On October 17, 2025, the frigate Forbin successfully intercepted an A2SM bomb using an Aster 30 missile. High-intensity exercise and lessons learned for the French Navy.
Summary
On October 17, 2025, the frigate Forbin, an air defense vessel of the French Navy, successfully fired an Aster 30 missile at an A2SM (Armement Air-Sol Modulaire) bomb launched in an exercise scenario simulating a high-intensity threat. This exercise implements the PAAMS naval combat system and confirms the frigate’s automated engagement capability in area defense. The training aims to prepare crews to contest airspace at sea, particularly against precision air-to-ground weapons. The French Navy’s ability to adapt its resources to new types of threats is thus reinforced: the Forbin proves that it can intercept not only fighters and missiles, but also air-launched guided bombs. This event redefines the tactical requirements of naval defense in operation.
The operational and tactical context of the interception
The French Navy is engaged in a strategic environment where air threats are rapidly evolving: drones, cruise missiles, long-range guided bombs. In this context, the frigate Forbin was put to the test in an offshore exercise scenario, simulating the launch of an A2SM bomb by a fighter aircraft (most likely a Rafale M). The target, designed for a low, fast trajectory with maneuverability, required a rapid response and precise guidance. The firing of the Aster 30 destroyed the munition before it reached its terminal phase: the defeat of a realistic target marks a milestone in the naval fight against air and air-sea threats. This type of exercise confirms the relevance of the integrated naval air defense concept, in which the Forbin, with its Heracles multi-function radar and PAAMS combat system, acts as the central element of an anti-air barrier.
The technical sequence of the interception by Forbin
During the engagement, the frigate’s Heracles radar detected the A2SM bomb in a slow descent phase at low altitude after being launched from an aircraft. The PAAMS (Principal Anti-Air Missile System) calculated a firing solution, activated the Sylver A50 vertical silo, and launched the Aster 30 missile from the frigate. The missile, with its range of approximately 100 km (capable of engaging long-range threats) and high maneuverability, intercepted the target before it entered its final impact phase. The interception was “largely automated,” meaning that the detection-processing-firing chain was carried out with a high level of autonomy, reducing human latency. This automation is a key element in responding to high-speed or unpredictable trajectory threats. The technical success demonstrates the combined performance of the sensors, tactical computing, and missile, validating Forbin’s ability to neutralize unconventional threats.
The role of the Aster 30 missile’s capabilities in this operation
The Aster 30 missile is the key element of the French Navy’s area defense. It complements the Aster 15 (range of approximately 30 km, for self-defense) in the air-to-air/air-to-surface anti-aircraft architecture. Thanks to its characteristics—active radar, two stages, high maneuverability, ability to engage missiles or aircraft—it can cover large areas and adapt to high-speed targets. In this operation, the Aster 30 demonstrated its ability to intercept not an aircraft but an air-launched guided bomb, which broadens the spectrum of threats covered. This capability increases the resilience of naval groups in the face of multiple or combined attacks. Thus, the use of an area defense missile becomes indispensable as threats evolve toward precision weapons with low trajectories or surprise attacks.
The importance of training and high intensity for the French Navy
The exercise illustrated by this interception is no ordinary drill: it simulates a high-intensity scenario with a precise, rapid, potentially stealthy, and demanding threat. For French Navy crews, this means maintaining a high level of preparedness, automating certain responses, and ensuring system-crew coordination and the validity of procedures. These training exercises provide valuable lessons: rapid equipment activation, radar surveillance responses, management of enemy electronic spoilers, and implementation of countermeasures. They help to strengthen the French Navy’s combat capabilities, develop naval air defense doctrine, and adapt to “new forms of conflict.” By confronting these threats, the Navy validates its ability to protect carrier strike groups, strategic vessels, and deployment areas outside mainland France.
Lessons learned for naval defense architecture
Several technical and strategic lessons can be learned. First, the interception of air-to-surface guided weapons via ship-to-air defense missiles shows that naval vessels are no longer just targets or projection platforms, but active nodes in network-centric defense. Second, the automation of the process (detection-fire) paves the way for faster reaction chains, which are essential for countering impulsive munitions. Finally, the demonstration reinforces the value of long-range missiles and area defense: in a context where attacks come not only from “conventional” bombs, but also from anti-ship missiles, drones, and gliding bombs, the ability to intercept early and from a distance makes all the difference. For the French Navy, it also validates its investment in the Horizon class, the PAAMS system, and multi-sensor naval air defense concepts.
Prospects and limitations of the system
Although this interception was successful, certain limitations and questions remain. The test took place in the context of a scheduled exercise, with a known target and controlled conditions. In real-world operations, the presence of jamming, saturation, decoys, or coastal risks can complicate the engagement. Dependence on high-performance sensors, data networks, and equipment in good condition requires rigorous maintenance. Furthermore, as the number of Aster missiles on board is limited (Forbin has a limited number of Sylver A50 cells), the ability to absorb a massive attack remains to be tested. Finally, while the target was a bomb with a known trajectory, engaging multiple simultaneous targets remains a challenge. It is now up to the French Navy to develop this capability in a variety of conditions and integrate it into its plans for escorting aircraft carriers, whether in coastal waters or on the high seas.
Implications for the French Navy and maritime superiority
The demonstration by the frigate Forbin opens a new chapter for the French Navy. It confirms that the ship can provide extensive protection for French naval groups, including the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle, against threats that are no longer just aerial but “hybrid” in their trajectory, speed, or origin. The ability to neutralize a guided bomb in transit redefines the concept of naval survival space. This may deter an adversary from resorting to saturation air attacks or gliding bombs against French or allied naval groups. At a time when naval competition is intensifying and threats are diversifying, this interception constitutes a significant tactical and strategic advantage.
The success of this operation underscores that the French Navy remains capable of “anticipating” rather than “reacting”: by training its personnel, validating its systems, and testing high-intensity scenarios, it maintains a credible posture. The Forbin, and more broadly the Horizon class, confirm their role in major area defense. The challenge now is to generalize the learning process, extend capabilities to other ships, and fully integrate into allied naval defense architectures.
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