The P1 prototype of the KAAN starts taxi tests. Turkey prepares its first stealth fighter, its system integration, and its exports.
Summary
On July 31, 2026, Turkish Aerospace launched taxi tests for the KAAN’s P1 prototype. This airframe is the second built for the program, following the P0 demonstrator which performed two flights in 2024. It incorporates a revised aerodynamic design, a more advanced systems architecture, and several pieces of equipment close to the future operational standard. Its maiden flight is announced before the end of 2026. This schedule remains ambitious, as ground tests must still validate braking, steering, flight controls, hydraulic systems, electrical power, and engine behavior. Turkish Aerospace aims for a maximum speed of Mach 1.8, a ceiling of 16,764 meters, and a maximum weight of 34.75 metric tons. These values remain development targets rather than already demonstrated performance. Turkey has ordered 20 KAAN Block 10 aircraft and holds an export contract covering 48 units for Indonesia.
The P1 Prototype Opens the True Test Campaign for the KAAN
The KAAN reached a visible yet frequently misunderstood milestone. On July 31, 2026, Turkish Aerospace, also known by its Turkish name TUSAŞ, released images of the P1 prototype moving under its own power along a taxiway.
This is not the first KAAN built. The P0 completed its inaugural flight on February 21, 2024. It remained airborne for 13 minutes, reaching 2,438 meters (8,000 feet) and a speed of 426 km/h (230 knots). A second flight followed on May 6, 2024, during which the aircraft climbed to 3,048 meters (10,000 feet) over a 14-minute mission.
Those flights proved that the general layout was airworthy. They did not validate a complete combat aircraft. The P0 was primarily a demonstrator designed to mitigate initial aerodynamic and mechanical risks.
The P1 represents the first truly representative prototype of the program’s new phase. Its role is to expand the flight envelope, test mission systems, and progressively bring the platform closer to its production standard.
A second prototype, the P2, is set to join the campaign. TUSAŞ also possesses a complete airframe reserved for static testing. This airframe will be subjected to loads exceeding those encountered in operational service to verify the structural integrity of the wings, fuselage, empennage, and primary joint attachments.
Expanding the number of airframes is essential. A single aircraft cannot simultaneously test aerodynamics, flight controls, sensors, armaments, radar cross-section, structural vibration, and airframe fatigue.
Taxi Tests Verify Far More Than Just the Wheels
A taxi sequence may appear modest compared to a first flight. Yet, it constitutes a major safety milestone. Taxiing is no minor detail in the development of a 34.75-metric-ton combat aircraft.
Initial low-speed taxi runs allow engineers to observe nose-wheel steering response, differential braking, vibration, temperatures, and hydraulic system behavior. They also verify the operation of mission computers, sensors, and electrical buses while the engines are running.
Subsequent tests transition to high speeds. The aircraft accelerates down the runway without lifting off. The test pilot monitors directional stability, braking efficiency, and landing gear dynamics. Test teams must also detect any potential nose-gear shimmy—an oscillatory phenomenon similar to wheel wobble that can become hazardous at high speeds.
Engineers evaluate the engines under real-world conditions. The air intakes must supply uniform airflow despite turbulence created by ground proximity, crosswinds, or rapid throttle adjustments. A compressor stall during high-speed acceleration would immediately compromise flight safety.
The fly-by-wire flight control system receives particular scrutiny. An aircraft like the KAAN relies on computers that translate pilot control inputs into commands sent to the control surfaces. Flight control laws must remain consistent throughout acceleration, rotation, and the transition to flight.
The P1’s initial liftoff can only occur after thorough data analysis from these taxi runs. Turkish Aerospace targets a first flight before the end of 2026. This objective remains credible, though it is not guaranteed. The P1 schedule has already slipped relative to earlier forecasts that envisioned a spring flight.
In a program of this complexity, a delay of a few months is not alarming; maintaining a schedule at the expense of incomplete testing would be far more concerning.
The New Airframe Corrects the Limits of the P0 Demonstrator
Images of the P1 reveal several differences compared to the P0. TUSAŞ has not published all modifications or their technical rationales, but visual observations point to an airframe much closer to the future production aircraft.
The nose section appears wider. This change likely provides additional volume for the radar, mission computers, electronic units, and cooling systems. The diameter available in the nose directly dictates the size of the radar antenna array. A larger antenna can enhance detection range, resolution, and multi-target tracking capability.
The engine air intakes appear taller and slightly set back. Their positioning is critical: they must deliver clean airflow to both engines across widely varying regimes, including high angle of attack, tight turns, supersonic acceleration, and low-speed flight.
Adjustments of just a few centimeters can alter pressure distribution along the fuselage. They can also free up space for side-looking sensors, radar warning receiver antennas, or missile approach warning detectors.
The spacing between the two engines also appears to have widened. This adjustment may facilitate internal volume management. The KAAN must accommodate fuel, avionics, and multiple internal weapons bays within a fuselage designed to reduce radar reflections.
The main landing gear appears set farther outward. This design choice clears space beneath the central fuselage, though it alters structural load paths. Mounting hardpoints must absorb landing impacts, braking forces, and side loads without adding excessive structural weight.
The geometry of the upper fuselage spine has also been reshaped. These refinements may address aerodynamic, structural, or low-observable requirements. Above all, they demonstrate that the P0 was not a frozen configuration.
Published Performance Metrics Remain Development Targets
Turkish Aerospace presents the KAAN as a multirole fifth-generation fighter. The aircraft officially measures 20.3 meters (66 feet) in length, with a wingspan of 13.4 meters (44 feet) and a height of 5 meters (16 feet). Its wing area covers 71.6 square meters (771 square feet).
Its maximum takeoff weight is rated at 34,750 kg (76,500 pounds). It is a heavy aircraft, comparable in size to air superiority fighters rather than light single-engine jets.
Each engine is specified to produce approximately 129 kN (29,000 pounds-force) of thrust with afterburner. The targeted maximum speed is Mach 1.8 at approximately 12,200 meters (40,000 feet). The published service ceiling is 16,764 meters (55,000 feet). The airframe is engineered to withstand load factors ranging from +9 g to −3.5 g.
TUSAŞ also claims a supercruise capability, which would allow the aircraft to maintain supersonic speeds without continuous afterburner use. Supercruise extends mission endurance and reduces fuel burn while partially limiting the aircraft’s infrared signature.
These figures outline the design specification; they do not represent demonstrated flight test data. The P0 only flew up to 426 km/h. The P1 must progressively explore transonic flight, supersonic regimes, high angles of attack, and high-g maneuvering.
Confirming actual performance will require hundreds of test sorties. Final metrics will also depend on the integration of the indigenous engine, mission system mass, and operational weapons fit.
Stealth Will Depend on the Entire Airframe
The KAAN is designed around a reduced radar cross-section (RCS). Its airframe uses planform alignment, angled surfaces, and canted vertical stabilizers to deflect radar energy away from threat emitters. Primary weapons must be carried in internal bays to eliminate radar reflections from wing pylons and external missiles.
However, an angular airframe alone is insufficient. Stealth also depends on panel seams, door seals, conformal antennas, intake duct shaping, and radar-absorbent materials. It demands exacting manufacturing tolerances: a minor misaligned panel or degraded coating can significantly increase radar signature.
The engines present another challenge. Initial KAAN aircraft rely on two General Electric F110-GE-129 turbofans. While powerful and proven, this engine was not originally designed for low-observable applications. Its conventional exhaust nozzle remains visible from the rear hemisphere and generates a pronounced thermal signature.
Turkey must therefore demonstrate a stealth capability that remains to be measured under representative conditions. No independent radar cross-section data for the KAAN is publicly available. It would be premature to assert that the platform matches the stealth performance of an F-35 or F-22.
The P1 appears to feature several electro-optical sensor apertures around the nose. Their arrangement suggests an Infrared Search and Track (IRST) system and an Electro-Optical Targeting System (EOTS) for ground targets. These passive sensors allow the aircraft to detect and track targets without radar emissions.
Their integration must preserve the low-observable profile. An unoptimized optical window, antenna, or skin protrusion can act as a radar reflector—precisely the type of engineering trade-off the P1 test program must resolve.
Avionics Must Transform the KAAN into a Combat System
Fifth-generation capability extends beyond speed and stealth; it relies on fusing data from multiple sensors to present the pilot with a coherent tactical picture.
The KAAN is planned to integrate an Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, electronic warfare suites, electro-optical sensors, and an integrated communications, navigation, and identification (CNI) system. ASELSAN plays a central role in this architecture.
An AESA radar utilizes numerous transmit/receive modules, enabling rapid beam steering without mechanical motion. It can scan for airborne targets, perform ground mapping, track multiple threats simultaneously, and conduct electronic attack.
Data fusion must synthesize inputs from the radar, passive infrared sensors, tactical data links, and off-board platforms. Rather than presenting disparate sensor displays, the avionics suite must provide a single, prioritized, real-time tactical picture.
The KAAN must also interoperate with Turkish F-16s, airborne early warning aircraft, uncrewed systems, and surface-to-air defense networks. Over time, Ankara intends to pair the fighter with autonomous uncrewed combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) capable of scouting ahead, jamming threat radars, or launching munitions.
This crewed-uncrewed teaming concept with UCAVs like the ANKA III could redefine the KAAN’s operational role. The fighter would function not merely as an interceptor, but as a flying command node controlling multiple distributed effectors.
While promising, this concept remains to be proven in flight testing. Transmitting high-bandwidth data in heavily jammed electromagnetic environments remains one of modern military aviation’s most demanding challenges.
U.S. Engines Secure the Timeline Without Guaranteeing Autonomy
Prototypes and initial production aircraft will be powered by the General Electric F110, mitigating technical risk given the engine’s proven record on variants of the F-16 and F-15. Turkish defense industry entities are already familiar with its maintenance and integration.
In July 2026, Turkish Aerospace General Manager Mehmet Demiroğlu stated that the requisite U.S. export authorization for 80 engines had cleared congressional review, with initial deliveries expected to begin in 2027.
While this clearance resolves an immediate program bottleneck, it does not remove long-term constraints. The engine remains the critical dependency for the KAAN.
An aircraft powered by U.S. engines remains subject to International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and third-party transfer approvals. Although Ankara designs the airframe, radar, and weapons, it lacks unrestricted authority to export the complete fighter to any customer.
Consequently, Turkey is developing the TF35000, a domestic turbofan designed to produce approximately 156 kN (35,000 pounds-force) of thrust. Prototype testing of this engine is planned after 2027, with integration onto the KAAN targeted around 2032.
This development timeline is ambitious. Developing a modern military turbofan is often more complex than airframe design, requiring advanced high-temperature metallurgy, single-crystal turbine blades, thermal barrier coatings, high-pressure compressors, and full-authority digital engine controls (FADEC).
The TF35000 will require thousands of test hours before achieving flight qualification and operational reliability. The KAAN’s true degree of industrial independence can only be fully evaluated once this domestic engine is fielded.
The Turkish Air Force Will First Receive a Core Operational Cadre
In May 2026, the Turkish Air Force signed an initial contract for 20 KAAN Block 10 aircraft, with first deliveries targeted for 2028.
This milestone requires realistic context. Taking delivery of initial aircraft does not immediately yield a fully operational squadron. Early production aircraft will be dedicated to pilot training, technician instruction, weapons integration testing, and mission data file development.
The air force must also build specialized infrastructure. Maintaining low-observable airframes requires climate-controlled hangars, specialized skin coating repair procedures, and advanced diagnostic tools. Secure computing environments and complex sub-component supply chains must also be established.
The first 20 KAAN fighters will thus serve as an operational development nucleus rather than a rapid replacement for the F-16 fleet. Turkey operates a large fleet of F-16s that will remain the backbone of its air power well into the 2030s.
Accordingly, Ankara continues to pursue new F-16 acquisitions, structural upgrades for existing airframes, and a potential interim procurement of Eurofighter Typhoons, while maintaining open dialogue regarding potential re-entry into the F-35 program.
This multi-track approach reflects pragmatic force planning. The KAAN cannot fulfill all Turkish Air Force operational requirements by 2028. Relying solely on a platform still in development would risk operational shortfalls as legacy fighters age.
The KAAN is expected to initially assume high-value missions: air superiority, deep strike, tactical command of uncrewed assets, and suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD). F-16s and Eurofighters would maintain high-volume routine air defense and strike roles.
The Indonesian Contract Provides International Credibility
The KAAN has secured its first international customer. Turkish Aerospace and the Indonesian Ministry of Defense signed a firm contract for 48 aircraft. The agreement encompasses industrial cooperation, local assembly options, and training support.
This order is significant, substantially exceeding Turkey’s initial Block 10 commitment. It provides the program with financial and industrial scale rarely achieved by a new fighter platform prior to entering service.
Indonesia’s procurement strategy reflects a desire to modernize a diverse fighter fleet sourced from multiple nations. Jakarta also seeks to develop its domestic aerospace sector through technology transfers beyond what standard Western defense purchases typically offer.
However, the contract presents risks for both parties. Indonesia is committing to an aircraft whose operational baseline has yet to fly, while Turkish Aerospace is obligated to deliver a complex platform with evolving development costs, engine transitions, and qualification schedules.
While exact contract values and delivery schedules remain undisclosed, performance under the agreement will depend on the progress of the P1, P2, and subsequent test aircraft.
Nevertheless, the Indonesian contract establishes the KAAN as an international program, offering Ankara commercial validation ahead of domestic service entry.
Saudi Ambitions Remain Significant But Non-Contractual
Saudi Arabia is also evaluating the KAAN. Discussions cover potential purchases, industrial participation, and localized manufacturing. Turkish Aerospace has cited various potential fleet sizes, ranging from several dozen to up to 100 aircraft depending on the framework agreed upon.
Establishing localized assembly and maintenance infrastructure in Saudi Arabia would require a substantial order volume to amortize capital investments in tooling, facility construction, and supply chain setup.
Riyadh has long sought access to next-generation fighter technology while advancing its Saudi Vision 2030 goal of localizing defense spending.
In this context, the KAAN presents an alternative platform with broader industrial transfer options than typical foreign sales. However, as of August 1, 2026, no firm contract has been signed with Saudi Arabia.
Spain has also been mentioned in preliminary discussions regarding potential industrial collaboration or European subsystem integration. However, Spain is already a partner in the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) program, requiring any potential involvement to navigate existing industrial commitments and NATO defense requirements.
Commercial Success Now Hinges on Flight Testing
The KAAN occupies a specific niche in the global fighter market, targeting nations seeking a modern combat platform without the export restrictions of the F-35 or exclusive reliance on U.S., Chinese, or Russian defense suppliers.
Turkey offers broad industrial participation, localized assembly, and integration of indigenous armaments. Its broader defense industry—producing uncrewed aerial vehicles, guided munitions, and AESA radars—allows Ankara to market an integrated defense package.
Yet, long-term defense exports depend on proven performance rather than strategic agreements. Prospective export customers will evaluate mission availability rates, operating cost per flight hour, engine reliability, lifecycle support, and long-term software upgrade paths.
They will also require verified performance metrics regarding radar cross-section, sensor range, weapons integration, electronic warfare resilience, and fleet readiness rates.
The P1 test campaign must provide these initial baseline metrics. While the first flight will not fully validate the system, it will initiate a comprehensive test process evaluating high-speed flight, structural g-loads, internal weapons deployment, aerial refueling, and electronic warfare integration.
Taxi Tests Initiate the Most Demanding Phase of Development
The KAAN has progressed beyond concept models and development plans. The P0 demonstrator completed its initial flights, the P1 has begun taxi testing, the P2 is in assembly, and domestic and export commitments are in place.
However, the core operational challenge is just beginning. Turkish Aerospace must transition a promising airframe into a reliable, maintainable, and combat-effective weapons system. This engineering effort must occur alongside the parallel development of a domestic engine, complex avionics, and a production capability to support multiple air forces.
The start of taxi tests on July 31 confirms program momentum. It does not, by itself, validate Mach 1.8 performance, supercruise, low-observable signatures, or delivery timelines. Each requirement must be systematically demonstrated in flight.
Turkey has established the KAAN as politically credible and commercially visible. The primary objective now is proving that its industrial ambitions can be realized through flight test validation.