With UMPK bombs, Su-34s, and Kh-101 missiles, Russia is now prioritizing long-range strikes to preserve its aircraft and wear down Ukrainian defenses.
In Summary
The Russian Air Force has profoundly altered its combat operations in Ukraine. After suffering significant losses early in the invasion while attempting to operate near Ukrainian air defense systems, it now prioritizes standoff strikes launched outside the highest-risk zones. Su-34s drop massive quantities of FAB bombs equipped with UMPK or UMPB kits dozens of kilometers from the front lines. Tu-95MS and Tu-160 bombers launch their Kh-101 cruise missiles from within Russian airspace, sometimes over 1,000 km from their targets. This doctrine protects aircraft, leverages vast stocks of Soviet-era bombs, and imposes an unfavorable economic cost ratio on Ukraine. Several thousand glide bombs can be deployed each month. Their impact is particularly devastating on fortifications and towns near the front lines. Russia has not achieved air supremacy; instead, it has found a different way to employ its airpower.
Ukrainian Defenses Forced Russia to Fight at a Distance
Russia’s current doctrine was largely born out of failure.
In February and March 2022, the Russian Aerospace Forces failed to permanently suppress the Ukrainian air defense network. S-300, Buk, and other mobile systems survived initial strikes, forcing Russian aircraft to restrict deep penetration missions.
Four years later, this constraint continues to shape the air war. RUSI estimates that Russia’s failure to conduct an effective Suppression and Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD/DEAD) campaign prevented tactical aviation from fully exploiting its numerical superiority.
Consequently, Moscow redefined the role of its aircraft. The Su-34 is no longer primarily used as a deep-penetration bomber penetrating enemy airspace. It has become a long-range launch platform.
This tactical evolution is detailed in the evolution of the Su-34 based on lessons from the war in Ukraine.
UMPK Kits Transform Legacy Stocks into Modern Weapons
The main breakthrough is as much economic as it is technological.
Russia possesses extensive stockpiles of conventional FAB-250, FAB-500, FAB-1500, and even FAB-3000 unguided bombs. Originally, these weapons had to be dropped relatively close to their target. Deploying them against modern air defenses would severely expose the launch aircraft.
The UMPK kit changes this dynamic. It adds deployable wings along with a navigation and flight correction system. A conventional unguided bomb thus becomes a guided glide bomb.
RUSI estimates that UMPK bombs can generally be launched around 50 to 70 km from the front, with ranges extending up to 130 km under certain flight conditions. This allows Russian aircraft to remain far enough back to complicate interception by Ukrainian defenses.
Cost represents another key advantage. Since the FAB bomb body already exists, only the guidance kit needs to be added. Russia thus gains a capability that replicates part of the impact of a much more expensive precision missile.
The Su-34 Has Become Moscow’s Flying Heavy Artillery
The resulting volume of strikes has been dramatic.
According to figures compiled by RUSI from Ukrainian data, Russia used 3,370 UMPK bombs in February 2025, 4,800 in March, over 5,000 in April, 3,786 in July, and 4,390 in August. Kit production reportedly rose from a few thousand in 2023 to around 40,000 in 2024, targeting 70,000 in 2025.
Ukrainian military intelligence subsequently offered a higher estimate, claiming in November 2025 that Russia sought to produce up to 120,000 glide bombs during that year. While this figure cannot be independently verified, Kyiv reported days with as many as 250 launches.
In 2026, RUSI still estimates that Su-34s launch hundreds of bombs every week against Ukrainian positions and towns near the front.
This focus on mass explains why Moscow maintains a high industrial priority on its tactical bombers, analyzed in the increased production rate of Su-34s and Russian glide bombs.
Glide Bombs Destroy What Small Drones Cannot Demolish
The military effect stems not from extraordinary precision, but from the raw explosive payload.
A FAB-500 has a total mass of roughly 500 kg, while a FAB-1500 reaches approximately 1,500 kg. These warheads can destroy fortified structures, collapse trench systems, or render command posts unusable.
While small FPV drones excel at targeting individual vehicles or personnel, they do not generate the same level of destruction.
RUSI notes that a detected Ukrainian artillery position or stronghold near the front can now be struck by a weapon carrying an explosive payload far greater than that of any tactical drone.
This presents a difficult dilemma for Ukrainian forces. Buried positions offer protection against artillery and FPV drones, but become ideal targets for heavy glide bombs. Conversely, dispersing units reduces vulnerability to heavy bombs, but complicates defensive operations.
This pressure has rendered certain static defensive lines far harder to maintain.
Cruise Missiles Apply the Same Doctrine on a Strategic Scale
The standoff strategy extends far beyond the immediate front lines.
Tu-95MS and Tu-160 bombers can launch the Kh-101 cruise missile without approaching Ukrainian airspace. Open-source estimates attribute a range of up to 2,800 km to the missile.
A bomber can thus take off from an airbase deep inside Russia, launch its missiles from within Russian airspace, and return home without ever directly confronting Ukrainian air defenses or fighters.
Modern strike salvos have also grown increasingly complex. In 2025 and 2026, they frequently combined hundreds of Geran and Gerbera drones, dozens of Kh-101 or 9M728 cruise missiles, and Iskander-M or Kh-47M2 Kinzhal ballistic missiles.
Flight paths can be programmed to bypass specific defensive batteries and ensure multiple weapons arrive almost simultaneously from different vectors. Kh-101s have also received countermeasures and navigation upgrades intended to reduce the impact of electronic jamming.
The objective is clear: saturate Ukrainian air defenses before delivering the most destructive payloads.
The Strategy Imposes an Unfavorable Economic Exchange on Ukraine
Intercepting a glide bomb is technically possible, but doing so on a large scale is extremely difficult.
Using an expensive surface-to-air missile against a weapon built around a legacy bomb creates a severely disadvantageous economic exchange ratio. Furthermore, placing a Patriot system close enough to the front to threaten Su-34s increases the risk of that high-value air defense asset being detected and destroyed.
The most effective solution remains targeting the launch aircraft directly.
However, Ukrainian F-16s equipped with AIM-120 missiles must approach dangerously close to Russian defenses to engage Su-34s operating dozens of kilometers behind their own lines. RUSI notes that the expected arrival of Swedish Gripens equipped with Meteor missiles could alter this balance due to their superior engagement range.
This operational shift is examined in the strategic impact of the Meteor missile against Russian Su-34s.
Russia Protects Its Aircraft but Shifts Vulnerability to Airbases
Standoff strikes do not render Russian aviation invulnerable.
While reducing operational risk during missions, this doctrine concentrates aircraft at a smaller number of airbases. Recognizing this, Ukraine has escalated deep strikes against airfields, ammunition depots, and strategic bombers.
The Tu-95 fleet represents a notable vulnerability. In 2025, RUSI estimated the active fleet at slightly over 60 aircraft, alongside roughly 20 Tu-160s capable of launching the Kh-101. Because the Tu-95 has been out of production for decades, any destroyed airframe is essentially irreplaceable.
Ukrainian attacks on Russian bomber bases have thus opened a second front in the air war: rather than attempting to intercept every missile mid-flight, Kyiv aims to destroy the launch platform prior to takeoff.
Russia Has Transformed an Initial Weakness into a Systemic Warfare Strategy
Moscow still lacks complete air supremacy over Ukraine. Its aircraft explicitly avoid portions of enemy airspace because opposing air defenses remain lethal.
However, this limitation no longer implies that Russian aviation is ineffective.
By converting legacy bomb stockpiles into guided munitions, heavily utilizing the Su-34, and integrating cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and drones into massive multi-axis salvos, Russia has constructed a model of airpower rooted in distance, mass, and attrition.
The implications extend well beyond Ukraine. For NATO forces, the key lesson is clear: a modern air defense system must do more than intercept a small number of sophisticated missiles. It must be capable of absorbing hundreds of relatively inexpensive munitions while conserving sufficient interceptors for the highest-tier threats.
Modern air warfare is thus challenging a long-held assumption: the most advanced aircraft is not necessarily the one that delivers the greatest operational impact. In the Russian model, the aircraft functions primarily as a launch platform for a continuous ammunition pipeline. The primary weapon has become the strike rate itself.