The F-16 in Ukraine is a divisive issue. Between promises of a “game changer” and accusations of failure, here is what it can really do, and what it cannot do.
In summary
The delivery of F-16s to Ukraine has created a clash of expectations. Some saw it as the weapon that would “turn the tide” of the war. Others saw it as a belated, fragile, and almost useless symbol in the face of Russian air defense. Both interpretations are too simplistic. The F-16 brings concrete gains, especially for air defense, interception, and long-range strikes when conditions allow. But it does not eliminate the density of Russian systems, the constraint of the number of trained pilots, or the logistical burden on the ground. It can reduce Ukrainian losses and complicate Russian planning. It cannot, on its own, open up the skies above the front line. The “game changer or fiasco” debate reveals above all a problem of methodology: we are judging an isolated aircraft, whereas modern air warfare is a complete system, from the runway to the missiles, from intelligence to maintenance.
The promise of a “game changer” and the reality of attrition
The temptation of a simple narrative
In a long war, public opinion seeks a clear lever. A well-known Western aircraft, widely publicized and associated with NATO’s air superiority, fits this narrative perfectly. The implicit promise is: “Give Ukraine the F-16, and it will regain the initiative.” “ This is understandable. It is also false.
A fighter jet does not ”win” a war on its own. It changes the balance of power if, and only if, it comes with crews, weapons, maintenance, supplies, sensors, and ground protection. Otherwise, it becomes a rare asset that must be protected, and therefore less likely to be deployed.
The constraint of Russian air defense
Skeptics point to a key fact: Russia has a dense ground-to-air defense system, with long-range systems such as the S-400. On paper, some of this system’s munitions have a range of 400 km (250 miles). This does not mean that all aircraft are “doomed” at 400 km. But it does mean that the airspace near the front line remains contested, and that the F-16 will often have to operate further away, lower, or for shorter periods of time.
Saying this is not to disparage the aircraft. It is to reiterate a principle. In a sky saturated with radar, missiles, and electronic warfare, survival depends first and foremost on risk management. Ukraine cannot afford to use its F-16s as consumables.
The actual level of F-16s delivered and what this changes
The fact that the airframes are “old” is not the real scandal
The F-16s promised by several European countries come mainly from modernized (MLU) F-16A/B fleets. Many were built between the late 1970s and early 1990s. Some commentators summarize this as “30 years old, therefore obsolete.” This is a shortcut.
An old airframe can remain relevant if the avionics, data links, weapons, and maintenance are up to date. The MLU modernization has added beyond-visual-range combat capabilities and compatibility with modern weapons. This does not turn these aircraft into stealth fighters. But it does give them tangible military value.
The issue of sensors and weaponry is more important than the myth of dueling
The value of the F-16 is not to engage in “clean” duels against Russian aircraft. Its value lies in better integration into a defense bubble, better detection, and firing more powerful missiles. The F-16 MLUs are designed to use the AIM-120 AMRAAM. Depending on the configuration and authorization, they can also use defense suppression munitions, such as the AGM-88 HARM already used by Ukraine on other platforms.
This does not guarantee dominance. It increases the options. And in a war of attrition, increasing the options counts for more than excelling in “maneuverable combat.”
Vulnerability on the ground, an often misrepresented debate
The reality of FOD and runways
The most concrete criticism concerns the F-16’s low air intake. The risk is well known: debris ingestion during taxiing or takeoff. This risk exists on all jet aircraft, but it is more significant when procedures require clean surfaces. Western militaries invest heavily in prevention, with strict debris control programs and routines.
This subject is often caricatured. No, the F-16 is not “incapable” of operating in Ukraine. Yes, it requires discipline and resources. But keeping surfaces clean under the threat of strikes is a challenge. Runways, taxiways, parking lots, fuel depots, parts, shelters—everything becomes a target. The real vulnerability is not only technical. It is operational.
The comparison with the MiG-29 is fair, but it is not enough
Soviet fighters such as the MiG-29 were designed for more rugged conditions. The MiG-29 has air intake protection devices, with hatches and auxiliary air intakes to reduce the risk of debris ingestion on rough terrain. This is a doctrinal advantage. But it does not “solve” the Ukrainian equation.
Even a robust aircraft cannot operate sustainably if the adversary strikes infrastructure, logistics, and personnel. The key issue therefore becomes ground maintenance in a struck environment, dispersion, protection, and the ability to repair quickly. Here, the F-16 can be viable if Ukraine also receives what surrounds the aircraft. Otherwise, the aircraft becomes a fragile trophy.
The political tempo and the issue of delays
The timeline explains some of the anger
On this point, the criticism is not coming out of nowhere. The United States approved the principle of training in May 2023. Formal authorization for transfers by third countries was announced in the summer of 2023. The first F-16s began to be transferred to Ukraine in the summer of 2024, and the Ukrainian president confirmed their operational use in early August 2024.
This pace fueled the idea of “costly” political hesitation. This is a moral judgment that everyone will make in their own way. Technically, the delays stem mainly from three factors: English language training, aircraft conversion, and training for everyone except the pilots. A squadron is not just about pilots. It requires mechanics, armourers, mission planning, security, parts, documentation and simulators.
Pilot training, the real bottleneck
Figures published in the press show constant pressure on training places. At times, Ukraine has reported having more candidates than available slots. Programs have been set up in Denmark, Romania, and the United States. But training quickly does not mean training well.
One point is rarely mentioned openly. A quickly converted pilot can take off and shoot. He does not immediately become a complete tactician in an environment saturated with threats. Pilot training is therefore a two-speed race: achieving minimum capability, then achieving robust capability. Between the two, there is a dangerous zone.
Initial feedback on deployment and the question of “fiasco”
The fact that there have been losses proves nothing, except war
A first F-16 crash was confirmed at the end of August 2024, with the death of the pilot, during a defense mission against a Russian attack. A second incident was reported in May 2025, with the pilot ejecting. In war, losing aircraft is normal. What matters is the curve: losses, repairs, adaptation of tactics, and pace of engagement.
Russian systems are obviously trying to shoot down these aircraft. The Ukrainians, for their part, are learning to use them without exposing them unnecessarily. In this context, talking about a “fiasco” based on a few incidents is intellectually lazy.
The real measure is daily use and the effect on air defense
Western military officials explained in 2025 that Ukrainian F-16s were flying “every day” on defensive and offensive missions. Again, this does not mean “air superiority.” It means usefulness.
The F-16 is particularly helpful in areas where Ukraine has been suffering since 2022: protecting cities, intercepting threats, and complicating Russian strikes. It cannot dismantle a ground-to-air bubble on its own. But it can force Russia to adapt its flight profiles, trajectories, and risk management. That is already a military achievement.
The question that settles the debate: what system should surround the F-16?
Dependence on ammunition and electronic warfare
An F-16 without modern missiles is an expensive aircraft. An F-16 without sufficient stocks is a parsimonious aircraft. An F-16 without electronic warfare support and reliable intelligence is an exposed aircraft. Modern air warfare is a chain.
This is where the “game changer” debate becomes useful, if it forces an adult discussion. What does Ukraine need, besides aircraft? Air-to-air missiles, parts, maintenance capabilities, base protection, and consistent command. Without these, the aircraft is overvalued. With them, it becomes a force multiplier.
The truth, neither heroic nor cynical
The F-16 in Ukraine is not a magic wand. Nor is it a gadget. It is a tool suited to part of the Ukrainian problem, especially air defense and attrition. The rest will depend on the ability to hold out over time, to protect on the ground, and to supply the machine with ammunition and maintenance.
Public debate loves labels. War, on the other hand, rewards strong supply chains, trained crews, and clear-headed decisions. If we are looking for the real “game changer,” it may be less spectacular than a jet: it is a country’s ability to sustain an air system under fire.
Sources
Reuters, July 10, 2024, “F-16 jets being sent to Ukraine from Denmark and the Netherlands…”
Reuters, July 31, 2024, “Ukraine receives first F-16 jets, officials say”
Reuters, August 5, 2024, “Ukraine finally deploying US-made F-16 fighter jets…”
Reuters, August 29, 2024, “Ukrainian military confirms F-16 crash, death of pilot”
Reuters, May 16, 2025, “Pilot ejects from Ukraine F-16 fighter jet after incident…”
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, August 12, 2024, “F16 fighter jets are in Ukraine now”
Le Monde, April 25, 2024, “European-trained Ukrainian F-16 pilots will not be ready until late 2024”
Politico, June 5, 2024, “Ukraine presses US, Europe to step up F-16 pilot training”
AP News, August 23, 2023, “S-400… range 400 kilometers (250 miles)”
FAA, Advisory Circular AC 150/5210-24A, February 8, 2024, “Airport Foreign Object Debris (FOD) Management”
US Air Force, Incirlik AB, January 12, 2007, “New aircraft demand increased FOD vigilance”
Airvectors, 2025 (update), “Mikoyan MiG-29 Fulcrum” (air intake devices for rough terrain)
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