Beijing is combining coastguard patrols, legal pressure and strategic missiles to deter its neighbours and the United States.
In summary
China is trialling a method of coercion designed to be long-term. Since June 2026, its coastguard has been maintaining a presence with vessels approximately 100 kilometres east of Taiwan. Beijing presents this presence as routine maritime policing. Two days after the first formation was relieved, a Chinese nuclear-powered submarine fired a strategic ballistic missile towards the Pacific. The missile, probably a JL-2 or a JL-3, travelled approximately 7,300 kilometres carrying a training warhead. These operations do not share the same specific mission. Yet they are part of a common strategy: to act on a daily basis just below the threshold of war, whilst reminding the world that any external intervention could trigger a major escalation. The coastguard serves to gradually assert Chinese jurisdiction. Conventional missiles complicate any regional military intervention. The nuclear missile protects the whole by the threat of a second strike. This strategy may yield local gains, but it also accelerates the formation of a coalition aimed at containing Beijing.
China tests a two-tier coercion strategy
The report is based on two closely related events.
Since June 2026, a China Coast Guard formation has been patrolling the Pacific, east of Taiwan. An initial flotilla led by the Daishan was relieved on 4 July by a formation led by the Xiushan. The vessels are reportedly operating up to around 100 kilometres from the Taiwanese coast.
China describes these movements as patrols, fisheries protection and rescue missions. It claims to be exercising normal jurisdiction in waters under its authority. Taiwan rejects this interpretation and denounces it as an attempt to gradually extend Chinese authority beyond the areas previously and regularly patrolled by the China Coast Guard.
On 6 July 2026, the People’s Liberation Army Navy carried out a far more spectacular demonstration. A nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine fired a strategic ballistic missile from the South China Sea towards the South Pacific.
The missile carried a training warhead and travelled approximately 7,300 kilometres. Its trajectory would likely have passed over part of the Philippines. The exact model has not been confirmed. The photographs published do not allow for a definitive distinction between a JL-2 and a JL-3. The JL-3 is said to have a range of over 10,000 kilometres.
It is important to be precise. There is no evidence that the two operations were planned as a single manoeuvre. They respond to different circumstances. Nevertheless, viewing them together reveals a coherent doctrine of graduated coercion.
At the lower end of the spectrum, Beijing uses white ships, administrative regulations and extended patrols. At the top end, it demonstrates that a Chinese submarine can launch a strategic missile beyond the first island chain.
The message is simple: China can exert daily pressure without deploying its navy. But it can also raise the stakes to the nuclear level if an external power attempts to force it into a strategic retreat.
The Coast Guard transforms a presence into jurisdiction
The choice of white-hulled vessels reduces political risk
The China Coast Guard is not a civilian force comparable to other coastguards. It is part of the People’s Armed Police, which in turn falls under the authority of the Central Military Commission.
It forms the front line of China’s ‘rights protection’ operations in disputed areas. The People’s Liberation Army Navy generally remains in the background. It can monitor the situation, deter hostile intervention and intervene rapidly should the confrontation escalate.
This division of roles is highly effective. A Chinese military destroyer approaching Taiwan or a reef held by the Philippines immediately triggers a strategic response. A coastguard vessel can carry out much of the same work whilst claiming to be on a policing mission.
It can identify a vessel, order it to leave, block its path, surround it or attempt to board it. In the South China Sea, the Chinese coastguard has already used water cannons, ramming manoeuvres, acoustic devices and boarding teams.
China has also adopted its own legislation to give these operations a semblance of legality. Since June 2024, under Chinese regulations, its coastguard has been able to detain foreigners suspected of offences for up to 60 days in waters that Beijing considers to fall within its jurisdiction.
The problem is obvious. A national law cannot, on its own, create international sovereignty. The arbitral tribunal established in the case between the Philippines and China ruled in 2016 that China’s maritime rights must derive from the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and not from a general claim to historical rights within the ‘nine-dash line’. Beijing rejects this ruling.
The coastguard is therefore being used to transform a disputed claim into an administrative fait accompli.
Continuity matters more than violence
The innovation observed east of Taiwan does not lie in the mere presence of a Chinese vessel. China has long been sending military and paramilitary vessels around the island.
What is new is the organised rotation between several units. A first group remains in the area. A second takes its place. Beijing then announces that the patrols will continue.
This rotation transforms a one-off visit into a permanent presence. It reduces the exceptional nature of each incursion. After several weeks or months, the Chinese vessel ceases to appear as an intruder. It becomes part of the maritime landscape.
This method has already been employed elsewhere. According to the US Department of Defence’s 2025 report, the China Coast Guard was present around the Luconia Shoals for 313 days in 2024, compared with 162 days in 2019. Near Kinmen and Matsu, it made an average of 13 weekly incursions into restricted or prohibited zones in 2024, compared with eight in 2023.
The aim is not necessarily to provoke a battle. It is to wear down the opponent.
Taiwan must detect every vessel, mobilise crews, dispatch its own patrol boats and record the violations. The Philippines face the same problem in the Spratly Islands. Each response consumes fuel, sailing hours, manpower and political capital.
China possesses superior naval and industrial capabilities. A contest based on sustained engagement therefore works in its favour.
The submarine-launched missile takes the threat to the nuclear level
The difference between an ICBM and a submarine-launched missile
The term ‘ICBM’ is often used to describe the launch on 6 July. This requires some clarification.
An ICBM is, strictly speaking, an intercontinental ballistic missile launched from the ground. A missile fired from a submarine is an SLBM, or submarine-launched ballistic missile. The JL-2 and JL-3 belong to this second category.
The Chinese missile tested in July is therefore a strategic submarine-launched missile, capable of reaching an intercontinental range.
This distinction is not merely technical. A land-based missile and a submarine-launched missile do not play exactly the same role.
Land-based ICBMs can be housed in silos, concealed in tunnels or transported on mobile launchers. They offer considerable strike capability. However, their bases and deployment areas can be monitored by satellite.
A nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, by contrast, seeks to disappear into the ocean. Its mission is to survive an initial attack, then launch its missiles following the possible destruction of part of the land-based forces.
This survivability underpins the second-strike capability.
According to analysts quoted by Reuters, the July launch is believed to have been carried out from one of the six Type 094, or Jin-class, nuclear-powered submarines operated by China. The test served to assess not only the missile, but also the submarine, navigation, communications, the chain of command and authorisation procedures.
Physical range matters less than credibility
The missile travelled approximately 7,300 kilometres. This distance is sufficient to validate a strategic trajectory, but it does not allow us to conclude that the system was tested at its maximum range.
A JL-2 would therefore have flown close to its upper limits. A JL-3 would have retained a significant margin. According to public estimates, the latter could exceed 10,000 kilometres.
From a protected area in the South China Sea, a Chinese submarine can threaten Guam, Hawaii and some US facilities in the Pacific. To reach the entire continental territory of the United States, it would probably have to move further east, at the risk of being detected by US or allied ships, maritime patrol aircraft and sensor networks.
The test is specifically designed to dispel any doubts about China’s ability to carry out this type of mission. A nuclear weapon is only a deterrent if the adversary believes it can survive, receive a command, be launched and reach its target.
Beijing had already fired a land-based DF-31B in September 2024 along a trajectory of approximately 11,000 kilometres towards the Pacific. The 2026 launch adds the submarine component to this demonstration on the high seas.
The Department of Defence estimated that China’s nuclear arsenal stood at the lower end of the 600-warhead range at the end of 2024 and could exceed 1,000 units by 2030.
The combination links local harassment to global deterrence
The first tier enforces Chinese law without declaring war
Fishermen, research vessels, the maritime militia and the China Coast Guard make up the first tier.
These assets establish a presence, gather intelligence and test adversaries’ reactions. They also enable Beijing to portray incidents as police or maritime administrative disputes.
An interception by a coastguard vessel does not automatically trigger the same alliance mechanisms as an attack by a frigate. However, the distinction becomes artificial when the coastguard works alongside the navy and participates in the same scenarios.
In 2024, the China Coast Guard was integrated into the JOINT SWORD exercises around Taiwan. During JOINT SWORD-2024B, its vessels encircled the island for the first time as part of these manoeuvres. The US report considers that this cooperation enhances China’s ability to deploy maritime police forces in a potential blockade campaign.
The coastguard is therefore not merely an instrument of peacetime. It can pave the way for a military operation.
The second tier gradually seals off the regional theatre
The People’s Liberation Army Navy, the air force, satellites, radars and conventional missiles constitute the second tier.
Their mission would be to prevent opposing forces from approaching or remaining in the area. The military refers to this as an access denial and area denial strategy.
Depending on the variant, the DF-17 and DF-21 missiles can strike land or naval targets at ranges of up to approximately 1,500 to 2,000 kilometres. The DF-26 has a range of approximately 3,000 to 4,000 kilometres. These systems can target air bases, ports, logistics centres or naval task forces.
The Department of Defence estimates that Chinese strikes could threaten forces operating up to approximately 2,780 to 3,700 kilometres from mainland China, or 1,500 to 2,000 nautical miles.
These missiles serve as a means of denial deterrence. They send a message to the United States, Japan and Australia that any intervention would be slow, dangerous and costly.
The strategic launch on 6 July does not directly fulfil this function. A JL-3 is not intended to chase away a Philippine patrol boat or defend a reef. It serves to protect the entire system against an escalation imposed by a major power.
The third level threatens to make any intervention costly
The nuclear level adds a punitive deterrent.
This does not mean that China intends to use a nuclear weapon at the first confrontation between coastguards. Beijing officially maintains a no-first-use policy.
The signal is more indirect. Any power contemplating striking Chinese bases, silos, command centres or submarines would have to factor in the risk of nuclear escalation.
China is thus seeking a form of dominant escalation. It wants to retain the initiative at every level.
It may start with a fishing vessel. It may follow up with a coastguard vessel.
It may deploy the navy, the air force or conventional missiles. Finally, it makes it clear that its territory and strategic forces are protected by a growing nuclear capability.
This architecture is designed to present the adversary with an unpalatable choice: to accept a gradual change in the situation or to take responsibility for an escalation itself.
Coordination focuses on alliances rather than territories alone
The timing of the July test launch is politically significant.
It took place on the day the Ocean of Peace Alliance between Australia and Fiji was signed in Suva. This treaty provides for consultations in the event of a threat to the sovereignty, peace or stability of either party. It also affirms that no potential aggressor should be able to believe that a signatory country would find itself isolated in the Pacific.
The launch also coincides with the Sino-Russian naval exercise Joint Sea-2026 and with RIMPAC, the major maritime exercise organised around Hawaii by the United States and its partners. The Philippine Coast Guard was taking part in this edition for the first time.
The probable flight path over part of the Philippines therefore carries strong symbolic significance. It serves as a reminder to Manila that its rapprochement with Washington, Tokyo and Canberra is taking place within the range of China’s strategic systems.
The missile is also directed at Japan. Tokyo is strengthening its missile defence, acquiring long-range strike capabilities and deepening its cooperation with the Philippines. Beijing wants to prevent the emergence of a network of bases, radars and launchers capable of supporting a US intervention around Taiwan.
Finally, the message is aimed at the Pacific island states. China is showing them that it can operate militarily beyond its near seas. It seeks to prevent the security agreements concluded by Australia and the United States from becoming the dominant framework in the South Pacific.
Geopolitical effectiveness remains real but contradictory
In the short term, the Chinese approach is effective.
Coastguard vessels can remain in the area for long periods. They impose costs on Taiwan and the Philippines. They are gradually shifting the boundary between what is considered exceptional and what is becoming routine. They enable Beijing to gather data on reaction times, procedures and the adversary’s surveillance capabilities.
Missiles reinforce this pressure. Conventional systems complicate the arrival of reinforcements. Submarine-launched missiles serve as a reminder that China can retain a capacity for retaliation even after a major attack.
Beijing does not need to secure an immediate surrender. Its primary objective is to increase the cost of any opposition. From this perspective, the strategy is a tactical success.
But its strategic record is less favourable.
Chinese pressure is pushing the targeted states to cooperate. The Philippines is hosting more US assets. Japan is supplying surveillance vessels and equipment to several South-East Asian countries. Australia is stepping up security agreements across the Pacific. The United States is also deploying more coastguard assets to Singapore and the Philippines in order to counter Chinese coercion with vessels that are less provocative than warships.
The nuclear test may intensify this dynamic. It is prompting the United States and its allies to step up anti-submarine warfare, underwater sensors, P-8 Poseidon patrols and surveillance of the passages through which Chinese submarines can leave the South China Sea.
China may therefore gain operational ground whilst bringing about a potential strategic failure: the very formation of the coalition it seeks to deter.
The real objective is to influence the adversary’s decisions
China’s strategy is not aimed solely at islets, reefs or sea lanes. It seeks to alter political calculations.
Taiwan must ask itself how long it can sustain round-the-clock surveillance. The Philippines must assess the extent to which their alliance with the United States actually protects them. Japan must weigh up the risks involved in hosting new US capabilities. Australia and the island states must decide whether closer security ties are worth a more direct confrontation with Beijing.
The coastguard poses the immediate problem. Conventional missiles make a military response difficult. The nuclear missile places an invisible limit over the whole situation.
This combination does not guarantee a Chinese victory. It does, however, offer Beijing considerable freedom of action. China can advance slowly, retreat temporarily and resume the pressure without having declared war.
The major risk stems from this ambiguity. A strategy based on levels of escalation presupposes that each actor understands the other’s intentions. Yet unannounced patrols, competing legal frameworks and long-range ballistic missile strikes increase the potential for error.
Beijing seeks to project the impression that its control over escalation is superior. This confidence can become dangerous. The more China combines coastguard, navy, conventional missiles and nuclear forces, the greater the risk that a local incident could rapidly affect strategic interests.
This approach may contain adversaries for years. It may also turn a skirmish between white-hulled vessels into a crisis between nuclear powers.
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