Moscow promises a Su-57 swarm leader with the S-70 Okhotnik. Between data links, electronic warfare, and the reality of the front lines, how viable is the concept?
In summary
Russia is promoting the Su-57–S-70 Okhotnik combination as the answer to the changing face of air combat: a manned fighter observes and makes decisions, while a heavy stealth drone exposes itself and strikes. On paper, this formula reduces human risk and extends the range of sensors and weapons. In practice, everything depends on three key factors. The first is the data link, which must remain stable under jamming and at long distances. The second is autonomy, as the drone must navigate, survive, and return in degraded mode without drifting toward the enemy. The third is industrialization: without mass production, the “pack” remains a demonstrator. The incident on October 5, 2024, in which an S-70 was destroyed by a Su-57 after losing control, illustrates the fragility of the concept. Beyond the rhetoric, the challenge is simple: to prove that a loyal wingman remains useful when the network really breaks down.
The Su-57–Okhotnik duo, a sixth-generation marker
The idea of a fighter jet that commands drones has become a marker of the sixth generation. On the Russian side, the narrative focuses on a duo: Su-57 and S-70 Okhotnik. The promise is twofold. First, to shift some of the risk away from the cockpit by sending the drone into contact. Second, to increase the number of sensors and weapons available without increasing the number of pilots. This is a response to a saturated sky, where ground-to-air defense and electronic warfare reduce freedom of action.
This gamble is consistent with doctrine. It is also very demanding. In modern warfare, connectivity is a target. Communications are jammed, intercepted, and deceived. And radio transmissions, even brief ones, reveal a presence. A loyal wingman is therefore only valuable if it remains useful when the network is degraded and if it does not expose a major technological secret in the event of the first crash.
The logic of using a pack leader fighter
Transforming a fighter into a tactical command post requires a clear division of tasks. The Su-57 stays in the background, where survival is more likely. It merges tracks, chooses priorities, and assigns roles. This is the spirit of collaborative combat: superiority comes from coordination, not from a single sensor.
Sharing roles between sensors, weapons, and exposure
The S-70 can play several cards. First, as a scout, by “provoking” a radar reaction without risking a pilot. Then as a decoy, forcing the enemy to turn on its sensors and reveal itself. Finally, as a weapons carrier, dropping ammunition from internal bays to remain discreet. In an ideal scenario, the drone accepts “dirty” profiles: penetration, exposure, jamming, risk-taking.
But we must be realistic. A heavy stealth drone is not a consumable weapon. Its loss can be costly, both in terms of money and credibility. And its production, if it remains low, mechanically limits the mass effect that is the strength of a “pack.”
The S-70 Okhotnik, a heavy drone at the top of the spectrum
The S-70 is presented as a flying wing, an architecture conducive to stealth and internal volume. Open data gives an order of magnitude: wingspan around 18 to 20 m (65 ft), length around 13 to 14 m, maximum take-off weight close to 20 to 25 t, speed around 1,000 km/h (620 mph). We are therefore talking about a drone closer to a small bomber than a tactical quadcopter. Its purpose is not FPV hunting. It is designed for deeper strikes and reconnaissance in a defended environment.
The stealth airframe and stability constraints
Its design suggests two priorities. First, internal bays, allowing for the discreet carriage of guided or gliding munitions. Second, flight autonomy that must remain stable despite a cell without a conventional tail, which is highly dependent on control laws. This is a sensitive issue: in contested areas, a failure, loss of navigation, or jamming can cause rapid drift.
The flying wing also raises the question of infrared signature. The images available show propulsion solutions that do not appear to maximize IR discretion. This does not render the aircraft useless. It simply reduces its margin against modern optronic and IR sensors.
The Su-57, sensors and mission management at the service of the drone
To control an unmanned platform, the Su-57 must see and sort. Public descriptions of its N036 Belka suite refer to an X-band AESA architecture, supplemented by side arrays and L-band antennas integrated into the leading edges, used in particular for identification and electronic warfare functions. Added to this is 101KS optronics, including an IRST sensor, useful for detecting without emitting, and therefore without giving away its position.
Workload and the possibility of a two-seater version
The problem is not only technical. It is human. A pilot cannot be a navigator, survivor, gunner, and fine controller of a heavy drone all at once. Hence the stories about a two-seater “command” version, or software aids that filter information and suggest actions. Without credible automation, the “pack leader” becomes cognitively overloaded. And an overloaded aircraft makes mistakes, especially under stress and jamming.
Data link, the heart of the concept and the breaking point
An effective loyal wingman must function when radio communication breaks down. Otherwise, it becomes a liability. The data link must therefore be robust, encrypted, resistant to jamming, and discreet. It must also manage latency and packet loss, especially if the mission moves away and direct visibility is lost.
Mixed mode operation between control and autonomy
This requires a mixed architecture. The drone needs onboard autonomy to navigate, avoid terrain, handle failures, and return on its own. Humans retain control of the effects, especially the use of weapons. Between the two, there must be clear degraded modes: standby orbit, automatic return, mission abandonment. Without this, the drone can drift, be captured, or become a threat.
Robustness under jamming and electromagnetic discretion
An additional difficulty lies in discretion. The more you transmit, the more detectable you are. The more you reduce transmissions, the more you depend on autonomy. The compromise is delicate, especially against an adversary who combines jammers, interception means, and strikes on relays. This is precisely what the war in Ukraine has made commonplace.
The October 2024 incident, a test in real conditions
On October 5, 2024, an S-70 crashed near Kostiantynivka after being shot down by a Russian Su-57, according to several open sources. The most widely accepted scenario is a loss of control or communication, followed by deliberate destruction to prevent recovery by Ukraine. The takeoff distance mentioned in some accounts, from Akhtubinsk, is about 587 km (365 mi) behind the front line, which illustrates an “operational test” profile rather than a routine one.
The lesson on anti-capture security and procedures
The episode serves as a warning: in a jammed environment, the chain of command can break down. The lesson is brutal. Without C2 resilience, a “pack” becomes a strategic risk. Hence the need for anti-capture procedures, sensitive data erasure, and abandonment plans. It’s thankless, but it’s unavoidable when a stealth system operates over contested territory.
The industrial equation, between ambition and constraints
The Okhotnik program has been associated with repeated announcements of its transition to production. The publicly stated timelines have slipped, which is typical for a heavy stealth drone. The question is not whether it will fly. It is already flying. The question is the series, and therefore the doctrine. Without volume, there can be no sustainable “pack.”
This constraint is compounded by a tense industrial environment. Industrial sanctions complicate access to certain components and push for substitutions that take time. In this context, there is a strong temptation to reserve the most advanced systems for limited units and communication, rather than rolling them out quickly.
The export argument: useful but difficult to convert
Selling a fighter jet today means selling an ecosystem. On paper, offering a Su-57 capable of orchestrating a heavy stealth drone is a powerful export argument. It promises a doctrinal leap without waiting for a new generation of aircraft.
But a customer wants proof and guarantees. They want a drone that is available, maintainable, and updated. They also want a chain of command that they control. However, a loyal wingman system lives and dies by its connectivity and software. If Moscow does not deliver the whole package, or if it delivers it at a discount, the commercial value collapses.
The question remains: will the pack survive the jamming?
The Loyal Wingman principle is rational. Recent warfare shows that attrition and jamming punish rare and overly connected systems. The Su-57–Okhotnik duo is therefore a full-scale test: successfully keeping a drone useful when the network degrades, and producing it in sufficient quantities to have an impact.
If it succeeds, Russia will gain a penetration tool and a technological showcase. If it fails, the revolution will continue elsewhere, in smaller, more numerous, and easier-to-produce drones, where mass and software matter more than stealth alone.
Sources
The War Zone — Russia’s S-70 Hunter Drone Was Armed When Shot Down By Friendly Fighter Over Ukraine.
Aviation Safety Network — Accident Sukhoi S-70 Okhotnik-B 074 Red, Saturday, October 5, 2024.
The War Zone — Watch Russia’s S-70 Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle Fly With An Su-57 For The First Time.
AeroTime — Sukhoi S-70 makes maiden sortie with Su-57 fighter jet.
The Defense Post — Russia Equips Su-57 Jets With AI-Based Secure Communications Suite.
Airforce Technology — Russian conglomerate develops AI communications for fifth-generation aircraft (Su-57).
TASS — Two-seat variant of Su-57 to be designed for control of Okhotnik drones.
Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses — S-70 Okhotnik UCAV Debuts on the Russia–Ukraine Battlefront.
Byelka (radar) — N036 Belka radar system overview.
Reuters — Rostec says defense exports halved since 2022 as Russian orders dominated.
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