The British army risks becoming obsolete in the face of drone warfare. Technical analysis of current limitations and urgent reforms.

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The war in Ukraine has shown that drones have become a key weapon, both for reconnaissance and strikes. Faced with this reality, the British army has begun to modernize its training, notably through a distributed training program and partnerships with the civilian sector. But this momentum is being hampered by an outdated and rigid regulatory framework imposed by the Military Aviation Authority (MAA), which severely restricts realistic training, notably by prohibiting flights beyond 2 kilometers out of line of sight and making the certification of armed drones too slow. The challenge is clear: without urgent adaptation of the regulatory framework and a coherent industrial policy, the British military will remain behind on the modern battlefield. This article examines the operational, industrial, and regulatory implications of this lag.

An operational revolution driven by drone warfare

The conflict in Ukraine has established the use of combat drones as a central tool in modern warfare. According to recent estimates, drones are involved in 80% of human casualties on the front line, all causes combined. This overwhelming share highlights a major shift in military practices: superiority no longer relies solely on tanks, artillery, or manned aircraft, but on the ability to operate low-cost, modular drones in very large numbers.

Towards a new ground tactic

The drones used range from modified amateur quadcopters to semi-autonomous aircraft transported by civilian trucks. Some are fiber-optic, guided by cable, and therefore immune to jamming. Others, soon to be fully autonomous, will no longer be vulnerable to electromagnetic interference. Their behavior is similar to “aerial sniping”: they remain hidden in vegetation or urban cover, waiting for a moving target, and attack at very close range.

This type of threat makes armored vehicles extremely vulnerable, particularly in densely populated areas or at choke points (bridges, intersections, rivers). Even logistics vehicles, command centers, and military engineering equipment become priority targets, leading to complete disruption of joint operations in the absence of effective protection.

The inadequacy of current countermeasures

Countermeasures to this threat are lagging far behind. Jamming can be circumvented by frequency hopping. Directed energy weapons offer promising prospects, but struggle to operate effectively at short range, especially in a saturated environment. Detecting wire-guided drones flying at low altitude and masked by radar clutter (background noise) remains problematic. However, modern conflicts, particularly in urban environments, reinforce this visual and electronic saturation effect.

Effective technical training, but limited by the current framework

The British Army has launched several promising initiatives to integrate the use of military drones into its training programs. The most significant initiative is the creation of a Drone Academy, in partnership with jHUB, aimed at providing modular and distributed training tailored to the diversity of units.

Distributed training adapted to operational realities

The training is based on a decentralized model, with courses based on FPV (First Person View) piloting via simulator and drone racing. Unlike traditional military courses, access is not conditional on a prior module, but on a practical skills test. This model has two advantages:

• It values skills acquired in civilian life, particularly in drone racing or digital leisure activities.
• It selects motivated candidates who are capable of self-training, which is necessary to maintain technical skills that are susceptible to “skill fade.”

This natural filtering process reinforces the consistency of the training program. It also limits wasted time, unlike more traditional training courses that teach the basics to already experienced operators (such as the example given of driving Land Rover vehicles).

An insufficiently structured second line

To become a credible operational force, the army must have a second line capable of supporting a mass commitment. This requires faster, reservist-oriented training and support for civilian structures, such as the British Army Drone Sports Association, which enable the low-cost development of a critical mass of competent operators.

Despite these efforts, a major structural obstacle is holding back the entire system: the current regulatory framework.

Regulation ill-suited to the realities of the battlefield

The Military Aviation Authority (MAA) is responsible for regulating military flights, including armed and unarmed drones. Its doctrine is based on a logic designed for manned aviation, with requirements that are ill-suited to semi-disposable systems that can be modified at very short notice and are often operated at very low altitudes.

Restrictions too heavy for training

The MAA limits most units to beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS) flights to a maximum of 2 kilometers, a ridiculous range compared to the engagements observed in Ukraine (often between 5 and 15 kilometers). This threshold does not allow for training in realistic conditions, particularly for long-range observation, signal relay, or indirect strike missions.

Conversely, the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) authorizes much longer flights, provided that the operator provides a documented Operating Safety Case. This risk analysis validation model should be transferred to the military, in a simplified form, to ensure rapid skill development across all units, not just artillery.

Certification unsuited to innovation cycles

The second major obstacle is the certification of armed drones. As things stand, no small armed drones are certified for ground use by the British military. However, the development cycles for these drones are measured in weeks. Without an accelerated certification system (less than 30 days), the equipment put into service will be systematically overtaken by the latest versions available.

This delay condemns the army to train with obsolete equipment, weakening the operational value of training. The other two branches of the armed forces (the Navy and the RAF) are less affected, as they focus on heavier drones or those operated over the sea, in an environment that is easier to regulate.

An industrial policy to be reconfigured around civilian drones

The British Army’s procurement policy remains too focused on traditional defense suppliers. This approach makes systems more expensive, more complex to mass produce, and often less adaptable to urgent needs.

Focus on civilian suppliers

Civilian drones are evolving very quickly and are produced at much lower costs. By selecting them as the basis for its equipment (with a few military adaptations), the military can:

• Reduce its unit costs (sometimes by a factor of 5 to 10).
• Guarantee immediate scalability in the event of conflict by mobilizing civilian production lines.
• Increase the number of civilian-military training programs, which strengthens the resilience of reserve forces.

This approach requires resisting pressure from major defense contractors, which offer expensive, sometimes oversized systems that are difficult to replace quickly.

Reduce industrial dependence on China

A large proportion of drone components, including optical sensors, batteries, and transmission modules, still come from China. This strategic supply risk should be addressed through an industrial policy focused on:

• Partial relocation of production to the United Kingdom.
• Partnerships with reliable technological allies (EU, US, Japan, Israel).

This also requires clear support for innovative SMEs that are able to deliver quickly and adapt to demands on the ground.

Reform to avoid tactical marginalization

The current training initiative offers a promising model. It is based on individualization of skills, a mass approach through reserves, and the use of civilian resources. But it cannot survive without regulatory reform.

Two simple measures would enable an effective transition:

1. Adopt a simplified BVLOS authorization model, inspired by the civilian system.
2. Create a fast-track certification process for armed drones, specific to the army.

Without this, the British army risks remaining structurally unable to compete with forces that are less constrained by regulations but better trained and equipped at low cost.

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