At El Alamein, Russia presents the Su-57E with S-71 drones and prepares the Su-57D to command the Okhotnik and swarms.
In Summary
At the El Alamein International Airshow, held in Egypt from September 8 to 10, 2026, Moscow presented a new doctrinal evolution of the Su-57. The fighter is no longer sold merely as a fifth-generation stealth aircraft. It is becoming the core of a system combining crewed aircraft, uncrewed effectors, and autonomous munitions. The Su-57E is notably presented with the S-71M and S-71K, two low-observable weapons designed to be launched from the fighter. In parallel, the new two-seat Su-57D is to test control of the S-70 Okhotnik, drone groups, and artificial intelligence functions. This manned-unmanned teaming strategy also addresses a Russian vulnerability: the Su-57 remains produced in low volumes. Moscow is therefore seeking to increase the military effect of each aircraft while relaunching an export campaign whose new customers remain undisclosed.
The Su-57E Becomes the Showcase for a Combat System Rather Than an Aircraft
The appearance of the Su-57E at El Alamein is significant for two reasons. It marks the first presentation of the Russian fighter at a major African airshow. Above all, United Aircraft Corporation and Rostec are no longer presenting the Su-57 in isolation.
Around the aircraft now appear weapons and drones designed specifically to operate alongside it.
This evolution brings Russian doctrine closer to concepts developed in the United States, Europe, and China: a piloted fighter remains the decision-making center, but delegates part of detection, reconnaissance, jamming, or strike duties to uncrewed platforms.
The Sukhoi Su-57 Felon thus becomes a sort of aerial node. Its value no longer depends solely on its radars, missiles, and stealth. It also depends on the number of effectors it can launch or coordinate.
This is the principle of manned-unmanned teaming.
The S-71s Transform the Fighter into an Advanced Launch Platform
Rostec took advantage of the Egyptian airshow to publicly unveil the S-71M and S-71K. The manufacturer presents them as low-observability uncrewed platforms featuring significant range and high speed.
Reuters describes both systems as hybrid weapons, positioned on the boundary between a cruise missile and an attack drone. A Rosoboronexport representative described them as being completely “neither a drone nor a missile.”
This ambiguity is revealing.
The S-71K Prioritizes a Relatively Simple and Economical Strike
The S-71K Kovyor is the better documented of the two. Ukrainian military intelligence published a technical analysis in April 2026 based on wreckage recovered following its use in Ukraine.
The weapon is powered by a small R500 turbojet engine. It carries a warhead derived from a 250 kg OFAB-250-270 bomb and reportedly relies primarily on inertial navigation to reach a target whose coordinates are designated prior to launch.
Its range is estimated at approximately 300 km. Its speed is reported to remain subsonic.
The principle is therefore not to build an extremely sophisticated missile. It consists of producing a relatively simple weapon that is difficult to detect due to its shaping and compact enough to be deployed from a low-observable aircraft.
This logic also enables the Su-57 to execute strikes without penetrating deep into areas covered by adversary air defenses.
The S-71M Introduces Greater Autonomy
The S-71M Monokhrom appears to follow a different logic. Available information describes it more as a jet-powered loitering munition capable of searching for a target following launch.
However, Rostec remains much less specific than certain Russian publications regarding its true capabilities. Detailed figures for range, warhead size, or loiter time have not been officially confirmed.
This is an important distinction. At El Alamein, Moscow demonstrated a credible family of weapons mature enough to have been deployed. On the other hand, it has not publicly demonstrated all the autonomous capabilities attributed to them.
The Su-57D Aims to Become an Airborne Command Post
The second element of the Russian strategy lies in the Su-57D, whose two-seat prototype completed its maiden flight on May 19, 2026.
United Aircraft Corporation assigns it three functions: training, combat, and command of mixed aerial formations combining crewed and uncrewed platforms.
The benefit of the second crew member is clear. Controlling multiple drones, analyzing their sensors, modifying their missions, and supervising their weapons represents a considerable cognitive workload. Assigning this to a pilot tasked simultaneously with maneuvering a fighter in a hostile environment quickly becomes unrealistic.
The second operator must therefore become a form of airborne mission commander.
Sukhoi indicates an intent to use the Su-57D to test control of the S-70 Okhotnik, as well as drone groups or swarms. UAC also references experiments related to combat artificial intelligence.
However, objective capabilities must be separated from target goals. No public operational demonstration has yet shown a Su-57D effectively controlling a drone swarm.
The concept is serious. Its operational maturity remains to be proven.
The S-70 Okhotnik Highlights Both Potential and Challenges
The paired development of the Su-57 and S-70 Okhotnik has been underway for several years.
The S-70 is a large flying-wing combat drone. It is intended to operate ahead of the fighter, carry weapons, and transmit data to the Su-57 crew.
Yet its development has also highlighted the difficulties of collaborative combat.
On October 5, 2024, an S-70 operating over Ukraine was shot down by a Russian aircraft, highly likely after its operators lost control of the platform. Video footage showed a fighter firing an air-to-air missile at the drone before it crashed in Ukrainian-controlled territory.
The incident is technically significant. A loyal wingman is only useful if its data link remains reliable under jamming, if it can maintain certain functions following a communication loss, and if it does not become a source of intelligence for the enemy in the event of a failure.
The Su-57D is intended precisely to help resolve part of this challenge.
The Su-57’s Numerical Weakness Drives Moscow Toward Drones
The Russian strategy also has a much more pragmatic justification: Moscow does not possess hundreds of Su-57s.
The contract signed in 2019 provides for 76 aircraft by 2028 for the Russian armed forces. However, the quantities actually delivered remain difficult to verify, as UAC generally announces “batches” without disclosing the exact number of aircraft involved.
The production rate of military aircraft like the Su-57 remains a weak point of the program.
The Komsomolsk-on-Amur plant was modernized and expanded to increase production rates. Nevertheless, Russia continues to rely on complex supply chains for certain electronic components, manufacturing equipment, and materials.
Western sanctions have not halted this industry. However, they have made it more costly and more dependent on indirect import routes. A study by the Royal United Services Institute identified numerous foreign components and equipment items in Sukhoi supply chains transiting through countries such as China, Belarus, and Kyrgyzstan.
The military calculation thus becomes logical: when an advanced fighter remains scarce, each aircraft must command greater combat power.
Losses in Ukraine Underscore the Value of Every Airframe
The war in Ukraine reinforces this constraint.
In June 2024, a Su-57 parked at the Akhtubinsk air base, approximately 590 km from the front line, was damaged during a Ukrainian drone attack. Satellite imagery confirmed explosions in the immediate vicinity of the aircraft.
In April 2026, Ukraine subsequently claimed to have damaged two additional Su-57s at the Shagol air base near Chelyabinsk. The attack was acknowledged by Ukrainian military authorities as having hit several aircraft, but the exact extent of the damage inflicted on the Su-57s was not independently verified.
It would therefore be excessive to speak of heavy attrition in flight. The issue is different: every airframe lost or grounded carries immense weight when the available fleet numbers only a few dozen units.
Drones allow risk to be shifted precisely toward less valuable platforms.
Su-57E Exports Remain Veiled in Secrecy
Moscow is simultaneously seeking to turn this new architecture into a commercial selling point.
On the eve of El Alamein, Alexander Mikheev, Director General of Rosoboronexport, announced the signing of new contracts for the Su-57E. According to him, execution of commitments toward new foreign clients is set to begin in 2026.
However, no countries were named. No aircraft quantities were announced. No contract values were published.
Rosoboronexport indicates only that its total order backlog exceeds $60 billion. This figure applies to all Russian armaments combined and therefore does not measure the specific commercial success of the Su-57.
This represents a major difference from Western programs with public orders and schedules. The new Su-57E contracts remain unverified until the aircraft are observed with their customers.
Russia Seeks to Multiply Power Rather Than Aircraft
The Russian Su-57 is thus entering an interesting phase of its development.
Moscow knows that in the short term, it will be difficult to field as many fifth-generation fighters as the United States and its allies can field with the F-35. Its response is therefore to broaden the very definition of an air force.
A Su-57 can launch S-71s. A Su-57D could command multiple drones. An S-70 could take greater risks than a piloted aircraft. Other effectors could tomorrow saturate defenses or extend the group’s detection radius.
On paper, the multiplication factor is potent: a few dozen fighters can generate a far higher number of platforms and weapons in the airspace.
However, this architecture compensates for low volumes on one condition: that communications, autonomy, drone production, and system integration perform reliably in contested environments.
It is precisely there that the credibility of the Russian concept will be tested. El Alamein demonstrates that Moscow now knows how to present a Su-57 lead-pack fighter. Turning that promise into a mass-produced military capability remains a much harder step to achieve.
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