Following heavy MQ-9 losses in Iran, the US Air Force is accelerating the MMA: a lower-cost, modular drone built to fight in large numbers.
In Summary
The US Air Force is accelerating the Massed Modular Aircraft program, or MMA, after sustaining heavy MQ-9A Reaper losses during the war against Iran. At least 45 Reapers are reported lost, representing roughly a quarter of the American fleet. Washington intends to shift its approach. Rather than replacing an expensive drone with an even more sophisticated platform, the USAF is seeking an aircraft that is cheaper, modular, and mass-produced. The discussed target is at least 180 platforms, featuring an airframe cost of around $10 million, excluding sensors and mission systems. The MMA will be required to carry a payload of at least 1,270 kg (2,800 lb), feature a combat radius of at least 4,260 km (2,300 nm), and absorb a level of attrition that is unacceptable with the MQ-9. Underlying these specifications is a major doctrine shift: survivability will no longer rely solely on technology, but also on numbers.
MQ-9 Losses in Iran Abruptly Shift US Calculations
For two decades, the MQ-9 Reaper aligned perfectly with American conflicts against adversaries operating limited air defense systems. It could loiter for extended periods, monitor an area, and strike targets with AGM-114 Hellfire missiles or guided bombs.
Iran has just demonstrated the limits of this concept.
According to several US officials cited by defense media and The Washington Post, at least 45 MQ-9s have been lost since the start of operations against Iran. This represents approximately a quarter of the operational fleet available at the beginning of the conflict.
The issue is not that the Reaper is ineffective. The Chief of Staff of the US Air Force even characterized it as one of the most useful assets in the operation. The issue is economic.
A fully equipped MQ-9A, complete with sensors, communications, and mission hardware, represents tens of millions of dollars. The US Air Force estimates it cannot sustainably endure such a rate of attrition.
The Reaper remains a large, relatively slow turboprop drone. Its cruising speed is close to 370 km/h (200 kt). Its signature and performance profile do not allow it to survive over extended periods near modern surface-to-air defenses.
Against Iran, this has already proved problematic. Against China, it would become critical.
The Massed Modular Aircraft Inverts the Reaper’s Logic
The Massed Modular Aircraft is therefore based on a different premise: designing an attritable platform from the outset.
The term does not imply that the drone is disposable. It means its loss must remain economically and operationally acceptable. A force can lose several platforms while continuing its mission.
This represents a profound shift in how modern military aircraft are conceived.
The USAF is not primarily requesting exceptional stealth or revolutionary propulsion. It wants proven technologies, rapid production, and an architecture simple enough to keep costs down.
Lieutenant General Christopher Niemi, responsible for US Air Force modernization, now references a requirement of at least 180 MMAs.
The cost target is particularly aggressive: roughly $10 million for the airframe, or about half the target price of a Collaborative Combat Aircraft. However, this figure does not necessarily include sensors, communications, weapons, and mission equipment.
This distinction is essential. A fully equipped MMA will cost more.
Required Performance Remains That of a Large Drone
The MMA will nevertheless not be a small, consumable drone.
The Defense Innovation Unit solicitation demands a minimum payload of 1,270 kg (2,800 lb). For comparison, the MQ-9A has a published maximum capacity close to 1,700 kg.
The required combat radius reaches at least 4,260 km (2,300 nm) with payload. For a one-way deployment, the drone must be capable of traveling at least 14,800 km (8,000 nm).
These operational ranges directly address the geographical constraints of the Pacific.
The platform will also need to exceed approximately 370 km/h (200 kt) and operate from runways shorter than 1,830 m (6,000 ft), including facilities less prepared than traditional main air bases.
Washington is also requiring a power margin of at least 25 kW of electrical power and approximately 5 kW of cooling capacity to host varied mission payloads.
The MMA could thus serve interchangeably as an ISR platform, communications relay, electronic warfare asset, or strike vector.
Modularity Must Prevent the Next Drone from Aging Too Quickly
The true innovation may prove less visible than its aerodynamic performance.
The program mandates a Modular Open Systems Approach. Hardware and software interfaces must be open and standardized to allow rapid swap-outs of sensors, radios, or software code.
A traditional system can require several years of development to integrate a single piece of new equipment. The MMA is designed to radically shorten this cycle.
This architecture aligns with the logic of the stealth fighter jets and autonomous systems developed alongside next-generation platforms.
Specifically, the US Air Force intends to reuse government architectures developed for CCAs. It also aims to transition from traditional piloting to a framework where a single operator supervises multiple drones.
Communications will rely on a combination of SATCOM and mesh networks. If the primary link is severed, the aircraft must be capable of executing certain functions locally.
This progressively bridges traditional ISR drones with autonomous combat systems.
Mass Becomes a New Form of Protection
The most compelling principle of the MMA relates to survivability.
A B-21 or future F-47 is engineered to avoid detection using stealth, electronic warfare, and highly complex systems.
The MMA adopts a different logic: protection is also derived from mass.
Deploying twenty platforms instead of four forces an adversary to detect more targets, commit more radars, and expend more surface-to-air missiles. Even if multiple drones are destroyed, the remainder can execute the mission.
The cost of interception thus becomes a strategic variable.
Destroying a $10 million drone with a surface-to-air missile costing several million dollars remains feasible. However, repeating the process dozens or hundreds of times depletes inventories and exposes battery positions.
This approach mirrors developments surrounding high-altitude fighter jet speed and performance parameters in contested airspace. Washington is clearly preparing for a conflict in which the sheer quantity of available platforms will be nearly as decisive as their individual sophistication.
General Atomics’ Wildfire Already Demonstrates Industrial Ambition
General Atomics, manufacturer of the MQ-9, naturally has no intention of ceding this market.
The company is developing a new drone designated Wildfire. While few official specifications have been released, General Atomics points to particularly ambitious goals.
The manufacturer is working toward a ferry range of up to 18,500 km (10,000 nm), the capacity to carry up to four AGM-158C LRASM anti-ship missiles, and operating formations of up to 100 aircraft under semi-autonomous control.
These figures should not yet be considered contracted performance metrics. However, they indicate the trajectory being pursued by industry.
The USAF initially seeks to obtain a full-scale prototype rapidly. The solicitation issued in July indicated a first flight within 21 months of contract award and 20 operational aircraft by Fiscal Year 2031. Following the losses in Iran, Secretary of the Air Force Troy Meink requested a further acceleration of the timeline. The objective stated in early September is now to demonstrate a prototype approximately one year after selection.
The MQ-9 Gives Way to an Economy of Aerial Warfare
The MMA program reflects a straightforward lesson from recent conflicts: an aircraft can be outstanding yet still become economically unsuited for a war of attrition.
During counterterrorism campaigns, losing an occasional MQ-9 was tolerable. Losing dozens of platforms in a matter of months completely changes the equation.
The US Air Force is therefore not abandoning high-end drones. It is building a layered force. The F-47 and B-21 will deploy high-cost technologies to penetrate the most heavily defended airspace. CCAs will escort manned fighters. MMAs will provide depth, surveillance, strike capacity, and, above all, mass.
The American wager is now clear: stop demanding that every platform survive at all costs.
In a war against a peer nation capable of regularly destroying US aircraft, Washington wants to replace losses faster than the adversary can inflict them. It is less dramatic than unveiling a new stealth aircraft. But in a prolonged conflict, this industrial capability could prove far more decisive.
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