Chinese hypersonic weapons are shaking up global deterrence. Analysis of the DF-ZF and airborne missiles capable of bypassing missile defenses.
Summary
China is currently at the forefront of hypersonic weapons development, with vehicles capable of flying at over Mach 5 (6,200 km/h) while maneuvering to evade interception systems. The DF-ZF, a hypersonic glide vehicle tested in 2014, and the DF-17 and DF-21D missiles that carry it, represent a major strategic breakthrough. These weapons exploit extreme speed and unpredictable trajectories to penetrate US missile shields and overwhelm regional defenses. Beijing is banking on this technology to consolidate its global strike capability, including from airborne launchers such as the H-6N or the future H-20 stealth bomber. Through this program, China seeks to guarantee its conventional and nuclear deterrence, but also to impose a new power geometry in its strategic competition with the United States.
A new strategic era based on speed
For the past decade, China has established itself as the United States’ main hypersonic competitor. Repeated tests of gliding vehicles and hybrid missiles demonstrate a clear strategy: to surpass existing defense architectures.
Hypersonic weapons operate in an intermediate zone between the atmosphere and space, where ground-based and space-based radars lose their effectiveness. By combining speed, maneuverability, and precision, these systems blur the distinction between conventional and strategic strikes.
The hypersonic challenge lies in the very physics of flying at Mach 5 or faster: at these speeds, air resistance generates temperatures of over 1,500°C, which only composite alloy or refractory carbon structures can withstand. Chinese engineers achieved this technological breakthrough in the mid-2010s with the DF-ZF, the first credible demonstration of an operational hypersonic glider.
The DF-ZF: the heart of China’s hypersonic program
The DF-ZF (formerly known as WU-14) is a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) launched by a ballistic missile and then released into the upper atmosphere at an altitude of approximately 100 km. Once detached, it dives toward its target, gliding at a speed of between Mach 5 and Mach 10, while performing lateral maneuvers that make it virtually impossible to intercept.
This glider is generally associated with the DF-17 missile, which has an intermediate range (approximately 1,800 to 2,500 km), was first tested in 2017, and was officially unveiled during the military parade on October 1, 2019 in Beijing. The combination combines the power of a ballistic missile with the flexibility of an aerodynamic vehicle. Unlike a conventional missile, whose trajectory is predictable, the DF-ZF can change its angle of approach, rendering predictive models of American warning systems such as THAAD or Aegis BMD useless.
The DF-ZF is believed to be capable of striking targets anywhere in the western Pacific in less than 10 minutes. Analysts at the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency estimate that China has already reached a level of industrial maturity that allows for limited mass production.
The principle of hypersonic gliding flight
Hypersonic gliding flight combines two modes: a ballistic phase of launch and an atmospheric phase of controlled flight.
In the first phase, the rocket engine propels the glider beyond the Kármán line (100 km). Then, aerodynamic lift allows for gliding flight at very high speeds in the upper layers of the atmosphere.
This “semi-orbital” trajectory offers several tactical advantages:
- altitude too low for space sensors;
- speed too high for anti-missile systems;
- reduced radar signature thanks to the thin ionized envelope created by air friction.
This plasma, partially enveloping the vehicle, temporarily masks its electromagnetic emissions and makes radar tracking difficult. Missile defenses designed to intercept conventional parabolic trajectories are thus circumvented by the very physics of flight.
Airborne hypersonic missiles: the second phase of the program
Beyond the DF-17, China has begun developing air-launched hypersonic missiles capable of striking at very long ranges without prior warning.
Satellite images have shown a modified DF-21 missile under an H-6N bomber, an aircraft derived from the Soviet Tu-16. This missile, designated CH-AS-X-13 by US intelligence, is believed to have a range of over 2,000 km and could reach Mach 10.
This configuration has two advantages: the aerial platform allows the missile to be projected beyond regional defenses, while the hypersonic glide vehicle extends the strike range without passing through orbital space.
The future H-20, a Chinese strategic stealth bomber currently under development, is expected to eventually carry internal hypersonic weapons, giving Beijing a global strike capability comparable to that of the American B-21 Raider.
These developments are intended to deter any American military action in the China Sea or around Taiwan by threatening forward bases and carrier strike groups.
The reasons for China’s success in hypersonics
China’s success is based on massive investment in R&D and centralized industrial integration. Beijing spends tens of billions of yuan each year on research into aerodynamics, ramjet propulsion, and heat-resistant materials.
The Chinese Academy of Aerodynamics and Aeronautics (CAAA) and the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT) are jointly conducting this work, supported by civilian university laboratories.
China also benefits from a very dense hypersonic testing system, comprising at least seven wind tunnels capable of simulating speeds of up to Mach 25. This infrastructure gives Chinese engineers an experimental advantage in validating flight profiles and guidance systems.
Finally, cooperation between the civilian and military sectors—the famous “military-civil fusion” strategy—allows innovations from space and commercial aeronautics to be integrated into military programs. This is how the DF-ZF benefited from research on the re-entries of Chinese Shenzhou space capsules.
A countermeasure to US missile defense systems
The development of hypersonic weapons is a direct response to the US missile defense doctrine. Since the 2000s, the United States has increased its deployment of radars and interceptors: THAAD in South Korea, Aegis Ashore in Japan, and GBI in Alaska.
These systems, designed to counter intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), rely on the predictability of the trajectory.
Chinese hypersonic vehicles exploit this weakness: flying at variable altitudes, changing angles and courses, they are impossible to intercept with current technologies. An interceptor must anticipate the target’s trajectory with a margin of error of a few milliseconds—yet a hypersonic glider can change its position by several tens of kilometers during this time.
What’s more, the extreme speed reduces the engagement window to a few seconds. A system such as THAAD, whose firing dome is limited to 200 km altitude and 200 km range, cannot intercept a vehicle traveling in the stratosphere, between 40 and 80 km.
A global strategic threat
China’s entry into the exclusive club of hypersonic powers—alongside Russia and the United States—is transforming global nuclear deterrence.
Gliders such as the DF-ZF or hypersonic cruise missiles under development (such as the Starry Sky-2) can be armed with both conventional and nuclear warheads, introducing strategic ambiguity: a launch could be interpreted as a nuclear strike, triggering a disproportionate response.
This ambivalence worries Western planners because it reduces the time available for political decision-making. A Mach 10 strike from China to Guam, for example, would reach its target in less than 12 minutes. At this speed, no early warning satellite system would allow for an organized response.
A technological race still open
Despite this apparent lead, China has not yet proven the operational reliability of its systems in a real war context. There have been numerous tests, but the data remains classified.
The United States is investing heavily to catch up, with programs such as the Hypersonic Conventional Strike Weapon (HCSW) and the ARRW (Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon). Russia, for its part, already claims to have deployed the Avangard, a nuclear hypersonic glider, and the Kinzhal, an air-launched missile capable of reaching Mach 12.
The competition is not only about speed, but also about guidance, thermal resilience, and terminal accuracy. In these areas, China is making rapid progress but remains dependent on technologies that are still undergoing validation.
Towards a new multipolar deterrence
Hypersonic technology is not only changing the technical landscape, it is redefining deterrence.
By equipping its arsenal with weapons capable of bypassing any existing defense, China is seeking to freeze American containment ambitions in the Indo-Pacific. In this way, it intends to guarantee the survival of its second strike force, but also to strengthen its diplomatic weight vis-à-vis Washington.
Speed becomes a political tool here: whoever strikes first, without being seen or intercepted, has both a psychological and military advantage.
The rise of the DF-ZF illustrates this silent revolution: 21st-century warfare will be fought as much in the realm of hypersonic speed as in space and cyberspace.
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