Moscow accelerates Su-57 production while its next-generation engine promises more thrust, extended range, and enhanced supercruise capabilities.
In summary
Russia is clearly accelerating the development and production of the Su-57 Felon, but an important distinction must be made: contrary to some published reports, the fighter is not yet receiving the AL-51F1 engine—a designation often linked to the former Izdeliye 30 program—in serial production. As of 2026, Rostec and United Aircraft Corporation now officially refer to the Izdeliye 177, a next-generation engine whose flight tests on the Su-57 began in December 2025. Its maximum thrust with afterburner reaches 16,000 kgf, or approximately 157 kN. It is designed to lower fuel consumption, extend range, and enhance supercruise capability. However, its operational deployment is slated only for the coming years. Concurrently, the war in Ukraine is pushing the Russian defense industry to boost production rates, accelerate modifications based on combat feedback, and strengthen industrial autonomy. Western sanctions, however, complicate access to electronic components, machine tools, and advanced aerospace technologies.
The Su-57 becomes an industrial priority without replacing other Russian fighters
Russia is investing heavily in its Su-57. Yet it is not focusing its entire military aviation industry on this single aircraft.
United Aircraft Corporation continues parallel production of the Su-34 and Su-35S. In April 2026, Rostec announced another delivery of Su-35S aircraft to Russian forces. UAC Director Vadim Badekha acknowledged in June that the Su-35 remains one of the most heavily utilized aircraft in the war in Ukraine.
The Su-57 occupies a different position. It represents the technological apex of the Russian combat fleet and is intended to progressively become the core platform around which the most advanced capabilities are integrated: low radar observability, new missiles, data fusion, manned-unmanned teaming, new electronic architectures, and modernized propulsion.
Serial production has officially begun, and deliveries to the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) have been steady since 2021. The landmark contract provides for the delivery of 76 Su-57s through 2028. However, the exact number of currently operational airframes is not transparently disclosed by Moscow. In February 2026, UAC simply announced the delivery of a “major batch” of aircraft in a new technical configuration, featuring upgraded avionics and weapons systems.
This discretion prevents an exact assessment of the fleet’s expansion. It does not, however, obscure the ongoing industrial effort.
In Komsomolsk-on-Amur, where the Su-57 is assembled, new facilities have been constructed to test fuel systems and avionics. Additional infrastructure dedicated to testing aircraft systems was still under construction in May 2026. The plant has also developed an automated flow-assembly line, new methods for applying radar-absorbent coatings, and automated production equipment.
The Su-57 is therefore not yet the quantitatively dominant fighter of the VKS. Instead, it is becoming Russia’s primary operational testbed for next-generation combat aviation.
The engine cited as the AL-51F1 is not yet in serial service
This is where available information demands the greatest caution.
For several years, the future definitive engine for the Su-57 was publicly known as Izdeliye 30, or “Product 30.” Its maiden flight on a T-50 prototype dates back to December 5, 2017. In numerous specialized publications, it was subsequently linked to the AL-51F1 designation.
However, this nomenclature is no longer used by Russian industrial state corporations in their latest official communications.
On December 22, 2025, UAC and United Engine Corporation announced the start of flight tests on the Su-57 with an engine officially designated as Izdeliye 177. Rostec categorizes it as a fifth-generation aircraft engine intended for advanced tactical aircraft.
In June 2026, Vadim Badekha offered further clarification. When asked when the Su-57 would transition entirely to its next-generation powerplant, the head of UAC replied that the Izdeliye 177 was still undergoing flight testing and that fitting the production aircraft would take place over “the coming years.” He also noted that installing the new engine would not require modifications to the Su-57 airframe.
Consequently, as of August 8, 2026, claims that the AL-51F1 or Izdeliye 30 is currently being installed in serial-production Su-57s delivered to the VKS are inaccurate.
There is demonstrably technological continuity between the legacy second-stage engine program and current developments. However, automatically equating the AL-51F1, Izdeliye 30, and Izdeliye 177 is currently premature.
The only designation explicitly claimed by Rostec for the engine currently undergoing test flights on the Su-57 is Izdeliye 177.
The new engine primarily provides greater available power
The most significant official metric involves its thrust.
United Engine Corporation reports 16,000 kgf with afterburner, or roughly 156.9 kN per engine. A twin-engine Su-57 would thus theoretically possess slightly over 313 kN of combined maximum thrust, before accounting for atmospheric conditions and installation losses.
Judging a combat engine solely by its peak afterburning thrust, however, would be a mistake.
For a modern fighter, crucial parameters also include dry (non-afterburning) thrust, specific fuel consumption, allowable turbine inlet temperature, throttle response, weight, service life, electrical power generation, and performance stability across different flight envelopes.
Rostec claims the Izdeliye 177 reduces fuel consumption across all power regimes and extends service life compared to the previous generation. The manufacturer also emphasizes that the 177 family is designed to generate significantly more electrical power for onboard systems.
This last point is critical.
Active electronically scanned array (AESA) radars, electronic warfare suites, mission computers, high-bandwidth datalinks, and upcoming manned-unmanned teaming systems consume ever-increasing amounts of electricity. The power output of a modern jet engine is no longer just about driving the aircraft forward; it must also supply the vast electrical demands of its sensor suite.
Supercruise enables supersonic flight without excessive fuel burn
One of the most heavily promoted capabilities is supercruise.
Supercruise refers to a combat aircraft’s ability to maintain sustained supersonic flight without using afterburners.
An afterburner injects additional fuel directly into the hot exhaust stream behind the turbine. This fuel ignites prior to the nozzle, dramatically increasing thrust.
The immediate advantage is rapid acceleration.
The energy penalty, however, is severe.
Fuel consumption surges exponentially. Exhaust gas temperatures spike, dramatically increasing the aircraft’s infrared signature. A fighter cannot operate afterburners for extended periods without severely compromising its combat radius and loiter time.
Maintaining Mach 1 or higher on dry thrust alone allows an aircraft to sustain high speeds over far greater distances.
This reduces response time when heading to an interception zone, imparts higher kinetic energy to launched missiles, and allows the aircraft to exit hostile airspace much faster.
An important nuance must be added: the current Su-57 already possesses an official supersonic non-afterburning capability via its baseline AL-41F1 engines. Rostec highlighted this capability long before the introduction of the new engine.
The 177 engine does not create supercruise from scratch.
Rather, its role is to expand the operational envelope in which supercruise is practically usable, offering higher dry thrust, reduced fuel burn, and superior performance under heavy combat payloads.
United Engine Corporation states that the 177 family will enable sustained supersonic cruise across a much broader altitude band. Exact figures for dry thrust and operational supercruise speeds have not been made public.
Thus, figures occasionally cited in media reports—such as Mach 1.9 or Mach 2 in supercruise—should be viewed with considerable reserve until verified by official data.
The Su-57 remains designed as a heavy multirole fighter
The Su-57 is a much heavier and larger aircraft than a light multirole fighter.
For its export variant, the Su-57E, Rosoboronexport lists a maximum takeoff weight of 34 metric tons, a maximum payload capacity of 7,500 kg, a maximum speed of Mach 2, a service ceiling of 18,800 meters, and an advertised combat radius of 1,250 kilometers.
Its design reflects a specific set of engineering trade-offs.
Low observability is achieved through airframe shaping, surface treatments, and internal weapons bays. Simultaneously, the Su-57 retains a heavy emphasis on aerodynamic performance and extreme maneuverability, enhanced by 3D thrust-vectoring nozzles.
Its sensor architecture is similarly distinct. Rostec highlights the Belka radar system, which uses multiple AESA panels integrated across the airframe to provide wide-angle radar coverage around the aircraft.
From Moscow’s perspective, the platform must execute air-to-air missions, strike land or naval targets, and operate effectively in heavily contested electronic warfare environments.
Russia has also recently expanded its weapons catalog for the Su-57E. Rosoboronexport lists the short-range RVV-MD2, medium-range RVV-SDM, long-range RVV-BD air-to-air missiles, the Kh-69 stealthy cruise missile, the Kh-58UShKE anti-radiation missile, the Kh-35UE anti-ship missile, and various precision-guided bombs.
The operational focus is not that of a pure air-superiority fighter. The Su-57 is engineered as a multirole combat node.
The two-seat variant prepares for manned-unmanned teaming
This direction accelerated in May 2026 with the first flight of the two-seat Su-57D prototype.
The utility of a second crew member extends far beyond pilot training.
UAC and Rostec explicitly state that this variant is designed to act as a command-and-control aircraft for strike packages combining manned aircraft and unmanned aerial systems.
This orientation demonstrates how Russia currently envisions integrating the Su-57 into the VKS.
A stealth platform can penetrate deeper into contested airspace, utilize its own sensors, assimilate data from off-board assets, and command several loyal wingman drones.
The second crew member can focus entirely on managing sensors, weapons, and unmanned systems, leaving the pilot free to handle flight dynamics and direct combat maneuvers.
UAC states that all of its recent military aviation developments are shifting toward network-centric architectures designed for manned-unmanned teaming.
In this context, the 177 engine takes on added significance: higher electrical output and improved fuel efficiency are just as critical for powering complex electronics as they are for kinematic performance.
The war in Ukraine rapidly accelerates certain developments
The conflict in Ukraine is exerting a dual, paradoxical effect on the Russian aerospace industry.
On one hand, it is accelerating development programs.
Vadim Badekha noted in June 2026 that since 2022, military demand for hardware production and overhaul had surged several-fold. For certain categories of new aircraft, UAC claims to have increased production four- to five-fold, stating that supporting the war effort has been the group’s overriding priority since 2022.
The Su-57 is directly benefiting from real-world combat feedback.
Rostec maintains that the program undergoes regular modifications based on operational experience in Ukraine, particularly regarding avionics, software, and weapons integration. While exact combat performance cannot be independently verified from public Russian statements, the industrial logic holds: actual warfare reveals software bugs, communications bottlenecks, maintenance hurdles, and weapons deficiencies far faster than peacetime flight testing ever could.
This environment allows Russia to test, modify, and integrate updates directly into active production lines.
This is one of the few industrial advantages of a prolonged conflict: it dramatically shortens the loop between design, combat feedback, and modification.
Sanctions simultaneously complicate Russia’s technology push
The second consequence is far less favorable for Moscow.
Western sanctions specifically target Russia’s ability to procure critical components for advanced military hardware.
The European Union bans the export to Russia of advanced semiconductors, electronic components, aerospace technologies, engine parts, optical equipment, and numerous dual-use goods. These restrictions have progressively expanded to include CNC machine tools and specialized materials used in military aerospace manufacturing.
Furthermore, the United States has continually targeted illicit procurement networks used to funneled foreign integrated circuits into Russian defense plants. The U.S. Department of the Treasury has sanctioned Russian suppliers providing electronic components to enterprises involved in manufacturing Sukhoi fighters.
The effect does not necessarily stall a program entirely.
A large defense industrial base can substitute certain components, stockpile critical parts, or route procurement through third countries. However, these workaround routes increase costs, extend supply chains, and restrict access to cutting-edge technologies.
For the Su-57, this is a particularly sensitive vulnerability. A fifth-generation fighter consolidates the very domains where these restrictions bite hardest: microelectronics, AESA radar components, electronic warfare suites, high-performance processors, advanced composite materials, precision machine tools, and high-temperature engine metallurgy.
Thus, the war increases operational demand at the exact moment it restricts access to key technologies.
The new engine illustrates Russia’s industrial dilemma
The Izdeliye 177 encapsulates the state of the Su-57 program in 2026.
Russia retains notable expertise in aerodynamics, propulsion, missile design, and airframe engineering. It continues to invest in its manufacturing footprint and manages to produce Su-57s despite more than four years of large-scale conflict and severe economic sanctions.
Yet the engine’s timeline highlights the program’s enduring bottlenecks.
The second-stage engine was framed as a foundational element of the Su-57 nearly a decade ago. A prototype flying with the Izdeliye 30 took to the air as early as December 2017. Yet in 2026, Russian industry is still flight-testing a new engine ahead of future integration into serial production lines.
This does not mean the development effort has failed. Advanced military powerplants require years of rigorous qualification.
It simply means that the Su-57 continues to evolve while already in operational service.
This is perhaps the clearest way to view its current place within the Russian Aerospace Forces. The Felon is neither a mass-produced asset capable of swiftly replacing the vast Su-30 and Su-35 fleets, nor is it a static platform that Moscow can present as fully finalized.
Instead, it is a maturing platform, manufactured alongside legacy fighters, and gradually upgraded with new engines, weapons, avionics, and unmanned teaming capabilities.
The transition to the 177 engine will mark a major milestone when it occurs at scale. It will likely enhance the fighter’s sustained speed, combat range, electrical generation, and long-term growth potential.
However, as of August 8, 2026, the distinction between design ambitions and operational capability remains clear: the new engine is flying in tests; it is not yet standardized across the fleet. In a program as closely scrutinized as the Su-57, that distinction matters far more than striking designations.
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