Rostec claims accelerated production of Su-34 and Su-35 aircraft. Behind the slogan “24/7,” the key weapon remains the guided glide bomb and its effects in Ukraine.
Summary
On January 25, official Russian statements highlighted the “continuous” production of Su-34s and Su-35s to compensate for losses and maintain pressure in Ukraine. The message is aimed as much at industry as at strategic psychology: to show that sanctions are not slowing down the pace. On the ground, the key is not only the aircraft, but also the ammunition. Russia relies heavily on glide bombs equipped with guidance kits, capable of striking from a distance without exposing the aircraft to Ukrainian ground-to-air defenses. The Su-34 serves as a robust and enduring carrier, while the Su-35S protects the entire operation with its air-to-air superiority and long-range sensors. The term “AI-guided” is often a shortcut: most kits are still based on inertial and satellite navigation, reinforced against jamming. The combination of aircraft and inexpensive kits creates a weapon of attrition and saturation that is difficult to neutralize on a large scale.
Rostec’s communication and the reality behind “24/7”
The choice of words is not neutral. Claiming a 24/7 production cycle serves three purposes. First, it reassures the Russian Ministry of Defense of the ability to replace aircraft lost in combat. Second, it sends a signal to partners and rivals that Russia intends to wage a long war, despite its technological isolation. Finally, it protects the credibility of Rostec and its subsidiary UAC, which must demonstrate that the industrial base remains capable of delivering combat aircraft in volume.
In reality, the exact rate is difficult to verify, as Moscow no longer publishes detailed figures. However, several public milestones confirm a sustained pace of deliveries. At the end of 2025, Rostec and UAC reported on batches of Su-34s delivered to the army and on a “record” fighter production balance sheet in 2025, with preparations for the 2026 plan underway. The term “24/7” should therefore be read as a slogan for industrial mobilization. It describes an organization with successive teams, production lines running at maximum capacity, and priority given to military over civilian needs.
What matters, beyond the figures, is strategic arbitration: Russia is prioritizing platforms that are immediately useful in Ukraine, rather than making a quantitative leap to more complex and costly programs. The Su-34/Su-35S combination fits perfectly with this logic.
The Su-34 and Su-35S duo, the backbone of Russian tactical aviation
The Su-34, a tactical bomber designed to take a beating
The Su-34 is not a conventional multi-role fighter. It is a modern tactical bomber, recognizable by its side-by-side cockpit, designed for air-to-ground strikes in a contested environment. Its value in Ukraine lies in three simple elements.
First, its payload capacity. We are talking about a maximum payload of around 8 tons, with a wide range of bombs and missiles. Second, its endurance. Its range and ability to fly far from its base offer flexibility to engage targets on multiple axes. Finally, its survivability: a robust airframe, countermeasures, and mission profiles that avoid penetrating too deeply into ground-to-air bubbles.
In the current war, the Su-34 has mainly become a “guided munitions truck.” It flies relatively high, drops bombs from a distance, and then withdraws. It thus capitalizes on ammunition, not on the audacity of its profile.
The Su-35S, the air-to-air bodyguard and the formation’s radar
The Su-35S is the other pillar. This aircraft is primarily an air superiority fighter, with modernized avionics, powerful radar, and high maneuverability. In the Russian system, it serves two purposes.
First function: to protect carriers (Su-34, but also Su-30SM or Su-57 on an ad hoc basis) against Ukrainian aircraft. Even if direct engagements remain limited, the presence of a Su-35S changes the tactical calculation.
Second function: to extend the detection and engagement bubble.
Rostec has even highlighted strikes at “several hundred kilometers,” which is more rhetoric than a systematic range in real-world situations. But this brings up one point: Russia is relying on distance, early detection, and gradual attrition rather than high-risk deep penetration.
This logic explains why Moscow is insisting on the production of Su-35S aircraft. The aircraft becomes a tool for controlling airspace, even partially, above the front line.
The “IA-guided glide bomb,” a term that combines technology and marketing
The really important issue is not the Su-34 or Su-35S in isolation, but the ammunition. Russia has transformed a massive stockpile of unguided bombs into low-cost precision weapons thanks to UMPK kits.
The principle of the kit: transforming a “dumb” bomb into guided ammunition
A kit of this type generally adds three components:
- a deployable wing to increase glide range
- a guidance and navigation module
- rear control surfaces to correct the trajectory
The result is simple: a conventional bomb (FAB-250, FAB-500, or even heavier) becomes a gliding bomb that can be dropped outside the most dangerous zone. The orders of magnitude often observed in open analyses refer to typical distances of around 40 to 60 km, depending on altitude and speed at release, with possible variations and developments.
This is precisely what interests Moscow. A gliding bomb can reach a tactical target without paying the price of a cruise missile and without risking the aircraft close to the front line.
Why talking about “AI-guided” is often misleading
In the majority of documented cases, guidance is based on a combination of inertial navigation and satellite signals (GLONASS/GPS according to terminology). The technological leap forward mainly concerns resistance to jamming, antenna quality, and trajectory correction algorithms.
“Artificial intelligence” may exist on the margins, in the form of automatic trajectory optimization or better disturbance management. But this is not generally “smart” ammunition in the sense of an imaging seeker that recognizes a target as a high-end missile would. The term “AI-guided” is therefore often used to modernize the narrative, to impress, and to suggest technological superiority.
The brutal fact is elsewhere: even without spectacular AI, low-cost guided munitions create permanent pressure on a front several hundred kilometers long.
Use in Ukraine: a weapon of attrition and demolition
A strategy of attrition rather than instant breakthrough
Glide bombs are primarily a weapon of attrition. They are used to destroy fixed positions: trenches, buildings used as strongpoints, depots, logistics hubs, light bridges, and staging areas. Their advantage is that they are “accurate enough” to strike effectively and numerous enough to be used every day.
NATO estimates and open military analyses indicate very high consumption. A JAPCC document mentions an increase to around 3,500 UMPK bombs per month in early 2025, or more than 100 per day. This rate is not a detail: it explains why Ukraine can lose ground without collapsing, but by suffering a continuous erosion of its positions.
This weapon does not win the war on its own. But it makes every move more costly. And it forces the adversary to make a painful choice: either stay buried and get hit, or move and expose themselves to detection.
The role of the Su-34 and Su-35S in this scenario
The Su-34 delivers, the Su-35S provides cover. This complementary role allows strikes to be carried out without entering the maximum destruction zone of Western systems delivered to Ukraine. This is a “safe distance strike” tactic. It does not guarantee invulnerability, but it reduces the risk.
This is also why it is in Russia’s interest to maintain production. Losing a Su-34 is costly in terms of crew and airframe, but losing the strike rhythm is even more costly in terms of operational initiative.
Ukraine’s limitations and responses
Ukraine has effective systems, but in limited quantities. A modern surface-to-air missile is expensive and rare. Firing a high-value interceptor at a relatively inexpensive gliding bomb is a classic economic problem: you win the battle of the day, but you wear yourself out.
The other limitation is GNSS jamming. If Ukraine effectively disrupts satellite guidance, accuracy drops. But Russia is adapting: improved anti-jam antennas, guidance combinations, more salvos, and the choice of “broad” targets where perfect accuracy is not essential.
The result: the gliding bomb becomes a constant threat, even when it is not surgical.
Replacing losses, an industrial race under sanctions
Russia has suffered significant combat aircraft losses since 2022, as documented by OSINT sources. The figures vary depending on the methods used, but the trend is clear: Su-34s have been particularly exposed, as they are on the front line of the strike. This attrition explains the aggressive communication on production.
Rostec, UAC, and their factories also have to deal with another problem: components. Several investigations have shown the presence of Western parts in recent Russian aircraft, despite restrictions. This does not mean that the aircraft can no longer be produced. It means that the supply chain is under strain, more expensive, slower, and sometimes more risky.
This is where the “24/7” rhetoric takes on another meaning: it indicates that the state is willing to pay the additional industrial costs, reorganize teams, and prioritize military production, even if this harms other sectors.
What this sequence portends for 2026, on both the Russian and European sides
Rostec’s message is clear: Moscow wants to convince others that it can last. The Su-34/Su-35S duo, combined with guided gliding bombs, is suited to mass warfare at a distance. It is a brutal but coherent model.
For Europeans, the lesson is a cold one. Air defense is once again becoming a central issue, not only against missiles, but against a “rain” of low-cost guided munitions. Interceptors are needed, but so are radars, electronic warfare, logistical dispersion, and strike capabilities against launch bases.
The paradox is that the most decisive weapon here is not a fifth-generation aircraft. It is a kit that transforms a Soviet bomb into modern guided munitions. Industrial warfare is not only about sophistication. It is about daily cadence, the ability to produce, deliver, and repeat.
And if 2026 confirms this trajectory, the question will not only be “who has the best aircraft?”, but “who can keep up the pace the longest?”
Sources
Rostec – UAC Delivered a Batch of the Su-34 to the Russian Aerospace Force (Dec. 10, 2025)
Rostec – UAC Delivered Another Batch of the Su-34 for the Russian Air Force (Sept. 15, 2025)
TASS – This year’s final batch of Su-35S fighters delivered to Russian Defense Ministry — Rostec (Dec. 24, 2025)
Interfax – “Rostec” said 2025 was record year for combat aircraft output (Dec. 25, 2025)
RBC – “Rostec” called 2025 record year for combat aircraft production (Dec. 25, 2025)
JAPCC – Countering Russia’s Glide Bomb Warfare in Ukraine (2025)
European Security & Defense – Blood and dust: The rise of Russia’s glide bombs (July 15, 2025)
Long War Journal – New footage confirms Russia using UMPK guidance kits on large bombs (2024-2025)
Business Insider – UAC aims to increase fighter output by 30% by 2030 while cutting managers (June 2025)
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