Israel is consolidating its air superiority over Iran thanks to the F-35I “Adir,” which played a key role in recent strikes against sensitive Iranian targets.

Israel has once again demonstrated its air superiority over Iran, notably during the recent coordinated strikes carried out in April and May 2025 against nuclear and military infrastructure on Iranian territory. These precision strikes relied on the use of the F-35I “Adir” stealth fighter jet, a specially modified version of the American F-35A. This model is a pillar of Israel’s doctrine of strategic interdiction and preventive action. While Tehran claimed to have shot down three F-35s, independent analyses have invalidated these claims, as the images released were found to be pre-conflict.

Israel’s ability to carry out deep, long-range strikes against highly protected targets confirms the operational mastery of its stealth fighter jet and highlights the current shortcomings of Iran’s air defense. At the same time, the use of the F-35I in such a radar- and surface-to-air missile-saturated environment highlights the importance of stealth fighter aircraft, which are capable of penetrating enemy airspace without being intercepted.

This operational context illustrates a lasting strategic imbalance between the two countries, which only rapid modernization of Iranian capabilities could reverse—an unlikely prospect in the short term.

A stealth fighter jet designed for strategic projection

The F-35I “Adir” fighter jet is a variant of the F-35A designed to meet the specific requirements of the Israeli military. Integrated into the fleet since December 2016, it benefits from software and hardware modifications specific to the Israeli defense ecosystem. These adaptations include a national electronic warfare system, a customized sensor suite, and the ability to use Israeli weapons such as Spice 1000 guided bombs and Delilah missiles.

Israel currently operates around 39 F-35Is out of a total order of 50 units, some of which are stationed at Nevatim Air Base in the Negev desert. Each aircraft costs around €78 million ($85 million), excluding maintenance and training. Their range of approximately 1,400 kilometers without refueling is extended by Boeing 707 refueling aircraft and, soon, KC-46A Pegasus aircraft.

The F-35I excels in deep strike, air defense suppression, and electronic intelligence gathering missions, thanks to its AN/APG-81 AESA radar, EOTS/Distributed Aperture System infrared sensors, and networked data processing capabilities.

During recent operations against Iran, Israeli F-35s most likely entered the airspace via circumventing flight paths, taking advantage of their low radar signature to avoid activating Iranian SAM systems. This capability is a major tactical advantage, particularly against aging systems such as the SA-5 Gammon or export versions of the S-300PMU-2, which have limited detection capabilities against low-observable targets.

An asymmetrical balance of power against Iranian air defense

The Iranian Air Force suffers from numerous structural handicaps that limit its ability to counter a force equipped with F-35s. The majority of Iranian fighters are older models, such as the F-4 Phantom II, MiG-29, and F-14 Tomcat acquired before 1979, with varying levels of maintenance and interception capabilities that fall short of current standards.

Iran’s air defense relies on a heterogeneous combination of Russian, local, and Chinese-Korean systems. The Bavar-373 system, presented as equivalent to the S-300, remains largely theoretical in terms of performance. In practice, Iran has no L-band or VHF radar modern enough to effectively detect stealth aircraft at medium range.

Israel’s penetration of Iranian airspace demonstrates these limitations. No F-35s have been confirmed shot down, despite official claims by Tehran. Images purporting to prove the loss of aircraft have been found to be from a previous incident involving debris unrelated to the current operation. Satellite imaging and OSINT experts identified inconsistent metadata, confirming evidence manipulation.

The technological asymmetry is reinforced by the absence of fifth-generation fighters in Iran’s arsenal. The Kowsar program remains a derivative of the US F-5, and discussions for the acquisition of the Russian Su-35 have not yet resulted in concrete deliveries. As it stands, no Iranian aircraft is capable of tracking, targeting, or engaging an F-35 in real-world conditions.

An Israeli strategy based on stealth and initiative

Israel applies a military doctrine centered on preemptive strikes and electronic warfare, combined with stealth operations carried out with F-35 fighter jets. This concept is based on the ability to identify a long-term strategic threat and then strike with precision before it reaches a critical threshold.

The integration of the F-35I into this doctrine strengthens the IDF’s first strike capability. During recent operations, the F-35s were reportedly used to destroy command systems, ground-to-ground missile silos, and structures near the Natanz site, considered one of the centers of Iran’s nuclear program. The use of GBU-39 enhanced penetration guided bombs is likely.

Close cooperation between the Israeli Air Force and military intelligence (Aman, Mossad) allows for extremely precise targeting, without reliance on US identification or control systems. This gives Israel strategic autonomy, particularly for sensitive operations that Washington would not publicly approve.

The ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) capabilities of the F-35I also allow real-time mapping of enemy defenses and transmission of data to other vectors (drones, F-15I). Together, this forms a coordinated strike ecosystem that is difficult to counter for an army such as Iran’s, whose communications are often analog and whose jamming capabilities remain limited.

Lasting superiority, but not without limits

While the F-35 fighter jet offers Israel a decisive advantage in conducting strategic strikes, it is no absolute guarantee against an Iranian response in other forms. Iran favors asymmetric capabilities, such as ballistic missile attacks (Shahab, Dezful) or long-range armed drones (Shahed 136, Mohajer-6).

On May 19, 2025, Israel intercepted nearly 50 missiles and drones launched from several locations in Iran and Syria in response to strikes on its facilities. While the F-35s did not play a direct role in the interception, they contributed to the identification and tracking of the launch platforms thanks to their multi-band sensors.

Maintaining Israeli air superiority will therefore also depend on the resilience of the ground-to-air warning and coordination system, notably the Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow 3, all interconnected with data collected by the F-35s. The challenge is not only air superiority, but the ability to neutralize a response in the strategic depth.

Israel will also have to anticipate the evolution of technological alliances: if Iran gains access to more advanced radar technologies via Russia or China, or if the Su-35 actually enters service, the current superiority could erode. For the time being, however, no player in the region has a tool equivalent to the F-35 stealth fighter jet, either in terms of reliability or interoperability with other systems.

Get in touch to live a unique fighter jet experience – we fly in France AND YOU CAN TAKE THE CONTROLS!!!