Following the failure of the SCAF program, France is developing a national sixth-generation fighter jet. Dassault has the expertise, but the budget remains uncertain.
In Summary
After France and Germany abandoned the SCAF joint fighter program, Paris is developing a national solution to preserve its autonomy in combat aviation. The text issued by the Joint Committee on the Update of the Military Program calls for a French sixth-generation demonstrator by 2035, with the possibility of bringing in partners. However, it does not confirm the name “Super Rafale,” a definitive configuration, or the formally decided inclusion of internal weapon bays. The aircraft under consideration would in fact be a new stealth platform, distinct from the Rafale F5, but designed to utilize its technologies, weapons, combat cloud, and escort drones. The main obstacle will be financial. A complete system could cost several tens of billions of euros. France will have to simultaneously finance the aircraft, its engine, sensors, weapons, drones, and digital infrastructure.
The Collapse of the SCAF Forces Paris to Develop a National Plan
The breakdown is now as much political as it is industrial. On June 8, 2026, France and Germany acknowledged that Dassault Aviation and Airbus were unable to reach an agreement on the continuation of the next-generation fighter for the Future Air Combat System (SCAF).
Launched in 2017 and later expanded to include Spain, the SCAF was intended to deliver a comprehensive system by around 2040. Its central component was the New Generation Fighter, which was to operate alongside escort drones, distributed sensors, missiles, and a combat cloud.
The disagreement was not limited to the division of contracts. It also concerned the project’s technical leadership, intellectual property, and decision-making authority over the aircraft’s design. Dassault refused to assume responsibility for the outcome without having the corresponding industrial authority. Airbus advocated for a more balanced distribution of responsibilities among the partners.
Operational requirements also diverged. France requires an aircraft capable of contributing to nuclear deterrence and operating from the future PA-Ng aircraft carrier. Germany has no naval aviation requirements. It carries out a nuclear mission within the framework of NATO, but using American weapons. Spain has yet other priorities.
These differences were not minor. They affected the aircraft’s weight, landing gear, structure, engine system, range, and armament. They made the search for a compromise increasingly artificial.
The national strategy remains less defined than it appears
It would be premature to claim that France has already launched a stealth “Super Rafale” ready to enter development.
The text issued by the Joint Committee on the update to the Military Programming Law calls for the development, by 2035, of a sixth-generation national demonstrator. It also mentions the possibility of partnerships.
As of June 28, 2026, this text has yet to be submitted to Parliament for a final vote.
This draft sets out a general direction. It does not yet constitute a comprehensive development contract. It does not specify the aircraft’s weight, speed, engine, electronic architecture, or the number of aircraft to be ordered.
Nor has any official announcement from Dassault Aviation presented a program called “Super Rafale.” This term is primarily used by the media and commentators to refer to a French solution positioned between the Rafale F5 and the SCAF’s former NGF.
This distinction is crucial. Paris has not yet ordered an operational aircraft. Its primary goal is to preserve the necessary expertise to be able to build one.
The demonstrator must prevent an industrial breakdown
A demonstrator is not a production prototype. It is used to test the riskiest technologies before finalizing the specifications of the operational aircraft.
It can validate a new stealth geometry, air intakes, propulsion systems, flight controls, radar-absorbing materials, or thermal management systems. It can also be used to experiment with cooperation between a pilot, artificial intelligence, and multiple drones.
This demonstrator addresses an industrial emergency. Without a project for a new airframe, French design offices risk gradually losing the expertise acquired through the Mirage, the Rafale, and the nEUROn.
Aeronautical expertise cannot be preserved in an archive. It is maintained through design, testing, and the resolution of real-world problems. A hiatus of fifteen or twenty years could make rebuilding the industry much more costly.
The “Super Rafale” would actually be a new aircraft
The name is catchy, but technically misleading. An aircraft featuring a highly stealthy design and internal weapons bays would not be a simple evolution of the Rafale.
The Rafale F5 will retain the Rafale’s general architecture. It will be equipped with new computers, more powerful communication systems, improved electronic warfare capabilities, new weapons, and the ability to control drones. However, its airframe will still be based on an aircraft designed in the 1980s.
Transforming this airframe into a true stealth aircraft would require modifying its underlying structure. The fuselage, air intakes, vertical stabilizers, control surfaces, and the layout of internal equipment would all need to be redesigned.
At this stage, the “Super Rafale” would therefore be more of a successor to the Rafale, sharing certain elements of its system architecture.
Internal weapon bays would require a new architecture
The Rafale carries its missiles, bombs, and fuel tanks on external hardpoints. This configuration facilitates maintenance and provides a large payload capacity. However, it increases drag and radar signature.
An internal weapons bay allows weapons to be concealed within the fuselage. The aircraft’s contours remain smoother. Angles capable of strongly reflecting radar waves are reduced. Drag is also reduced when the aircraft flies in a penetration configuration.
The advantages are real. But they come at a cost.
A weapons bay occupies a considerable amount of space. It requires doors, ejection mechanisms, and safety devices. It must withstand severe thermal, vibrational, and aerodynamic stresses.
Opening it can temporarily increase the aircraft’s radar signature.
It also limits the size of weapons carried in stealth configuration. A heavy cruise missile or a future nuclear weapon may require a particularly long weapons bay. The alternative is to retain external hardpoints for certain missions, at the cost of reduced stealth.
No official document has yet confirmed the configuration of the future French fighter’s weapon bays. Their inclusion seems logical for a sixth-generation aircraft. This should not be presented as a definitively chosen feature.
The Rafale F5 will form the first stage of the new system
The Rafale F5 is not merely a stopgap program. It is intended to lay the groundwork for some of the technologies that will be necessary for the post-Rafale era.
Its entry into service, initially announced for around 2030, is now projected for around 2033 in the most recent budget documents. At least 47 French Rafales are expected to be upgraded to this standard by 2035.
The F5 is set to receive a thoroughly modernized IT architecture. It will need to process more data, exchange information at high speeds, and coordinate remote effectors. It will carry the future ASN4G nuclear missile and new weapons designed to neutralize air defenses or strike naval targets.
A new version of the M88 engine is also being considered. Safran’s T-REX project aims for a thrust of nearly 9 metric tons, compared to about 7.5 metric tons for the current version. This increase is expected to improve payload capacity, acceleration, and intercept performance.
The future national fighter could incorporate some of the technologies developed for the F5. It could share communication protocols, certain software, weapons, and electronic warfare modules.
This continuity would reduce risks. However, it would not transform the Rafale F5 into a sixth-generation stealth aircraft.
The combat drone will bridge the gap between the two generations
At the same time, Dassault Aviation is developing a stealth combat drone designed to support the Rafale F5. The first tests are now scheduled for around 2028. The parliamentary bill aims for an operational demonstrator by 2035.
This program is set to benefit from the experience gained with the nEUROn. This European demonstrator, led by Dassault, has completed more than 170 flights and tested stealth capabilities, autonomous flight, and the firing of weapons from an internal weapons bay.
The new drone will be more than just a flying decoy. It will be capable of conducting reconnaissance, jamming, target designation, and attack missions. It will also be able to carry weapons to increase available firepower without routinely exposing a crew.
The combination of the Rafale F5, a stealth drone, and the future national fighter jet would allow for a gradual transition. The F5 would remain the command center. The drone would handle the most dangerous tasks. The new aircraft would then provide greater range, stealth, and computing power.
The actual budget far exceeds the price of a single aircraft
No detailed public budget exists yet for the future national fighter. The precise figures put forward at this stage are therefore speculative.
The cost must be broken down. Funding is needed for the demonstrator, followed by the development of the operational aircraft. The engine, radar, electronic warfare systems, communication systems, and software must also be designed. Next come the drones, the combat cloud, weapon systems, simulators, and infrastructure.
Phase 1B of the SCAF program amounted to 3.2 billion euros over approximately three and a half years of work shared among France, Germany, and Spain. It focused primarily on studies and risk mitigation. It did not fund the entire development or production process.
Before the project was scrapped, France’s planned commitment authorizations for the SCAF totaled 1.2 billion euros in 2026, with 454 million euros in payment appropriations. These figures illustrate the scale of the effort required even before the construction of a fleet.
A Senate report had estimated the total cost of the SCAF at 50 to 80 billion euros. Other public estimates have approached 100 billion euros, depending on the scope of the analysis and whether production costs were included.
These estimates cannot be directly applied to the French project. Nevertheless, they provide an order of magnitude. A fully developed sixth-generation aircraft cannot be financed with just a few billion.
The national cost could reach several billion per year
A budget of 50 to 80 billion euros spread over twenty years would represent an average expenditure of 2.5 to 4 billion euros per year. This average masks a gradual ramp-up, followed by peaks during testing, industrialization, and the first orders.
France would not necessarily have to pay the entire amount on its own. It could open the program to Sweden, Belgium, India, the United Arab Emirates, or other partners. It could also split up the areas of cooperation: one country would contribute to the engine, while another would finance a drone or weaponry.
This approach would reduce budgetary exposure. It would also avoid recreating the rigid governance structure that paralyzed the SCAF.
The challenge remains considerable. France must simultaneously fund its nuclear deterrent, the PA-Ng aircraft carrier, nuclear submarines, missiles, air defense, satellites, and the modernization of ground-based equipment.
The future fighter jet will therefore have to be prioritized against immediate operational needs. Every billion spent on its development will be money unavailable for purchasing ammunition, tactical drones, or surface-to-air defense systems.
Drones Do Not Make Manned Fighter Jets Obsolete
The war in Ukraine has demonstrated the effectiveness of drones. It has also shown their limitations.
Inexpensive drones are excellent for reconnaissance, saturation attacks, and striking targets near the front lines. They can be produced in large numbers. Their loss remains acceptable.
An aircraft designed to penetrate several hundred or several thousand kilometers into a defended airspace operates under a different set of constraints. It must withstand jamming, manage complex sensors, employ high-value weapons, and adapt to unforeseen situations.
Communications can be cut off. Satellites can be jammed. Data links can reveal a position. A highly autonomous drone must therefore make decisions without receiving constant instructions.
This autonomy poses technical, legal, and political challenges. An algorithm can identify a probable threat. It remains more difficult to delegate a complex decision to it in an ambiguous environment, especially when a nuclear weapon or a strategic strike is involved.
The pilot therefore retains a command role. However, he or she no longer has to perform all tasks alone.
The right model combines a crew with autonomous systems
The debate between piloted aircraft and drones is misguided. Major powers are not choosing one over the other. Instead, they are building hybrid systems.
The manned aircraft provides the primary sensors, computing power, command, and decision-making. Drones extend its detection range. They jam enemy radars, carry missiles, or draw in air defenses.
This architecture avoids systematically risking an aircraft worth several hundred million euros and a pilot trained for several years.
It also allows for increased scale. A force of 100 fighter jets can have a greater impact if each pilot controls multiple autonomous platforms.
France must therefore fund the aircraft and its drones, rather than choosing between the two. This is precisely what makes the budgetary equation difficult.
All other major powers retain a piloted aircraft
The United States has awarded Boeing the contract to develop the F-47 as part of the Next Generation Air Dominance program. This piloted fighter is designed to operate alongside autonomous Collaborative Combat Aircraft.
The U.S. Air Force is already testing several models of escort drones. It is seeking a combination of a small number of high-performance aircraft and a larger fleet of less expensive platforms.
The United Kingdom, Italy, and Japan are following the same approach with the Global Combat Air Program. Their future piloted aircraft is scheduled to enter service around 2035 and will operate alongside collaborative drones. Japan has allocated 160.2 billion yen in its 2026 budget for the fighter’s development, plus an additional 4.8 billion yen for the associated drones.
Following the collapse of the SCAF program, Germany launched an industrial initiative called Team Gen 6, centered on Airbus, MTU Aero Engines, Hensoldt, and MBDA Deutschland. Berlin is also exploring a potential partnership with the GCAP. Italy has expressed openness to this possibility.
Spain is seeking to preserve the expertise it has acquired in sensors, communications, and collaborative combat. Its future could lie in a partnership with Germany or in participation in a less centralized European architecture.
China, for its part, is testing large, tailless stealth platforms and developing a wide range of combat drones. The exact specifications of its new aircraft have not been made public. However, observations confirm that Beijing has not abandoned the manned fighter.
The international consensus is clear. No major power is relying solely on drones to ensure long-term air superiority.
Industrial sovereignty will come at a political cost
France possesses an exceptional industrial base. Dassault Aviation knows how to design an airframe and flight control systems. Safran specializes in engines. Thales supplies radars, optronics, and some electronic warfare systems. MBDA develops weaponry.
This expertise makes a national program technically credible. It does not automatically make it financially viable.
The main risk would be to launch an overly ambitious aircraft and then stretch out its financing to the point of losing the desired technological advantage. The second danger would be to sacrifice quantity in favor of a remarkable platform that is available in insufficient numbers.
A sixth-generation fighter cannot become an isolated industrial monument. It must be accompanied by stockpiles of missiles, numerous drones, refueling aircraft, satellites, and maintenance capabilities.
The French decision is therefore sound if it aims to preserve design freedom and avoid foreign dependence. It becomes questionable if sovereignty is reduced to the production of a prestigious aircraft without an operational fleet to support it.
The question is no longer whether Dassault can design the post-Rafale generation. The company is capable of doing so. The real question is whether the government will agree to allocate several billion euros per year, for nearly twenty years, to the entire system—and not just to its centerpiece.
Sources
National Assembly, text of the Joint Committee on the Update of the Military Programming for the Years 2024 to 2030, June 23, 2026.
Senate, bill updating the military programming, Joint Committee Report No. 777, June 2026.
Senate, report on the update to the 2024–2030 Military Programming Act, May 2026.
Senate, report “2040: The SCAF Odyssey,” July 2020.
National Assembly, Budgetary Opinion on the Forces Equipment Program for 2026, October 2025.
Ministry of the Armed Forces, “Rafale Standard F5: First Orders Notified to Manufacturers,” October 2024.
Ministry of the Armed Forces, “Rafale Standard F5: At the Cutting Edge of Technology,” June 2025.
Dassault Aviation, annual reports and communications regarding the SCAF, the Rafale F5, and the nEUROn demonstrator.
U.S. Air Force, “Air Force Awards Contract for Next Generation Air Dominance Platform F-47,” March 2025.
Ministry of Defense of Japan, “Progress and Budget in Fundamental Reinforcement of Defense Capabilities, FY2026,” December 2025.
Spanish Ministry of Defense, presentation of the NGWS and FCAS programs, 2025.
Le Monde, “SCAF: Paris and Berlin Abandon the Franco-German Fighter Jet Project,” June 8, 2026.
Reuters, statements by Éric Trappier on the future of the SCAF, April 2026.
International Institute for Strategic Studies, analysis of the cancellation of the SCAF fighter jet, June 2026.
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