Russia is losing its MiG-29s faster than it can produce or recommission them. Attrition, budgets, industrial limitations, and the shift to drone warfare.
Summary
Since the start of the war in Ukraine, Russia has suffered fighter jet losses that exceed its replacement capacity, particularly for the MiG-29. Confirmed destruction by open sources shows that attrition far exceeds Russian industrial production rates, even though these have been redirected towards the war effort. This situation reveals structural flaws: limited stocks of airframes in reserve, production difficulties, shortages of critical components, and constrained budgetary trade-offs. Faced with the accelerated wear and tear of its combat aircraft, Moscow is adapting its posture, reducing the exposure of its fighters and shifting a growing part of its effort toward drones and remotely operated munitions. This shift is not a mature doctrinal choice, but a forced response to a war of attrition that the Russian aviation industry is struggling to sustain over time.
The observation of structural attrition
Russian air losses documented since 2022 show a clear trend. According to counts based on geolocated images and videos, Russia has lost several dozen MiG-29s that have been destroyed or severely damaged. The exact figures vary depending on the methods used, but the most commonly cited range is between 25 and 35 aircraft confirmed as out of action since the start of the conflict.
This figure must be put into perspective. Before the war, Russia had an estimated operational fleet of around 90 to 110 MiG-29s, all versions combined, only some of which were actually capable of high-intensity combat. The MiG-29 is no longer at the heart of Russian doctrine, which is dominated by the Su-30, Su-34, and Su-35, but it is still used for air defense, interception, and occasional support missions.
The destruction of a third of the operational fleet in less than three years is a shock. Above all, this attrition is not being offset by new deliveries. The MiG-29 is no longer in series production for the Russian forces. The few airframes assembled are for export orders or specific variants, with no direct impact on immediate operational requirements.
The industrial limits of Russian renewal
Contrary to popular belief, Russia cannot quickly “roll out” fighter jets from its production lines. The MiG-29 is an aircraft designed in the 1980s, whose industrial chain has been largely dismantled or converted. Putting a standard version back into production would require heavy investment, stable suppliers, and a schedule incompatible with an ongoing war.
Moscow theoretically has airframes in storage. In practice, their condition is problematic. Many have been cannibalized for parts, while others have exceeded their structural potential, expressed in flight hours or cycles (takeoffs and landings). Returning them to service requires extensive inspections, replacement of critical components, and full military certification. This process takes months, sometimes more than a year per aircraft.
Russia has attempted to focus its efforts on more modern platforms, such as the Su-35S and Su-34M. But here too, production rates are limited. Western estimates suggest an annual production of 20 to 30 combat aircraft across all categories, a figure that is insufficient to simultaneously compensate for losses, wear and tear, and the need to increase capacity.
The weight of components and sanctions
The renewal of the fleet does not depend solely on the final assembly lines. It relies on hundreds of subsystems, some of which incorporate sensitive electronic components. Sanctions have made it difficult to access high-quality microelectronics, which are essential for radars, fire control computers, and navigation systems.
Russia has developed alternative solutions, but with inferior performance and variable reliability rates. This results in fewer aircraft being available, more frequent maintenance downtime, and sometimes deployment with reduced capabilities. In a context of high attrition, each unavailable aircraft increases the pressure on the rest of the fleet.
This industrial constraint explains why Moscow favors extending the life of existing airframes rather than replacing them. But this strategy has a physical limit. An airframe cannot be extended indefinitely without compromising safety and performance.
The budgetary cost of an aviation industry under strain
Financially, the war is weighing heavily on the Russian budget. Military spending has exceeded 6% of GDP, a level rarely reached since the end of the Cold War. A growing share of these funds is being absorbed by day-to-day operations: ammunition, logistics, salaries, and compensation.
Producing a modern fighter jet is expensive. A 4++ generation multi-role fighter costs tens of millions of euros per unit, not including initial support. In a context of sanctions, these costs are increasing because supply chains are longer and less efficient.
For Moscow, replacing a lost MiG-29 with a new aircraft is not just an industrial issue, but a budgetary decision. Every ruble invested in a fighter jet is a ruble that does not finance drones, missiles, or artillery shells, which are being consumed at a massive rate.
Tactical adaptation in the face of losses
Faced with this reality, Russia has adapted the use of its aircraft. MiG-29s are less and less engaged deep inside Ukrainian territory. They operate more from the rear, launching missiles from a distance or conducting deterrent patrols.
This posture reduces risk but limits effectiveness. A fighter that remains in the rear loses some of its tactical value. It becomes a missile vector rather than a tool for air superiority. This evolution reflects a constraint rather than a choice.
Ukraine, for its part, is exploiting this increased caution. Surface-to-air systems, combined with reconnaissance drones, create threat bubbles that complicate Russian engagement. Each sortie becomes a risk calculation, and each loss is more difficult to accept.
The gradual shift towards drone warfare
The inability to quickly replace the MiG-29s is accelerating an already noticeable trend: the rise of drones. For Russia, a drone costs infinitely less than a combat aircraft, both to purchase and to operate. It does not require a pilot and can be mass-produced.
Drones cannot completely replace a fighter jet, but they can compensate for some of its functions. Reconnaissance, targeted strikes, saturation of enemy defenses: these are all missions now entrusted to unmanned systems. This transfer of responsibility reduces the pressure on manned aircraft, but also reveals its limitations.
This shift is both imposed and chosen. It reflects the impossibility of maintaining a conventional combat air force at a high rate of attrition without a robust and open industrial base. Russia therefore favors “consumable” solutions, accepting high losses of drones in order to preserve more scarce assets.
The strategic impact beyond the MiG-29
The issue is not limited to one type of aircraft. The case of the MiG-29 is symptomatic of a broader problem: the difficulty of sustaining a prolonged war of attrition in the air against an adversary capable of inflicting regular losses.
Even if the MiG-29 is no longer the backbone of Russian aviation, its rapid erosion sends a clear signal. Platforms inherited from the Soviet era are reaching the end of their life cycle, and their replacement is slow, costly, and politically constrained.
In the medium term, this situation could force Moscow to review its doctrinal priorities. Fewer aircraft, but more missiles and drones. Less permanent air presence, but more targeted strikes. This is not necessarily an admission of weakness, but it is a change imposed by industrial and economic realities.
A war that redefines the value of aviation
The destruction of more MiG-29s than Russia can replace is not just a tactical indicator. It is a strategic revelation. It shows that, in modern warfare, air superiority is no longer measured solely in terms of the number of aircraft, but in terms of the ability to sustain the effort over time.
For Moscow, each MiG-29 lost is a brutal reminder of the limitations of its industrial apparatus. For Kyiv, it is proof that a strategy combining ground-to-air defense, intelligence, and targeted strikes can erode a technologically superior adversary.
What happens next will depend on Russia’s ability to transform its industry, secure its supply chains, and accept a combat model in which manned aircraft are no longer the central tool. Drone warfare is not a fad. It has become, out of necessity, a response to the accelerated attrition of combat aviation.
Sources
- Oryx — Russian Aircraft Losses in Ukraine
- International Institute for Strategic Studies — The Military Balance
- Reuters — Russia’s defense industry struggles to replace combat losses
- The War Zone — Russian Fighter Jet Attrition And Production Limits
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute — Military Expenditure Database
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