Following Colombia, Saab is targeting Peru with the Gripen E/F. Cost, technology, offsets, and Brazilian production are reshaping the South American market.
Summary
The Saab Gripen E/F is establishing itself as one of the most credible fighter jets in South America. In November 2025, Colombia signed a 3.1-billion-euro contract for 17 aircraft, comprising 15 single-seat Gripen E models and two twin-seat Gripen F models. Deliveries are scheduled between 2026 and 2032. Meanwhile, Peru remains an open case. Saab continues to defend its bid against the American F-16 Block 70 and the French Rafale within a highly volatile Peruvian political context. The Gripen appeals because it meets a simple regional constraint: South American air forces want to modernize their fleets without purchasing a system that is too expensive, too heavy, or too dependent. Its operating cost, rapid maintenance, open architecture, modern sensors, Meteor missiles, and the Brazilian industrial ecosystem provide Saab with a rare argument: performance without the political and budgetary weight of a major American or French system.
The Colombian contract altering the regional balance
Colombia has reached a major milestone. On November 14, 2025, Saab signed a 3.1-billion-euro contract with the Colombian government for 17 Gripen E/Fs. The package includes 15 single-seat Gripen E fighters, two twin-seat Gripen F fighters, associated equipment, weaponry, training, and support services. Deliveries are slated to span from 2026 to 2032.
This is not a symbolic purchase. It is one of the most significant military contracts ever signed by Bogotá. It addresses a long-standing issue: replacing the aging Israeli Kfirs of the Fuerza Aeroespacial Colombiana. Purchased in the late 1980s, these aircraft, derived from the Mirage 5, have undergone modernizations but are now reaching the end of their operational lifespan. Maintaining them has become expensive, their availability is increasingly fragile, and their operational value is diminishing against modern radars, missiles, and aircraft.
Colombia hesitated for a long time. The primary options were the Swedish Gripen, the American F-16, and the French Rafale. The selection of the Gripen is no accident. It reflects a preference for an intermediate solution: more modern than the legacy aircraft it replaces, less financially burdensome than the Rafale, less politically dependent than the F-16, and already physically present in Brazil.
The contract value also demonstrates that the true price of a fighter jet is never limited to the cost of the airframe alone. The 3.1 billion euros cover a complete system. This encompasses weapons, simulators, training, spare parts, support, infrastructure, and industrial offsets. Simply dividing the total amount by 17 yields roughly 182 million euros per aircraft. This figure should not be interpreted as a pure unit price; rather, it reflects a comprehensive multi-year package.
The Gripen appeals because it meets real budgetary constraints
The Gripen’s foremost selling point in South America is cost. Regional military budgets do not match those of the United States, China, France, or the Gulf States. Governments must justify every expenditure against social needs, infrastructure, domestic security, and political crises.
A Rafale offers superior combat power in several domains, but it is expensive to purchase and operate. The F-16 Block 70 boasts an immense global network and highly robust American backing, but it entails strong political and logistical dependency on Washington. The Gripen positions itself as an intelligent compromise. It is not the heaviest or the most prestigious option, but it is modern, agile, connected, and designed to be maintained with reasonable resources.
This is a decisive factor. In many countries, the challenge is not just purchasing an aircraft; it is keeping it flying for 30 years. An overly expensive fighter ends up spending too much time grounded. A more efficient aircraft, offering higher availability, can generate more useful flight hours.
Saab places heavy emphasis on rapid maintenance turnaround. The Gripen E can be rearmed and refueled for an air-to-air mission in 15 to 25 minutes by a small team. It can operate from dispersed bases, rudimentary runways, or reinforced roadways. This philosophy stems from the Swedish doctrine of territorial defense, and it appeals to nations that do not always possess a dense network of hardened airbases.
In South America, this logic is highly practical. Distances are vast, budgets are constrained, and infrastructure is uneven. An aircraft requiring fewer personnel, less heavy equipment, and less downtime offers a concrete advantage.
Gripen E/F technology is not that of a bargain-bin fighter
The Gripen E/F is not a fifth-generation stealth aircraft, nor does it pretend to be. Its value lies elsewhere. It offers a modern architecture, advanced sensors, sophisticated electronic warfare, and high flexibility for weapons integration.
The Gripen E measures 15.2 meters in length, while the twin-seat Gripen F measures 15.9 meters. Both feature a wingspan of 8.6 meters, a maximum takeoff weight of 16,500 kilograms, a maximum thrust of 98 kilonewtons, and ten hardpoints. The aircraft utilizes the GE F414G engine, derived from a highly proven engine family. It features an AESA radar, an IRST infrared detection system, an integrated electronic warfare suite, and advanced data links.
One of its principal selling points is data fusion. The pilot does not simply receive raw data; they are presented with a highly readable tactical situation. The aircraft merges inputs from the radar, IRST, electronic warfare sensors, pods, and companion aircraft. This approach gives the Gripen an operational weight that belies its physical size.
The Gripen E can also employ the Meteor missile, one of Europe’s highest-performing long-range air-to-air missiles. Saab asserts that the aircraft can carry up to seven Meteors and two IRIS-Ts in an air-superiority configuration. The Meteor is significant because its ramjet engine gives it beyond-visual-range capabilities, maintaining energy far longer than a conventional solid-propellant missile.
For Colombia, this reshapes the equation. The country is transitioning from an updated Kfir to an aircraft capable of networked combat, long-range firing, surveillance, reconnaissance, and precision strike. The technological leap is massive.
The Gripen also attracts interest by offering flexible sovereignty
The word sovereignty surfaces frequently in Latin American defense debates. It signifies more than just military independence; it means the capacity to use, maintain, adapt, and understand equipment without relying entirely on a single foreign power.
This is where the Gripen scores critical points. Saab sells an aircraft, but it also exports an industrial approach, with Brazil serving as the prime example. In 2014, Brasília selected the Gripen to replace its aging fleet. The contract for 36 aircraft included a technology transfer package and the local production of 15 aircraft in Brazil by Embraer at Gavião Peixoto, in the state of São Paulo.
In March 2026, Brazil rolled out its first locally assembled Gripen. This marks a regional milestone: for the first time, a Latin American country has assembled a modern supersonic fighter. Saab now views this Brazilian line as a potential export hub. The signal sent to Colombia and Peru is unmistakable: the Gripen is no longer just an aircraft imported from Sweden; it is becoming a South American ecosystem.
This dimension is highly strategic. For a country like Colombia, joining a Gripen family already established in Brazil facilitates training, technical exchanges, regional maintenance, and, down the line, industrial cooperation. For Peru, it can diminish the perception of isolation. Buying the Gripen no longer means depending solely on Linköping; it means joining a supply chain that also passes through Embraer.
Brazil provides the Gripen with decisive industrial depth
The Brazilian case is essential to understanding why the Gripen could become South America’s flagship fighter. Brazil ordered 36 Gripen E/Fs, and initial deliveries have commenced, with the conclusion of the first batch expected in 2027. In June 2026, Sweden indicated that Brazil had expressed interest in an additional 20 Gripens. These aircraft would be manufactured in Brazil.
If this order materializes, the regional effect will be powerful. Brazil would become not only the premier Gripen operator in the region but also its industrial heartland. Colombia would serve as the second operational pillar, and Peru could become the third. In this scenario, Saab would achieve critical mass in South America.
Critical mass matters. An isolated aircraft is expensive to sustain. A shared regional fleet allows for expanded spare parts inventories, shared simulators, centralized training centers, technical expertise, and software updates. It also renders the offer far more credible to other nations that will need to modernize their fleets in the 2030s.
Chile, Ecuador, Argentina, and other air forces could monitor this dynamic, even if their specific requirements and budgets vary. Saab’s ultimate goal is not merely selling to Colombia; it is establishing the Gripen as a regional standard.
Peru remains Saab’s true commercial test
Peru is the most delicate case on the table. Lima wants to replace its MiG-29s and Mirage 2000s, whose availability and modernity no longer meet the needs of the Fuerza Aérea del Perú. The requirement generally cited involves 24 multirole aircraft, with a baseline budget hovering around $3.5 billion, according to several specialized reports.
The Gripen long appeared well-positioned. Its price point, offsets, and the Brazilian precedent aligned cleanly with Peruvian needs. However, the landscape shifted with the aggressive return of the F-16 Block 70. In September 2025, the US State Department approved a potential sale to Peru of 12 F-16C/D Block 70s and associated systems for an estimated $3.42 billion. While this authorization does not equate to a signed contract, it signals that Washington is taking the market seriously.
Reuters reported as recently as March 2026 that Saab was pressing ahead with its campaign in Peru, despite political turbulence and signs of interest in the F-16. Saab’s CEO, Micael Johansson, affirmed that his group had submitted a competitive and cost-effective offer while remaining in close contact with the Peruvian Air Force. He also acknowledged that political decisions could pause the procurement process.
Precision is necessary here: Peru is not currently a guaranteed win for Saab. Media outlets have claimed at various points that the Gripen had been chosen, while others subsequently reported a pivot toward the F-16. The most reliable sources mandate caution: the procurement remains politically unstable and highly competitive.

The Peruvian choice pits three strategic logics against each other
Peru is not merely selecting an airframe; it is choosing a strategic alignment.
The Gripen proposes a framework of controlled costs, agility, light maintenance footprint, and cooperation with Brazil. It offers access to a modern platform capable of carrying top-tier European weaponry while avoiding complete dependence on Washington.
The F-16 Block 70 offers an American framework. It provides a proven platform, an immense global network, deep parts inventories, operational feedback, and unmatched logistical depth. However, the total cost of the American package is steep. The amount approved by the DSCA reaches $3.42 billion for just 12 aircraft and a comprehensive suite of systems, engines, missiles, parts, and services. For a nation with finite resources, this bill raises a straightforward question: how many aircraft can realistically be purchased, armed, and sustained?
The Rafale offers a framework of uncompromised power. It is arguably the most capable of the three across several complex missions: deep penetration, striking power, conventional deterrence, electronic warfare, payload capacity, autonomy, and operational maturity. However, it is more expensive. For Peru, which must rebuild an entire fleet, the Rafale might deliver less mass for the same budget.
This is what makes the Gripen compelling. It is not necessarily the absolute best in every standalone category, but it may be the most coherent option for a military forced to reconcile budget, availability, technology, and sovereignty.
The Gripen matches the requirements for air policing and territorial defense
South American air forces do not share the same operational mandates as the US Air Force or the French Air and Space Force. Their primary missions are monitoring vast territories, protecting borders, intercepting unidentified aircraft, combating illicit trafficking, maintaining a regional deterrent capability, and executing sovereignty missions.
Within this framework, an exceptionally expensive and heavy aircraft is not always the optimal response. High availability is paramount, operating costs must be manageable, rapid-alert capabilities are essential, modern sensors are required, and credible air-to-air weaponry is a necessity. Furthermore, forces must be able to train pilots without draining the national defense budget.
The Gripen E/F fits this operational profile well. Its twin-seat Gripen F variant is particularly valuable for technological transition, advanced flight training, and certain complex missions. Colombia is procuring two, and Brazil has requested them as well. For air forces jumping a technological generation, the twin-seat model remains a prized asset.
The Gripen also provides political flexibility. It can integrate weaponry from various international sources. Saab actively promotes its open architecture, which allows for faster software and hardware upgrades compared to aircraft where every minor modification demands a heavy recertification process. For nations eager to avoid being locked into a single supplier, this argument carries weight.
The Gripen’s limitations remain real
It would be an exaggeration to present the Gripen as a flawless aircraft; it possesses clear limitations. It is a single-engine fighter. Some nations explicitly prefer twin-engine aircraft for long overwater flights, demanding environments, or perceived safety margins over isolated terrain. The Rafale retains an advantage in payload, unrefueling range, and heavy multirole versatility. The F-16 maintains the edge of a global ecosystem, with thousands of units produced and a massive, industrialized support chain.
Furthermore, the Gripen E is newer than the legacy Gripen C/D models. Its operational ecosystem is still scaling up. While Brazil, Sweden, Colombia, and Thailand form a solid user base, it is not yet comparable to the global footprint of the F-16. Production rates will need to keep pace if Saab multiplies its commercial successes.
Dependence on certain foreign components, notably the American-sourced GE F414G engine, also remains a talking point. Saab maintains that the Gripen is fully exportable and that this configuration does not block contracts. However, the reality of international arms exports always involves political clearances, restrictions, and diplomatic trade-offs.
Finally, the Gripen is not a stealth aircraft. Faced with modern, integrated air defenses, it must rely on electronic warfare, low-altitude tactics, long-range missiles, networked cooperation, and operational discretion. While this may prove entirely sufficient for most regional missions, it does not turn the aircraft into an F-35.
Saab’s South American bet is becoming a credible reality
The Gripen has the potential to become South America’s benchmark fighter, provided it can convert its commercial momentum into a sustainable ecosystem. Colombia delivers a major contract win for Saab, Brazil provides industrial depth, and Peru could offer the regional mass required to solidify the market. If these three nations align, the Gripen will become more than just an aircraft purchased by individual air forces; it will become a regional standard.
This scenario is by no means guaranteed. Peru could pivot toward the F-16, Brazil could delay subsequent orders, public budgets could contract, and political transitions could reshuffle national priorities. Defense contracts in South America are rarely linear affairs.
Yet, the underlying dynamic is genuine. The Gripen is arriving at the precise moment regional fleets are aging out. Countries want to modernize without surrendering their autonomy, while national budgets impose strict financial discipline. Brazil offers a nearby industrial base, and Colombia has validated the choice operationally and politically.
The Gripen does not need to be the most powerful aircraft on the global market to win. It simply needs to be the most rational choice for nations demanding a modern, available, sustainable, and less restrictive combat aviation asset. This is exactly where Saab has positioned its campaign, and it is why South America has emerged as one of the most vital arenas in the global fighter jet market.
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