The deactivation of the 924th Fighter Group at Davis-Monthan seals the withdrawal of the A-10 in favor of the F-35A. Issues, missions, and budgets: technical analysis.
The US Air Force Reserve has deactivated the 924th Fighter Group at Davis-Monthan AFB. This decision accompanies the accelerated withdrawal of the A-10C Thunderbolt II and the gradual activation of the F-35A Lightning II within the 47th Fighter Squadron, the cornerstone of a fifth-generation fleet. The deactivation ceremony took place on September 6, 2025, with a final flyover by the A-10C. The group employed approximately 550 personnel in operations, maintenance, and support, and trained A-10C pilots for overseas theaters. The replacement aims to provide more survivable, interconnected, and stealthy multi-role capabilities, but it also opens up a budgetary debate: hourly cost, unit investment, and logistical sustainability. Beyond the symbolism, it is the architecture of American air power that is being reorganized, with a refocus on fifth-generation fighters, F-35 training, and expeditionary capabilities less dependent on specialized attack aircraft.
The fact: deactivation at Davis-Monthan and the end of an A-10 cycle
On September 6, 2025, the US Air Force Reserve officially retired the pennants of the 924th Fighter Group during a ceremony at Davis-Monthan AFB (Arizona). A-10Cs made a final flyover, marking the end of a chapter that began in 2011 with the reactivation of the group in Tucson. The official announcement highlights the depth of the group’s history, from its origins in World War II to its latest training campaigns and “Hawgsmoke” competitions. Authorities emphasized the importance of passing on an “Attack” operational culture to the next generation, centered on the F-35A Lightning II.
Organically, the 924th comprised three entities: the 47th Fighter Squadron (operations), the 924th Maintenance Squadron (maintenance), and the 924th Operational Support Flight (support). Together, they brought together approximately 550 specialists covering more than twenty professions. The group, associated with the 944th Fighter Wing (Luke AFB), has provided training on the A-10C and graduated 29 pilots since 2014, illustrating robust “FTU” production for an aircraft at the end of its service life. Deactivation does not erase this expertise: it redirects it to an F-35A program that is ramping up.
Beyond the local event, the closure of the group is part of a national plan: complete withdrawal of the A-10s by 2026, transfer of resources to more sustainable platforms in a contested environment. The much-discussed image of an A-10 nose-to-nose with an F-35 in front of Hangar 4 sums up the technological shift: from 30mm cannons and “low speed/low altitude” resilience to sensory stealth and network effects.
The reason: a planned withdrawal of the A-10 and a refocused fleet
The debate over the A-10 goes back more than a decade. The aircraft remains a benchmark in CAS (Close Air Support) capability thanks to its survivability at low altitude, its range, and its specific weaponry. But its mission profile exposes it to modern ground-to-air defenses with long range and multispectral detection. In a high-intensity conflict, the probability of losses increases and the window of opportunity for deployment narrows. The US Air Force has therefore accelerated the withdrawal, aiming to phase out the A-10 fleet by 2026, in order to reallocate training slots, budgets, and personnel to the F-35A Lightning II and associated programs.
This transition also fits within a constrained budgetary framework. The trade-offs in the 2026 plan reduce the number of F-35As acquired per year, while confirming the phase-out of the A-10s. In other words: fewer new aircraft than desired in a given fiscal year, but a clear shift toward fifth generation aircraft, at the cost of a temporarily smaller fleet. The objective remains the same: to build a force that is more capable of combat in A2/AD zones, stand-off attacks and discreet penetration, while eventually integrating swarms of collaborative drones.
Finally, Davis-Monthan is not being marginalized. The base is changing its vocation with the arrival of units dedicated to power projection and special forces, according to the plan already announced in 2023. The site therefore retains a central role in the US Southwest, even if the shadow of the Warthog is receding.
The replacement: missions, training, and capability differences
The 47th Fighter Squadron is set to join the “F-35 community” after the group is deactivated, which means a shift from A-10 training to F-35A training. The core of the change lies in the spectrum of missions. The F-35A is multi-role: limited but credible air superiority, penetration and strike, tactical ISR via integrated sensors, electronic warfare, ground support with guided munitions (SDB-II/GBU-53, JDAM, AGM-154). Its stealth reduces the initial detection distance and facilitates first-day attack profiles against modern defenses. The aircraft operates as a sensory node: data fusion, real-time sharing via Link-16 or MADL, multi-platform designation, and “quarterbacking” of other vectors.
In contrast, the A-10C Thunderbolt II was optimized for close air support at low altitude, with its GAU-8/A 30 mm cannon, repeated passes, and persistence over the battlefield. In permissive scenarios, it remains formidable. But when faced with layered defenses equipped with AESA radars, mobile surface-to-air missiles, and IRST systems, its survivability declines. The F-35A does not offer identical CAS, but rather remote, sensor-centric CAS: positive identification, precision firing, reduced exposure, and cooperation with reconnaissance/attack drones. For an air component command, the real flexibility of the F-35A (unit, sensor, shooter) becomes a force multiplier that is rarely achievable with a dedicated fighter.
On the training side, switching from an A-10 FTU to an F-35 FTU means revising the syllabus, high-fidelity simulators, debriefing infrastructure, and instructor pipeline. The transfer of “mission planning,” “deconfliction,” and “kill chain” skills remains relevant; what changes is the density of information and sensor management. The 29 A-10 pilots qualified since 2014 illustrate a controlled pace that will need to be reoriented towards the F-35, in a context where deliveries are resuming with the TR-3 upgrade and increasing software maturity.
Budget differences: hourly cost, unit cost, sustainability
Costs must be compared using the same metrics. The DoD’s “reimbursable rates” provide a consistent order of magnitude per hour. In FY2024, the A-10C is billed at around $10,887 per hour, compared to $18,337 for the F-35A; in FY2025, the latter will be around $17,835. At the average exchange rate (assumption $1 ≈ €0.92), this corresponds to approximately €10,000 for the A-10C and €16,400–17,000 for the F-35A. These figures do not tell the whole story (they do not include all ownership costs), but they do allow for a disciplined comparison on an identical basis.
On the acquisition side, the average flyaway unit cost of an F-35A (lots 15-17) is approximately $82.5 million per unit, or nearly €76-77 million depending on the exchange rate used, with variations related to options, the customer country, and the engine. Industrial discussions in 2024-2025 were also marked by the TR-3 transition and temporary payment holds, without calling into question the overall trajectory of the program. Conversely, as the A-10 is no longer in production, the “purchase price” comparison is meaningless: the focus is on maintenance, cannibalization of parts, and availability.
Finally, the CBO and GAO reports highlight two realities: the gradual decline in F-35 availability with age and the sustained pressure of support costs. Hence the interest in a broader network (reduction in annual hours per cell, improvement in logistics chains, new MRO practices) and a capacity mix that spreads the budgetary risk. The retirement of the A-10 frees up maintenance lines and armament slots for aircraft that will remain in service beyond 2040, but requires the F-35 to be made sustainable now.
Next steps: operational consequences and trajectories in Arizona
For Tucson and Arizona, the withdrawal of the A-10 reallocates space, personnel, and flight paths. Davis-Monthan is reconfiguring itself for projection and assistance missions that will benefit from already dense infrastructure and a regional aeronautical ecosystem. The personnel of the 47th Fighter Squadron and associated technical units will be invaluable in accelerating the F-35 adaptation: their skills in tactical planning, rare failure management, and rapid turn-around are transferable, provided that the F-35’s sensor/system transition can be absorbed.
At the USAF/AFRC level, the challenge is clear: reduce fleet diversity, focus investment on platforms designed for high-intensity combat, and prepare for cooperation with collaborative combat aircraft (CCA) that will carry sensors and munitions. The 2025-2027 schedule remains delicate: deliveries, software maturation, training pace, sustainability. But the scale effect should eventually come into play, especially if the F-35 chain stabilizes its support costs and production remains predictable for the manufacturer and its subcontractors. In this context, the A-10 chapter is respectfully closing, while a more discreet, more connected, and more digitally demanding mode of action is being written—exactly what the fifth generation is aiming for.
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