If the United States reduces its commitment, what will become of the allied F-35 fleets? Dependence, political risks, and the absence of a real Plan B.
In summary
The question is no longer theoretical. With the regular return of the debate on a possible American strategic withdrawal, some allies are openly asking: what would happen if the United States stopped supporting the F-35? Behind the fighter jet lies a system that is deeply integrated with US infrastructure, whether in terms of software support, logistics, updates, or sensitive data management. Apart from very specific cases, such as the United Kingdom and Israel, no country currently has real autonomy over the entire life cycle of the F-35. A breakdown in US support would not mean an immediate halt to flights, but a gradual and inevitable deterioration in capabilities. This structural dependence makes the F-35 a major political issue: it is not just an aircraft, but a vehicle for lasting strategic alignment. The lack of a credible Plan B raises a central question of military sovereignty for allied air forces.
The F-35 as a pillar of a global US architecture
The F-35 Lightning II was never designed as a conventional export program. From the outset, Washington opted for an integrated, centralized, and controlled system, intended to strengthen interoperability between allies while maintaining political and technological control.
The F-35 depends on an American architecture for its heavy maintenance, software support, configuration validation, and capability upgrades. Allied fleets are not autonomous. They are connected to an ecosystem controlled by the United States, with constant data flows and strict access rules.
This approach has long been presented as an advantage. It guarantees operational homogeneity, shared technological superiority, and costs that are theoretically controlled through pooling. But it also creates structural dependence, which is rarely highlighted during purchasing decisions.
The political scenario of a partial US withdrawal
The hypothesis of a complete withdrawal by the United States from its international commitments remains extreme. On the other hand, many allies consider partial disengagement, reduced support, or strict prioritization of US national interests to be plausible.
The debate surrounding “America First,” already evident in previous administrations, has left a lasting mark. It has given rise to a new concern: US military support is no longer perceived as unconditional.
In this context, a future executive could decide to limit certain forms of cooperation, slow down the flow of parts, make software updates conditional, or restrict access to certain levels of data. These discreet but powerful levers would be enough to gradually weaken an allied fleet without announcing a sudden break.
What does “ceasing support” for the F-35 mean in practical terms?
Stopping support for the F-35 does not mean remotely deactivating an aircraft. It means interrupting or limiting several critical elements.
First, logistical support. The F-35 relies on a global network of spare parts, much of which transits through authorized US centers. Without priority access to these flows, delays skyrocket and availability plummets.
Next, software support. The F-35 is an evolving platform. Without regular updates, the aircraft retains its basic capabilities but quickly loses its advantage in the face of constantly evolving threats.
Finally, operational certification. Every new weapon and every major modification requires US approval. Without this green light, tactical options are automatically reduced.
The illusion of national autonomy
Several countries have raised the possibility of maintaining their F-35s independently. In practice, this option is largely illusory.
The aircraft’s complete documentation, critical source codes, and certain algorithms remain strictly controlled by Washington.
Recreating an autonomous support chain would require colossal investments, probably several billion euros, with no guarantee of success.
Even nations with advanced aerospace industries face legal and political barriers. Export contracts explicitly limit modifications and access to sensitive technologies.
The relative exceptions of the United Kingdom and Israel
Two countries stand out as special cases. The United Kingdom enjoys first-tier partner status. Its industry is involved in the development and production of the F-35, particularly in terms of structural and propulsion components. London has increased maintenance and integration capabilities, without being completely autonomous.
Israel is another unique case. Its F-35I has been partially adapted to specific national requirements. Israel has greater leeway in the integration of certain systems, but remains dependent on the United States for the core of the platform.
These two exceptions prove the rule: complete autonomy does not exist, even for the closest partners.
The absence of a credible Plan B
Given this dependence, the question of Plan B comes up regularly. In reality, there is no simple solution.
Changing aircraft type is a theoretical option, but completely unrealistic in the short or medium term. The F-35 fleets represent investments of tens of billions of euros, dedicated infrastructure, and years of training.
Returning to previous-generation aircraft would pose a major operational problem. Doctrines, networks, and concepts of use have been built around the F-35. Abruptly abandoning it would create a capability gap.
The most realistic Plan B is therefore to reduce dependence, not eliminate it. This requires larger stocks of parts, enhanced local maintenance capabilities, and partial diversification of resources.
The military consequences of US disengagement
Operationally, the cessation of US support would have gradual but profound effects. Availability would fall, slowly at first, then more rapidly. Aircraft would be reserved for the most critical missions, to the detriment of training.
This would directly affect pilot training. There would be fewer flight hours, fewer multinational exercises, and a loss of doctrinal consistency with US forces.
In the medium term, the credibility of certain air forces would be called into question. An immobilized F-35 is not a deterrent. Yet deterrence relies as much on perception as on technical reality.
The political impact within NATO
Such a scenario would have major repercussions within NATO. The F-35 has become the backbone of the combat aviation of many European allies. Its weakening would create profound imbalances.
Some countries might be tempted to strengthen their national capabilities outside the allied framework. Others would seek alternative European solutions, but these would take decades to produce concrete results.
The main risk would be strategic fragmentation, weakening collective coherence at a time when international tensions are intensifying.
An accepted but rarely debated dependency
One of the blind spots in the debate is the accepted nature of this dependency when purchasing decisions are made.
The F-35 was chosen precisely because it anchors the allied air forces firmly in the American system.
This choice has brought real benefits. But it has also transferred a share of operational sovereignty. As long as political alignment is strong, this dependence is invisible. As soon as it weakens, it becomes a central issue.
What the question of US support really reveals
The question is not simply “what to do without the United States?” It is more uncomfortable: can we still conceive of a modern combat air force that is completely sovereign?
The F-35 illustrates a broader trend. Weapons systems are becoming so complex that they exceed the capabilities of individual nations. Sovereignty is now negotiated in networks, not in silos.
If Washington reduced its support, the F-35 fleets would not stop overnight. They would erode. Slowly, surely, until they lost their strategic value. This reality explains why, despite political debates, no ally today has a truly credible exit plan.
Sources
– Government Accountability Office reports on the F-35 program and its logistical support.
– U.S. Congressional hearings on allies’ dependence on the F-35 system.
– NATO strategic analyses on interoperability and capability sovereignty.
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