With the CCA, the US Air Force aims to move from prototype to mass production. Budget, supply chain, exports: the industrial challenge is as risky as the military one.
In summary
The US Air Force is entering a decisive phase of its Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) programme. After two years of accelerated development, General Atomics’ YFQ-42A Dark Merlin and Anduril’s YFQ-44A Fury prototypes are no longer merely experimental. They are paving the way for the production of a new type of collaborative combat aircraft, designed to support the F-35A, the F-22 and the future F-47 of the NGAD programme. The objective remains clear: to create an affordable fleet capable of increasing the number of sensors, missiles and platforms available without increasing the number of pilots or manned aircraft. But the programme is reaching its real sticking point. The more the USAF demands in terms of stealth, survivability, range and endurance, the further the unit price is likely to drift from the initial promise. The CCA is therefore as much a military test as an industrial one.
The CCA programme moves from the laboratory to the workshop
The Collaborative Combat Aircraft programme marks a profound shift in the way the US Air Force envisions its future air superiority. It is not about replacing the pilot. It is about providing them with unmanned teammates, capable of going further, taking greater risks, carrying sensors or missiles, and complicating the adversary’s tactical calculations.
The operational concept is simple. An F-35A, an F-22 or, in the future, an F-47 would no longer fly alone. It would be accompanied by one or more semi-autonomous combat drones. These aircraft could detect a threat, transmit data, jam radar, carry air-to-air missiles or act as decoys in a congested environment. The human pilot would remain in the decision-making loop, particularly regarding the use of weapons. But air formations would no longer be limited solely by the number of manned aircraft available.
The USAF has taken a significant step by officially designating the first two prototypes: the YFQ-42A Dark Merlin from General Atomics and the YFQ-44A Fury from Anduril. The FQ designation is significant. F refers to the fighter function. Q indicates an unmanned system. The Y specifies that these are still prototypes. This nomenclature lends military legitimacy to a category that did not yet exist in US combat aviation.
The choice of General Atomics and Anduril also sends an industrial signal. General Atomics embodies the experience accumulated with the Predator, Reaper, Avenger and SkyGuardian families. Anduril represents a new generation of defence players, closer to software, autonomy, rapid production and venture capital. The USAF wants to pit these two worlds against each other. This is healthy. It is also brutal. The winner will not simply be the one that flies. It will be the one that produces quickly, integrates weapons, controls costs and embraces an iteration cycle closer to that of digital technology than to traditional fighter programmes.
The YFQ-42A and YFQ-44A are progressing at different paces
General Atomics’ YFQ-42A Dark Merlin made its maiden flight in August 2025. It is based on a modular design derived from the company’s work on the XQ-67A and the MQ-20 Avenger. General Atomics advocates a so-called ‘family of aircraft’ approach, with a common core that can be adapted to multiple missions. This method aims to reduce development costs, speed up the production of variants and facilitate maintenance.
However, the programme has been given a useful reality check. In April 2026, a YFQ-42A was lost following an incident during take-off at a General Atomics test site in California. No injuries were reported. The investigation attributed the accident to a software error related to the automatic calculation of mass and centre of gravity. The aircraft was destroyed, but ground testing and maturation work continued. Flight operations resumed after approximately six weeks, once the software corrections had been validated.
This incident does not spell the end for the Dark Merlin. On the contrary, it illustrates the cultural shift that the USAF claims to embrace: identifying risks during the testing phase, before entry into service, rather than discovering them in the field. But it also serves as a reminder that aerial autonomy is not merely about spectacular artificial intelligence. Basic functions, such as take-off, flight control, stabilisation, mission management and return to base, must be flawless. An autonomous combat drone remains, first and foremost, an aircraft.
Anduril’s YFQ-44A Fury, meanwhile, made its maiden flight in October 2025. Anduril highlights a highly unusual development speed, moving from initial design to flight in less than two years. Its apparent advantage lies in its industrial culture. The company seeks to design systems that are simpler to produce, with less reliance on rare materials or overly long supply chains. The Fury carries its weapons under the wings, whereas the Dark Merlin relies on internal weapon bays, which are better for stealth.
The difference is significant. An external missile simplifies integration and reduces costs. But it increases the radar signature. Internal weapon bays better protect stealth, but impose greater structural, thermal and mechanical complexity. This trade-off sums up the whole dilemma of the CCA: a drone simple enough to be mass-produced, yet survivable enough not to be useless in high-intensity combat.
Cost becomes the true deciding factor for the programme
The political crux of the CCA programme lies in two words: affordable mass production. The USAF knows it cannot win a major conflict with only manned aircraft costing over $100 million each, especially in the Pacific, where distances are vast and enemy defences are very dense.
Former Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall had proposed a planning baseline of around 1,000 CCA. This figure came from a simple calculation: two drones for every 200 NGAD platforms and two drones for every 300 F-35s. This estimate is not a firm order. It is an order of magnitude to organise bases, training, logistics, firing ranges, maintenance and stocks.
The initial cost target was around a third of the price of an F-35.
Depending on the batch and whether or not the engine is included, a recent F-35A often costs between 80 and over 100 million dollars. This placed the CCA in a theoretical range of around 25 to 35 million dollars per aircraft. US officials even claim that the programme would perform better than this target. We must remain cautious. Early prototypes never tell the whole story of fleet costs.
The budget paints a clearer picture. For the 2027 financial year, the US Air Force is requesting nearly $1 billion to launch the initial purchases of CCA Increment 1, plus research and development funding in excess of $1 billion. The total request for the programme stands at around $2.3 to $2.4 billion. This is no longer a demonstration. It is the start of a budgetary acquisition chain.
The risk is clear. If the USAF gradually adds more stealth, more electronic warfare, more sensors, more fuel, more redundancy and more survivability, the CCA could become a small unmanned fighter, but with a fighter’s price tag. At that point, the concept loses its appeal. The CCA only makes sense if it remains good enough, not if it becomes perfect.
The supply chain becomes an industrial battleground
The CCA’s supply chain will be one of the most important indicators to watch in 2026 and 2027. Producing a few prototypes is one thing. Producing dozens, then hundreds of aircraft with engines, computers, actuators, data links, sensors and weaponry available in sufficient quantities is quite another.
Engines are a key sticking point. Collaborative combat drones require reliable, compact, sufficiently powerful and affordable propulsion systems. Anduril has sought to rely on commercial or mass-produced engines to avoid bottlenecks. GE Aerospace, for its part, is working on the GE426, a medium-class engine designed for autonomous combat aircraft. This battle over propulsion is strategic. A CCA that is inexpensive on paper will be of no use if its engine becomes scarce, expensive or difficult to certify.
The second major challenge concerns electronics. CCAs must incorporate an open architecture, secure data links, on-board computers, autonomy software, sensors and identification systems. The USAF is promoting the Autonomy Government Reference Architecture, or A-GRA, to avoid vendor lock-in. The objective is clear: to separate the mission software from the aircraft, so that algorithms, suppliers or versions can be changed without having to rebuild the entire platform.
This approach is crucial. It can reduce costs and speed up updates. But it requires a very high level of technical discipline. Interfaces must be stable. Responsibilities must be clear. In the event of an incident, the USAF will need to know whether the cause lies with the autopilot, the mission software, the sensor, the data link or the human operator. Modularity is a strength only if it does not turn maintenance into a constant investigation.
Physical production constitutes the third challenge. Anduril has launched Arsenal-1, its manufacturing facility near Columbus, Ohio, to produce autonomous systems in volume. The factory must also serve other families of drones and missiles. This approach contrasts sharply with traditional aerospace production lines. It promises higher throughput and less dependence on major prime contractors.
But the US defence sector has often seen highly ambitious factories falter over certification, quality, subcontractors and configuration control. Industrialisation will determine whether Anduril is a new model or merely an excellent communicator.
Weapons transform the CCA into a true combat multiplier
The move towards weapons integration is changing the nature of the programme. In February 2026, the USAF demonstrated the YFQ-44A Fury with an inert AIM-120 AMRAAM missile in a captive carry test. This type of test does not involve firing. It serves to verify that the aircraft can carry the weapon safely, that aerodynamic loads remain under control, that vibrations are acceptable, that the interfaces function, and that future separation can be tested.
The aim is to move towards live firing. The USAF emphasises a key point: the human retains firing authority. This clarification is not trivial. It addresses legal, political and operational concerns regarding autonomous weapons. Under the current concept, the drone can fly, manoeuvre and carry out a mission with a high degree of autonomy. But the decision to employ a lethal weapon remains within the chain of command.
The CCA’s primary role will likely be air-to-air. It will be able to carry missiles, move closer to the threat, extend the detection bubble and increase the number of available shots within a formation. An F-35A has excellent detection and data fusion capabilities, but its internal payload remains limited if it is to maintain its stealth. Adding UCAVs means adding missiles without adding pilots.
Ultimately, subsequent versions could carry out electronic warfare, reconnaissance, target designation or air-to-ground strikes. Increment 1 seems primarily designed to move quickly and validate the architecture. Increment 2 could be more ambitious, with greater range, survivability and a wider range of missions. This is where costs could spiral out of control.
The F-47 gives the CCA a central role in NGAD
The CCA should not be analysed in isolation. It is part of a broader system of systems, that of Next Generation Air Dominance. The F-47, entrusted to Boeing for the engineering and development phase, will be the US Air Force’s sixth-generation manned fighter. It is set to gradually replace the F-22 in the air superiority role.
The F-47 will likely be more than a conventional fighter aircraft. It will serve as a hub for command, sensors and collaborative combat. Its value will depend in part on its ability to control, coordinate and utilise remote platforms. In this framework, the CCA is not merely an accessory. It is an extension of the manned fighter.
This architecture addresses a very specific problem. In a conflict against a power such as China, forward bases, refuelling aircraft, radar aircraft and fighters would be threatened by ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, surface-to-air systems and enemy fighters. The American response is to disperse the load. Instead of concentrating power in a few very expensive manned aircraft, the USAF wants to distribute sensors and weapons across multiple platforms.
But this approach raises a difficult question: who commands what, at what range, using which data link, in the event of jamming or loss of communication? The CCA must be autonomous without becoming uncontrollable. It must be connected without becoming dependent on the network.
It must be intelligent enough to act, but not so free as to create a political risk. It is a fine line.
The international market is already preparing
The CCA programme will have commercial implications beyond the United States. In 2026, the Netherlands formalised a partnership with the US Air Force to acquire prototypes and participate in experimental work. This decision makes sense. The Royal Netherlands Air Force operates the F-35A. It is therefore seeking to understand at a very early stage how collaborative drones could enhance a fifth-generation fleet.
This initial international opening is significant. It shows that the market will not be limited to the USAF. Countries already using the F-35, both in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, will view the CCA as a potential extension of their existing fleet. The natural candidates are allies closely integrated into US architectures: the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, Italy, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Poland, South Korea and Singapore.
The market potential is significant. If a country cannot afford a larger fleet of manned fighters, it may seek to purchase a limited number of collaborative drones to increase the scale of its air patrols. But exports will not be automatic. The United States will have to balance industrial benefits, technological control, cybersecurity, ITAR regulations and the risk of proliferation of armed autonomous systems.
The CCA may also reshape global competition. Boeing with the Australian MQ-28 Ghost Bat, Lockheed Martin with Vectis, Northrop Grumman with the YFQ-48A Talon, General Atomics, Anduril, Kratos, BAE Systems, Baykar and even Chinese players are all positioning themselves in the collaborative combat sector. This market will not be a mere extension of the MALE drone. It will be closer to a market for autonomous, connected, armed light fighters, produced in shorter but faster production runs.
The real test will be discipline, not technology
The CCA programme is appealing because it promises to solve several problems at once: lack of payload capacity, the cost of manned aircraft, risks to pilots, Chinese saturation, ageing fleets and the slowness of major programmes. But it will only succeed if the USAF maintains strict discipline.
This discipline must focus on requirements. A CCA does not need to be a cockpit-less F-35. It must be useful, produced in numbers, replaceable, upgradeable and sufficiently survivable to accomplish its mission. The natural temptation for the US defence establishment will be to add capabilities. More stealth. More sensors. More electronic warfare. More range. More redundancy. More certification. In the end, the drone risks becoming too expensive to be used boldly.
The second danger is industrial. The United States wants to move quickly, but military aviation is unforgiving. A fast production line must remain a qualified production line. Software must evolve without compromising flight safety. Subcontractors must keep up the pace. The engines must keep up. Missile stocks must be compatible with the drones that will carry them.
The third danger is doctrinal. A CCA will be of no use if pilots do not know how to use it, if military staff do not know how to integrate it, or if the rules of engagement negate its value.
The creation of the Experimental Operations Unit shows that the USAF has understood this. Operators’ feedback must influence the design now, not after delivery.
The CCA is therefore entering its most critical phase. The prototypes have proven that the concept can fly. Weapons trials show that it can be lethal. The budget indicates that the USAF is preparing for the purchase. The Netherlands demonstrates that allies are watching closely. The central question remains: will the United States be able to produce a combat drone capable enough to survive, yet simple enough to remain affordable? The entire credibility of future collaborative air warfare hinges on this.
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