are neutralized, unavailable, or too vulnerable.
The capabilities of modern fighter jets
Increased autonomy thanks to technology
Modern fighter jets, such as the F-35 Lightning II, the F-22 Raptor and the Dassault Rafale, incorporate advanced electronic systems that reduce their dependence on AWACS. These aircraft are equipped with active electronically scanned array (AESA) radars, such as the AN/APG-81 on the F-35, capable of detecting targets at 250-300 km in optimal conditions. These radars offer low-altitude detection capabilities, which are essential for countering stealth raids, unlike older AWACS radars, which were limited by the Doppler effect before the 1960s. In addition, modern fighters incorporate electronic warfare (EW) systems, such as the Barracuda on the Rafale, which can jam enemy radars and collect electromagnetic data.
Multispectral sensors, such as the infrared systems (IRST) on the Rafale and F-35, can detect targets without radar emissions, enhancing stealth. For example, the F-35 can track up to 1,000 targets simultaneously thanks to its data fusion architecture, reducing the need for an external platform for situational awareness. The integrated Link 16 also allows this data to be shared with other units, forming a decentralized tactical network. However, without AWACS, detection range remains limited compared to the 650 km of the E-3 Sentry’s AN/APY-1 radars, and large-scale coordination becomes complex, especially in congested theaters of operations.
The intrinsic limitations of fighters
Despite these advances, modern fighters do not fully replace AWACS. Their radar field of view is limited by the size of the antenna, unlike the 9-meter rotodome of AWACS, which provides 360-degree coverage. In addition, fighters often have to activate their radars to obtain a complete tactical picture, compromising their stealth. When flying in radar silence, their reliance on passive sensors limits their range to around 100-150 km for IRST, which is insufficient against long-range threats. Finally, the cognitive load on pilots increases without AWACS, as they must simultaneously manage detection, identification, and combat, reducing their operational effectiveness.
The challenges of deployment without AWACS
Vulnerability of AWACS and scenarios without support
AWACS, such as the E-3 Sentry, are priority targets due to their detectable radar emissions. Their vulnerability was highlighted during exercises in which anti-aircraft systems such as the Russian S-400, with a range of 400 km, simulated their neutralization. In a high-intensity conflict, an adversary could use long-range missiles or jammers to render AWACS inoperable. For example, during Operation Desert Storm in 1991, E-3s operated 200 km from combat zones, protected by F-15 Eagle escorts, but such a setup is not always feasible.
Without AWACS, fighters must rely on their own sensors and ground-based systems, such as air defense radars. However, these are limited by terrain and interference, reducing their range to 150-200 km for low-altitude targets. Furthermore, coordination between units becomes fragmented without a centralized platform, increasing the risk of friendly fire or misallocation of resources. Operations such as Unified Protector in Libya (2011) have shown that AWACS are essential for coordinating hundreds of air sorties in real time.
Impact on air superiority
The loss of an AWACS directly affects air superiority. Without its ability to provide a Recognized Air Picture (RAP), fighters operate in a tactical fog, reducing their responsiveness to threats such as long-range air-to-air missiles (e.g., the Chinese PL-15, with a range of 200 km). Stealth fighters, although highly capable, cannot compensate for the lack of situational awareness, especially in scenarios involving drone swarms or multiple raids. For example, an F-35 can detect a target at 250 km, but without AWACS, it lacks contextual data to prioritize threats in congested airspace.
Alternatives to AWACS
Decentralized networks and collaborative platforms
To compensate for the lack of AWACS, air forces are exploring collaborative combat networks. The F-35’s System of Systems concept allows multiple fighters to share data via Link 16 or proprietary systems such as MADL (Multifunction Advanced Data Link). For example, a squadron of four F-35s can create a shared tactical image covering a radius of 500 km by combining their sensors. However, this approach requires significant bandwidth and perfect interoperability, which can be compromised by enemy jamming.
Surveillance drones, such as the MQ-9 Reaper, offer a partial alternative. Equipped with AESA radars and optical sensors, they can monitor a theater of operations at a lower cost (approximately $25 million per unit compared to $250 million for an E-3). However, their range and endurance (approximately 27 hours for the Reaper) remain inferior to those of AWACS, and they are vulnerable to anti-aircraft defenses.
Satellites and ground-based radars
Surveillance satellites, such as the Starlink constellations or dedicated military systems, can provide global coverage but lack the responsiveness required for real-time engagements. Their latency, often 1 to 5 seconds, is incompatible with the demands of air combat. Ground-based radars, such as Thales’ Ground Master 400 (range: 470 km), offer robust detection but are static and vulnerable to ballistic attacks. A hybrid combination, integrating drones, satellites, and ground-based radars, could partially compensate for the absence of AWACS, but it requires a robust communications infrastructure.
Strategic implications
Adaptation of operational doctrines
Without AWACS, air forces must adapt their operational doctrines. Fighters must prioritize stealth missions and long-range engagements to minimize their exposure. For example, the Rafale can use Meteor missiles (range 150 km) to neutralize targets without activating its radar. However, this limits large-scale operations, such as coordinating 50 to 100 air sorties, where AWACS excel. Armed forces are therefore investing in redundant systems, such as the E-7 Wedgetail, which offers a range of 550 km and better resistance to jamming thanks to its AESA radar.
Cost and feasibility
The cost of deployment without AWACS is based on the intensive use of fighter jets and drones, which increases fuel and maintenance costs. An F-35 costs around $35,000 per flight hour, compared to $15,000 for an E-3 Sentry. In addition, training pilots for autonomous missions requires advanced simulators and complex exercises, representing an investment of $10 million to $20 million per year for a squadron. These financial and logistical constraints underscore the importance of AWACS as an economic force multiplier.
Get in touch to live a unique fighter jet experience – we fly in France AND YOU CAN TAKE THE CONTROLS!!!